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ARTICLES
REFLECTIONS ON CALIFORNIA'S "AT WILL"
EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT JURISPRUDENCE
Rod M. Fliegel, Esq.*
I. INTRODUCTION
Garden-variety breach of contract claims are one of the
mainstays of the disgruntled former employee's wrongful ter-
mination arsenal.1 In a typical case, the plaintiff claims that
he or she was discharged in violation of an "implied-in-fact"
contract 2 not to terminate except for "good cause. "' As evi-
dence of the implied-in-fact contract, the employee points to
* Associate, Dillingham & Murphy in San Francisco, California. B.A.,
1989, Oberlin College; J.D., 1993, Golden Gate University School of Law. The
author is grateful to William F. Murphy, Professor David B. Oppenheimer, Jill
Frenkel and Georgette M. Pan for guidance and inspiration. For help editing
this article, the author wishes to thank Cara Elkin, Esq., and Wendy Wilbanks,
and the Santa Clara Law Review editorial staff.
1. This is explained in part by restrictions on tort recovery. See, e.g.,
Hunter v. Up-Right, 864 P.2d 88, 90-94 (Cal. 1993) (excluding misrepresenta-
tions used to effect termination from the range of actionable fraud); Livitsanos
v. Superior Court, 828 P.2d 1195, 1199-1204 (Cal. 1992) (holding the workers'
compensation system preempts claims for negligent and intentional infliction of
emotional distress based on "purely emotional" injury); Shoemaker v. Myers,
801 P.2d 1054, 1063-67 (Cal. 1990) (holding the workers' compensation system
preempts claims for negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress
arising from the plaintiffs discharge unless the plaintiffs discharge results
from risks not reasonably deemed within the compensation bargain or comes
within a specific statutory exception, e.g., "whistleblowing"); Foley v. Interac-
tive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 389-96 (Cal. 1988) (limiting recovery for breach
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing to contract damages).
2. "Implied" contract terms are established by conduct. CAL. Crv. CODE
§ 1621 (West 1985). "Express" contract terms are established using words. Id.
§ 1620. Beyond semantics, the distinction is largely one of proof. Bell v. Supe-
rior Court, 263 Cal. Rptr. 787, 789 (Ct. App. 1989). Implied terms "ordinarily
stand on equal footing with express terms." Foley, 765 P.2d at 385.
3. The good cause standard is discussed infra part II(A)(2).
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his or her years (or in some cases months)4 of company ser-
vice, to oral assurances of permanent employment, to the em-
ployer's personnel policies, and to his or her promotions, posi-
tive performance evaluations and salary increases.5 To
establish breach, the plaintiff then endeavors to show that
the reason asserted for termination did not amount to good
cause or was false and pretextual.6 Proof of both elements is
indispensable. Evidence of an implied-in-fact contract is nec-
essary to overcome the statutory presumption that the plain-
tiff was an "at will" employee, meaning an employee who
could be terminated for any lawful reason.7 Evidence of
breach is essential because damages are not available to a
plaintiff who merely demonstrates an implied-in-fact
contract.'
While experienced employment attorneys are accus-
tomed to seeing these issues, a new wrinkle is becoming in-
creasingly familiar to litigators on both sides of the fence.
Specifically, management-side attorneys are now enjoying
some distinct success using at will employment terms-provi-
sions stating that the employee may be terminated at any
time and for any reason-to foreclose potential contract
claims.9 In this scenario, the employer argues that the par-
ties' written at will agreement bars an implied-in-fact con-
tract as a matter of law, or alternatively, that extrinsic evi-
dence of an implied-in-fact contract is inadmissible under the
4. E.g., DeHorney v. Bank of Am. Trust & Sav. Co., 879 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.
1989) (where the plaintiff emphasized her eight months working for the defend-
ant as evidence of an implied-in-fact contract).
5. Evidence of an implied-in-fact contract is discussed infra part II(A)(3).
Plaintiffs can also establish a right to job security under a second theory by
demonstrating that "the contract was supported by consideration independent
of the services to be performed by the employee for his prospective em-
ployer .. " Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 935 (Ct. App. 1981);
see also Rabago-Alvarez v. Dart Indus., 127 Cal. Rptr. 222, 224-25 (Ct. App
1976) (affirming a verdict for the plaintiff on her contract claim where she gave
up long-term employment with another employer-which she was "extremely
hesitant to leave"-in exchange for a job with the defendant, and where the
defendant promised her she would have a permanent position and could only be
terminated for cause). This article does not address the "independent consider-
ation" theory.
6. Breach of contract is discussed infra part II(B).
7. The statutory presumption of at will employment is discussed infra part
II(A)(1).
8. See infra note 29.
9. See infra part I(F) (discussing the two most recent decisions, both de-
cided in favor of the employer).
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parol evidence rule. In support of the first contention, em-
ployers look to opinions such as Shapiro v. Wells Fargo Realty
Advisors,10 holding that "[t]here cannot be a valid express
contract and an implied contract each embracing the same
subject, but requiring different results.""' In support of the
latter, employers look to opinions such as Gerdlund v. Elec-
tronic Dispensers Int'l,'2 holding that "it cannot reasonably be
presumed that the parties intended to integrate two directly
contradictory terms in the same agreement."' 3
While popular for the purpose of summary judgment mo-
tions, 4 these arguments are far from a sure bet, because
10. 199 Cal. Rptr. 613 (Ct. App. 1984).
11. Id. at 621 (affirming ruling sustaining demurrer to the plaintiffs con-
tract claim because he signed an at will stock option agreement). Accord
Comeaux v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 915 F.2d 1264, 1271-72 (9th Cir.
1990) (reversing summary judgment, but holding that the plaintiff could not
establish an implied-in-fact contract given the fact that he signed an at will
employment application); Gianaculas v. TWA, 761 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir.
1985) (affirming summary judgment and holding that the plaintiffs were pre-
cluded from establishing an implied-in-fact contract as a matter of law where
they signed at will employment applications); Baker v. Kaiser Aluminum &
Chem. Corp., 608 F. Supp. 1315, 1320-21 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (granting summary
judgment where the plaintiff signed an at will employment agreement); Crain
v. Burroughs Corp., 560 F. Supp. 849, 852-53 (C.D. Cal. 1983) (same); Camp v.
Jeffer, Mangels, Butler & Marmaro, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 329, 333-35 (Ct. App.
1995) (affirming summary judgment where the plaintiffs signed at will ac-
knowledgment forms); Rochlis v. Walt Disney Co., 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 793, 797-98
(Ct. App. 1993) (affirming summary judgment in part because the plaintiff
signed an at will stock option agreement); Anderson v. Savin Corp., 254 Cal.
Rptr. 627, 630-31 (Ct. App. 1988) (affirming summary judgment where the
plaintiff signed an at will employment letter).
12. 235 Cal. Rptr. 279 (Ct. App. 1987). Shapiro and Gerdlund are the two
principal cases in this area. Thus, the doctrine may be referred to as the "Sha-
piro-Gerdlund doctrine."
13. Id. at 282 (reversing judgment for the plaintiff in a contract action
based on the trial court erroneously denying the defendant's motion in limine to
exclude evidence of oral representations of job security). Accord Haggard v.
Kimberly Quality Care, Inc., 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16, 21-24 (Ct. App. 1995) (revers-
ing judgment for the plaintiff in a contract action where the plaintiff signed
several at will employment agreements); Wagner v. Glendale Adventist Medical
Ctr., 265 Cal. Rptr. 412, 418-20 (Ct. App. 1989) (affirming summary judgment
where the plaintiff signed both an at will employment application and an at will
acknowledgment form); Malstrom v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 231 Cal.
Rptr. 820, 827-28 (Ct. App. 1986) (affirming summary judgment where the
plaintiff signed an at will agreement).
14. Most of the published opinions in this area were decided on summary
judgment. See generally part III, infra (chronicling cases). Note further that
the issue of the existence of an implied-in-fact contract and the issue of whether
the employer had good cause for termination may be resolved as a matter of
law. See infra notes 29 and 107.
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these decisions are not always easy to reconcile. For exam-
ple, courts disagree on the need for an "integrated" writing,
on the significance of at will employment applications, and on
the continued viability of an implied-in-fact modification
theory.
No one benefits from this uncertainty. Employers are
forced to commit considerable resources to litigation. 15 Addi-
tionally, employers, concerned about fueling potential con-
tract claims, have begun to eliminate important employee
benefits (e.g., termination guidelines and progressive disci-
pline policies).
In response, this article suggests that the cases can be
interpreted to stand for a unified proposition, and indeed, one
which finds support in conventional reasonable expectation
contract theory.16 Cases in this area of the law have all ad-
dressed the same fundamental question: Whether the parties'
employment agreement includes an implied-in-fact contract
term limiting the employer's statutory right to terminate the
employment relationship at any time for any lawful reason.
Courts have responded by establishing the "rule" that
once a plaintiff acknowledges his or her at will employment
status in writing, the plaintiff will only be permitted to argue
that the defendant breached an implied-in-fact security term
15. Ninth Circuit Judge Alex Kozinski suggests that: "What was once a
relatively simple inquiry has become the stuff of lengthy trials and burdensome
discovery, encompassing everything that ever transpired between the employee
and her employer, as well as the employer's treatment of other employees."
Kern v. Levolor Lorentzen, Inc., 899 F.2d 772, 783 (9th Cir. 1990) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting).
16. The employment relationship is fundamentally contractual. Foley v. In-
teractive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 381 n.14 (Cal. 1988) ("[Tlhere is no reason
that standard contract principles should not apply in the employment con-
text."); Cox v. Resilient Flooring Div. of Congoleum Corp., 638 F. Supp. 726, 737
(C.D. Cal. 1986) ("In California, the employment relationship traditionally has
been regarded as strictly contractual."). See also Scott v. Pacific Gas & Elec.
Co., 904 P.2d 834, 838-45 (Cal. 1995) (extending the standard implied-in-fact
contract analysis to claims for breach of an implied contract not to demote with-
out good cause); General Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court, 876 P.2d 489, 496-
504 (Cal. 1994) (analyzing, in terms of traditional implied-in-fact contract law,
the issue of whether a corporation has an absolute right to terminate an in-
house attorney under the auspices of the attorney-client relationship). This in-
cludes the at will relationship. Ninth Circuit Judge Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain
put it best when he stated that the question in breach of employment contract
cases is not whether there was in fact a contract, but instead whether the con-
tract required good cause for termination. Schneider v. TRW, Inc., 938 F.2d
986, 998 n.5 (9th Cir. 1991) (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting).
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by offering evidence that establishes a reasonable expectation
of job security. This rule, which focuses on objective evidence
justifying the plaintiffs expectations, is consistent both with
the idea that contracts are promissory in nature, that is, con-
tractual obligations are defined by the underlying "prom-
ise,"'7 and with the related idea that not all manifestations of
contractual intent rise to the level of a promise, but only ex-
ternal manifestations of intent which would lead a reason-
able person to conclude that the promissor is assuming a spe-
cific commitment.
1 8
Section IV explores this rule in more detail.19 The re-
maining sections will be structured as follows. Section II re-
views the basic law governing implied-in-fact contracts,2 ° the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,2 1 and the pa-
rol evidence rule.22 Section III reviews the caselaw.23 Sec-
tion V offers some concluding remarks.24 This article does
not provide a comprehensive review of rudimentary contract
theory, and does not attempt to justify the doctrine of at will
employment. The scope of the article is limited accordingly.
II. IMPLIED-IN-FACT CONTRACT CLAIMs AND RELATED
CONCERNS
2 5
A. Implied-In-Fact Employment Security Terms
1. The Statutory Presumption of At Will Employment
California Labor Code section 2922 provides that "[an]
employment, having no specified term, may be terminated at
17. See infra note 480. "A promise is a manifestation of intention to act or
refrain from acting in a specified way, so made as to justify a promisee in under-
standing that a commitment has been made." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS § 2(1) (1979). "The person manifesting the intention [to act or refrain
from acting in a certain way] is the promissor." Id. § 2(2). "The person to whom
the manifestation is addressed is the promisee." Id. § 2(3).
18. See infra note 482.
19. See infra notes 479-94.
20. See infra notes 25-107.
21. See infra notes 108-29. The implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing is implied not as a matter of fact, but instead as a matter of law. See
infra note 108. Some discussion of this claim is necessary, however, because
covenant claims go hand-in-hand with claims for breach of contract.
22. See infra notes 130-51.
23. See infra notes 152-478.
24. See infra notes 495-500.
25. In Koehrer v. Superior Court, 226 Cal. Rptr. 820 (Ct. App. 1986), the
court commented that the term "wrongful discharge" has generated some
confusion, explaining that the term has "been indiscriminately applied to
1996]
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the will of either party on notice to the other. Employment
for a specified term means an employment for a period
greater than one month."26 The first question to be asked in a
breach of contract action where the plaintiff does not have an
agreement for a specified term of employment is whether he
or she can overcome (or more accurately "rebut")27 this statu-
tory presumption with evidence of a reasonable expectation of
job security.28 Failing this, the plaintiff has absolutely no
situations involving only a breach of contract, situations involving a discharge
in violation of a fundamental public policy and situations involving breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing." Id. at 824. Recognizing
this, the court suggested that "[it would be conducive to proper analysis if
courts and lawyers used a different nomenclature to denominate these different
situations in which liability is imposed after all on different legal theories." Id.
According to the court, a more "[aippropriate nomenclature [is] 'breach of
employment contract' for the true breach of contract cases, 'tortious discharge'
for the public policy cases and 'bad faith discharge' for the cases involving
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing." Id. Accord
Anderson v. Savin Corp., 254 Cal. Rptr. 627, 629-630 (Ct. App. 1988).
26. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2922 (1991). "In 1872, California became the first
state to create a statutory presumption of at-will employment, with the enact-
ment of the predecessor to section 2922." Kern v. Levolor Lorentzen, Inc., 899
F.2d 772, 783 (9th Cir. 1990) (Kozinski, J., dissenting). For an overview of the
legislative history of Labor Code § 2922, see Hejmadi v. AMFAC, Inc., 249 Cal.
Rptr. 5, 14-15 (Ct. App. 1988).
27. In Foley, the California Supreme Court explained that the presumption
is rebuttable because "courts seek to enforce the actual understanding of the
parties to a contract, and in so doing, may inquire into the parties' conduct to
determine if it demonstrates an implied contract." Foley v. Interactive Data
Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 385 (Cal. 1988). See also Schneider v. TRW, Inc., 938 F.2d
986, 990 (9th Cir. 1991) ("An employee may overcome this presumption with
evidence of contrary intent."); Hoy v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 861 F. Supp. 881,
885 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (The presumption of at will employment "may be rebutted
only by evidence of an express or implied agreement that the employment will
terminate only 'for cause."'); Scott v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 904 P.2d 834, 839
(Cal. 1995) ("In Foley, we held that an implied-in-fact contract term not to ter-
minate an employee without good cause, based on the employer's course of con-
duct and oral representations, will overcome the statutory presumption found
in Labor Code section 2922 that employment for an indefinite period is termina-
ble at will.").
28. Funk v. Sperry Corp., 842 F.2d 1129, 1131 (9th Cir. 1988) ("California
law commences with a statutory presumption that employment is at will."); Cox
v. Resilient Flooring Div. of Congoleum Corp., 638 F. Supp. 726, 730 (C.D. Cal.
1986) ("Conventional analysis of California employment law begins with refer-
ence to Cal. Labor Code § 2922. . . ."); Harden v. Maybelline Sales Corp., 282
Cal. Rptr. 96, 98 (Ct. App. 1991) ("All employment termination cases begin with
the presumption of at will employment."); Shapiro v. Wells Fargo Realty Advi-
sors, 199 Cal. Rptr. 613, 621 (Ct. App. 1984) ("According to Pugh, as a first step
the court must determine whether plaintiff can rebut the presumption of 'at
will' status by showing an implied term of the contract to the contrary."). See
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breach of contract case.29 Employers are free to terminate at
will employees at any time for any or no reason; provided the
reason, if one exists, is not unlawful.3 0
infra note 48 (citing cases emphasizing the plaintiffs burden to demonstrate a
reasonable expectation of job security).
29. "In a contract action asserting breach of a covenant not to discharge
except for good cause, the plaintiff must demonstrate an agreement not to ter-
minate except for good cause and that the employer lacked good cause for the
discharge." Foley, 765 P.2d at 400 n.38.
Significantly, the issue of whether or not the plaintiff established an im-
plied contract can be resolved as a matter of law. Joanou v. Coca-Cola Co., 26
F.3d 96, 99 (9th Cir. 1994) (affirming summary judgment where the plaintiff
failed to present any evidence establishing an implied contract); Schneider, 938
F.2d at 989-91 (same); DeHorney v. Bank of Am. Trust & Sav. Co., 879 F.2d
459, 466-67 (9th Cir. 1989) (same); Bianco v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 897 F.
Supp. 433, 440-41 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (granting summary judgment where the
plaintiff only produced "scant" evidence of an implied-in-fact contract); Hoy, 861
F. Supp. at 884-87 (granting summary judgment where the plaintiffs only evi-
dence of an implied contract was his 26 years of company service); Paris v. F.
Korbel & Bros., 751 F. Supp. 834, 837 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (granting summary
judgment where the plaintiff failed to offer any evidence of an implied-in-fact
contract); Davis v. Consolidated Freightways, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 438, 446 (Ct.
App. 1994) (same); Wagner v. Glendale Adventist Medical Ctr., 265 Cal. Rptr.
412, 418-20 (Ct. App. 1989) (affirming summary judgment and noting that
there was an "utter lack of any substance to a claim of an implied or express
agreement"); Miller v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 259 Cal. Rptr. 56, 58-59 (Ct.
App. 1989) (affirming summary judgment where the plaintiff failed to establish
implied contract). But see Tonry v. Security Experts, Inc., 20 F.3d 967, 971 (9th
Cir. 1994) (commenting that the existence of an implied-in-fact contract must
be determined as a question of fact); Kern, 899 F.2d at 776 ("The existence of
such implied promises is a question of fact for the jury to decide."); Scott, 904
P.2d at 839 (stating that determination of whether parties' conduct established
implied contract is ordinarily a question of fact); Foley, 765 P.2d at 388 (same);
Luck v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 267 Cal. Rptr. 618, 625 (Ct. App. 1990) ("It
must be determined, as a question of fact, whether the parties acted in such a
manner as to provide the necessary foundation for an implied contract."), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 939 (1990); Hejmadi, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 13 ("The question of
whether an implied in fact promise has been made is normally a question for a
jury, rather than a court, to decide."); Walker v. Northern San Diego County
Hosp. Dist., 185 Cal. Rptr. 617, 622 (Ct. App. 1982) (emphasizing that the ques-
tion of whether the plaintiff established an implied-in-fact contract was one for
the jury, not the trial court).
In contrast, the existence of an implied-in-fact contract may not be resolved
as a matter of law. In Haycock v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 248 (Ct.
App. 1994), the court explained that the presumption of at will employment is
one affecting the burden of proof, and accordingly, that it is sufficient to war-
rant sending the issue to the jury even in the absence of evidence that the em-
ployment relationship was at will. Id. at 258. The court reversed a verdict for
the plaintiff where the trial court ruled that the plaintiff established an implied
contract as a matter of law. Id.
30. Foley, 765 P.2d at 376 ("Absent any contract... the employment is 'at
will,' and the employee can be fired with or without good cause."); Davis, 34 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 446 (affirming summary judgment and holding that where the
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2. Good Cause for Termination
An implied-in-fact contract can be used to limit the em-
ployer's power to terminate the employment relationship. 1
If found to exist, an implied-in-fact agreement operates as a
promise that the employer will not terminate except for "just"
or "good cause."3  The widely accepted definition of the good
plaintiff failed to rebut the presumption of at will employment, the defendant
"was at liberty to discharge [the] plaintiff for any reason or no reason (so long as
it was not unlawful)"); Hejmadi, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 17 (commenting that continu-
ous employment is not a benefit of an at will employment agreement); Brian F.
Berger, Note, Defining Public Policy Torts in At Will Dismissals, 34 STAN. L.
REV. 153 (1981) ("The employment-at-will rule allows an employer to discharge
an employee for good cause, bad cause, or no cause at all."); J. Peter Shapiro &
James F. Tune, Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN. L. REV.
335 (1974) ("Unless an employment contract expressly specifies a term of em-
ployment, an employer may discharge an employee for a good cause, a bad
cause, or no cause at all."). See also Haggard v. Kimberly Quality Care, Inc., 46
Cal. Rptr. 2d 16, 23 (Ct. App. 1995) (commenting that the interpretation that
employment was "terminable by either party 'at will, at any time, with or with-
out cause or advance notice'" was "inescapable"); Gerdlund v. Electronic Dis-
pensers Int'l, 235 Cal. Rptr. 279, 284 (Ct. App. 1987) (holding that the term
"any reason" is not ambiguous within the meaning of the context of the parol
evidence rule, because it "is plainly all-inclusive, encompassing all reasons 'of
whatever kind,' good, bad, or indifferent").
The policy supporting the at will doctrine is not to compel an employee to
accept employment, on the one hand, and not to force an employer to hire or
retain an employee, on the other. Consolidated Theaters, Inc. v. Theatrical
Stage Employees Union, 447 P.2d 325, 335 n.12 (Cal. 1968); Haycock, 28 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 258-59.
31. "As the name suggests, an implied-in-fact contract claim as a limitation
on an employer's historical at-will power to terminate one of its employees is
rooted in the conduct of the parties to the employment relationship itself." Gen-
eral Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court, 876 P.2d 487, 495 (Cal. 1994) (emphasis
added).
32. The terms "just cause," "good cause" and "cause" are interchangeable.
Scott, 904 P.2d at 837 n.1. Breach of implied-in-fact contract actions are not
limited to termination claims. See, e.g., Rose v. Wells Fargo & Co., 902 F.2d
1417, 1425-27 (9th Cir. 1990) (asserting implied promise to make reasonable
efforts to relocate the plaintiffs within the company in the event of a reduction
in force); Gianaculas v. TWA, 761 F.2d 1391, 1393 (9th Cir. 1985) (asserting
implied promise to displace junior employees in the event of a reduction in
force); Baker v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 608 F. Supp. 1315, 1317-18
(N.D. Cal. 1984) (asserting implied promise not to terminate the plaintiff before
he was eligible for early retirement); Hillsman v. Sutter Community Hosp., 200
Cal. Rptr. 605, 608 (Cal. 1984) (asserting implied promise to be terminated only
in accordance with by-laws); Shapiro, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 615 (asserting implied
promise regarding the opportunity to achieve the maximum level of base pay).
At first blush, the theory underlying the implied-in-fact promise not to ter-
minate except for cause would seem to be flawed in terms of traditional notions
of mutuality. The employer agrees to accept an obligation without exacting any
corresponding promise from the employee. While an appealing argument for
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cause standard is a fair and honest reason for termination
regulated by good faith.33 The terms are relative. 4
Good cause should not be confused with some sort of
promise or guarantee of lifetime tenure. In the words of one
court, "[e]ven when the implied promise of continued employ-
ment is found, it is only a promise not to terminate employ-
ment without some good reason.., or a fair and honest cause
or reason, regulated by good faith."35 Employers frequently
assert poor performance3 6 or misconduct 37 as the reason for
the employee's termination. Reductions in force are also com-
defense attorneys, the issue is in no way novel, and has already been resolved in
the employee's favor. In the seminal case of Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 171
Cal. Rptr. 119 (Ct. App. 1981), the court explained that consideration beyond
the employee's performance is not required, reasoning that there must be an
exchange of consideration, but not an exchange of promises of equal value. Id.
at 126. Accord Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 386 (Cal. 1988).
33. Pugh, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 928 ("Essentially, [the terms just cause and
good cause] connote a 'fair and honest cause or reason, regulated by good faith
on the part of the party exercising the power."') (quoting R.J. Cardinal Co. v.
Ritchie, 32 Cal. Rptr. 545, 558 (Ct. App. 1963)). See also Scott v. Pacific Gas &
Elec. Co., 904 P.2d 834, 841 (Cal. 1995) (adopting this definition); Walker v.
Blue Cross of Cal., 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 184, 189 (Ct. App. 1992) (same); Moore v.
May Dep't Stores Co., 271 Cal. Rptr. 841, 843 (Ct. App. 1990) (same); Wood v.
Loyola Marymount Univ., 267 Cal. Rptr. 230, 235 (Ct. App. 1990) (same); Clut-
terham v. Coachmen Indus., 215 Cal. Rptr. 795, 797 (Ct. App. 1985) (same);
Crosier v. United Parcel Serv., 198 Cal. Rptr. 361, 366 (Ct. App. 1983) (same).
For a thoughtful discussion of whether the good cause standard should be
discarded in favor of a "fairness" standard, see Cox v. Resilient Flooring Div. of
Congoleum Corp., 638 F. Supp. 726, 735-39 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (explaining that
courts are not suited to make decisions for employers and that courts have en-
couraged the proliferation of lawsuits by analyzing termination decisions in
terms of whether the plaintiff had a contractual right to .termination only for
good cause, and if so, whether the reason for the discharge met that standard).
34. Stokes v. Dole Nut Co., 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 673, 679 (Ct. App. 1995);
Walker, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 189; Moore, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 843; Pugh, 171 Cal.
Rptr. at 928.
35. Clutterham, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 797 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Accord Malstrom v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 231 Cal. Rptr. 820, 832
(Ct. App. 1986).
36. See, e.g., Hoy v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 861 F. Supp. 881, 887-88 (N.D.
Cal. 1994) (granting summary judgment where the plaintiff was terminated for
poor performance); Van Komen v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 638 F. Supp. 739,
740-41 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (granting summary judgment where there was over-
whelming evidence of the plaintiffs poor performance); Moore, 271 Cal. Rptr. at
843-44 (affirming summary judgment where there was no question that the
plaintiffs gross negligence resulted in a substantial loss of company property);
Robinson v. Hewlett-Packard Corp., 228 Cal. Rptr. 591, 599-601 (Ct. App. 1986)
(affirming summary judgment for wrongful termination where the defendant
discharged the plaintiff for poor performance when, despite efforts to accommo-
date the plaintiffs work-related back injury, the plaintiffs performance increas-
ingly deteriorated).
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mon.3 s Specific examples of good cause include sexual har-
Of course, poor performance is not good cause per se. Kelecheva v. Multivi-
sion Cable T.V. Corp., 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 453, 459-60 (Ct. App. 1993) (holding that
the plaintiff raised triable issue of material fact with evidence that he was ter-
minated because he refused to discriminate against a coworker who was the
union shop steward, not for poor performance and insubordination); Prevost v.
First W. Bank, 239 Cal. Rptr. 161, 167-68 (Ct. App. 1987) (reversing summary
judgment where there was evidence raising a triable issue of fact as to whether
the plaintiff was actually terminated for poor performance, as asserted by the
defendant, or whether he was discharged as part of a "power struggle").
37. See infra notes 39, 41, 43-44 (citing specific examples of misconduct).
Notably, specific acts of misconduct are admissible in a contract action on the
issue of the plaintiffs fitness for his or her job. Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 250
Cal. Rptr. 195, 203-04 (Ct. App. 1988) (rejecting the plaintiffs argument that
the trial court mistakenly admitted evidence that he did not get along well with
other employees, because the evidence was relevant to show the role the plain-
tiffs personnel problems played in his termination).
38. Schneider v. TRW, Inc., 938 F.2d 986, 989-92 (9th Cir. 1991) (affirming
summary judgment and finding that the plaintiff failed to refute the defend-
ant's evidence that she was discharged as part of a company-wide lay off for
economic reasons); Rose v. Wells Fargo & Co., 902 F.2d 1417, 1425-27 (9th Cir.
1990) (affirming summary judgment where the plaintiffs failed to refute the
defendant's evidence that they were discharged as part of a legitimate reduc-
tion in force following a merger); Gianaculas v. TWA, 761 F.2d 1391, 1394-95
(9th Cir. 1985) (affirming summary judgment where the plaintiffs failed to re-
fute the defendant's evidence that they were furloughed as the result of a gen-
eral reduction in management necessitated by the company's economic condi-
tion); Burdette v. Mepco/Electra, Inc., 673 F. Supp. 1012, 1016-17 (S.D. Cal.
1987) (granting summary judgment where there was unrefuted evidence that
the plaintiff was discharged as part of a reduction in force necessary due to
deteriorating market conditions); Cox v. Resilient Flooring Div. of Congoleum
Corp., 638 F. Supp. 726, 731-33 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (granting summary judgment
where there was evidence of a legitimate reduction in force and rejecting the
plaintiffs argument not that the reduction in force was pretextual, but that it
was pretextual as applied to him). See also Lorentz v. Carus Corp., No. C91-
1013BAC, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12591, at *7-9 (N.D. Cal. July 14, 1992)
(granting summary judgment where the defendant offered unrefuted evidence
that the plaintiff was discharged as part of a reduction in force necessary due to
severe financial difficulties); Mosely v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., No. C88-0905,
1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11643, at *9-10 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 1991) (granting sum-
mary judgment for the defendant where there was unrefuted evidence that the
plaintiff was discharged as part of a necessary reduction in force).
A reduction in force is also not good cause per se. Madden v. Independence
Bank, 771 F. Supp. 1514, 1519 (C.D. Cal. 1991) (denying summary judgment
where there was conflicting evidence that there actually was a reduction in
force). Cf. Harlan v. Sohio Petroleum Co., 677 F. Supp. 1021, 1030-31 (N.D.
Cal. 1988) (denying summary judgment on claim for breach of the implied cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing where the plaintiff raised a triable issue of
material fact about whether the alleged reduction in force was merely pretex-
tual). And discharge as part of a reduction in force may still be actionable
where the manner of the discharge violates the defendant's written policies.
Kern v. Levolor Lorentzen, Inc., 899 F.2d 772, 776-77 (9th Cir. 1990) (affirming
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assment,39 disloyalty, 40 reading confidential information,4 1
entering restricted areas at the workplace,42 marking down
merchandise without authorization,43 falsifying documents,44
failing to return to work as scheduled,45 and refusing to fol-
low the employer's reasonable instructions.4 6 What good
verdict for the plaintiff where there was evidence that the manner of the plain-
tiff's layoff breached the defendant's layoff policy).
39. Crosier v. United Parcel Serv., 198 Cal. Rptr. 361, 365-66 (Ct. App.
1983) (affirming summary judgment where the plaintiff violated the defend-
ant's nonfraternization policy by dating a subordinate, thereby exposing the
company to liability for sexual harassment).
40. Stokes v. Dole Nut Co., 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 673, 681 (Ct. App. 1995) (af-
firming summary judgment where the plaintiff management level employees
performed substantial acts toward the objective of establishing a competing
business knowing that they would be competing with the defendant); Fowler v.
Varian Assoc., 241 Cal. Rptr. 539, 542-44 (Ct. App. 1987) (affirming summary
judgment where the plaintiff marketing manager refused to disclose confiden-
tial information about competitor he was involved with, because in his position,
he was obligated to share information about his competitor's plans with the
defendant). Once again, this is not good cause per se. Wallis v. Farmers Group
Ins., 269 Cal. Rptr. 299, 307-08 (Ct. App. 1990) (affirming judgment for the
plaintiff on her implied contract claim and emphasizing that there was substan-
tial evidence in support of the jury's finding that the plaintiff was terminated
for filing suit against the defendant, not for a conflict of interest).
41. Burton v. Security Pac. Nat'l Bank, 243 Cal. Rptr. 277 (Ct. App. 1988)
(affirming summary judgment where the plaintiff entered a restrict area with-
out authorization and reviewed confidential materials).
42. Id.
43. Brokaw v. Saks Fifth Ave., No. C92-1477SBA, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
3893, at *9-13 (N.D. Cal. March 12, 1993) (granting summary judgment where
the plaintiff was discharged for marking down merchandise in violation of an
express policy prohibiting the same).
44. Lodermeier v. Toys "R" US, 9 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 301 (E.D. Cal. 1994)
(granting summary judgment where the plaintiff was discharged for directing a
subordinate to falsify accounting reports in violation of established company
policies). The plaintiff raised an interesting argument in Lodermeier. While
conceding that he directed a subordinate to falsify the accounting reports, the
plaintiff argued his misconduct warranted less severe disciplinary sanctions.
Id. at 304. He emphasized that the consequences of falsifying the reports were
minimal. Id. The court disagreed, reasoning that the plaintiffs misconduct vio-
lated a number of written policies, and was therefore "serious" regardless of the
financial consequences. Id.
45. Knights v. Hewlett-Packard Corp., 281 Cal. Rptr. 295, 297-98 (Ct. App.
1991) (affirming summary judgment where plaintiff repeatedly failed to satisfy
deadlines to return to work imposed by the defendant or to request additional
time off).
46. "'Willful' disobedience of a specific, peremptory instruction of the
master, if the instruction be reasonable and consistent with the contract, is a
breach of duty - a breach of the contract of service; and, like any other breach, of
itself entitles the master to renounce the contract of employment." May v. New
York Motion Picture Corp., 45 Cal. App. 396, 403 (1920); see also CAL. LAB.
CODE § 2856 (West 1995) (stating that employees must substantially comply
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cause does not include is the employer's subjective belief that
termination can be justified when this belief lacks any factual
support.47
3. Evidence Establishing an Implied-In-Fact Contract
a. General Principles
Whether or not the employee has met his or her burden
to establish an implied-in-fact contract is determined with
reference both to the reasonable expectations of the parties
48
with directions from their employers so long as the directions are not unlawful
or impossible to perform, and do not impose new and unreasonable burdens on
the employee); Compania Constructora Bechtel-McCone, S. Am. v. McDonald,
157 F.2d 749, 750-753 (9th Cir. 1946) (affirming judgment for the defendant
where the plaintiff refused to follow instructions from his foreman); Story v.
San Rafael Military Academy, 3 Cal. Rptr. 847, 847-48 (Ct. App. 1960) (holding
that the fact the plaintiff refused to follow instructions from his employer sup-
ported a finding of anticipatory breach); Bank of Am. Trust & Sav. Co. v. Repub-
lic Prod., 112 P.2d 972, 973 (Cal. App. 1941) (holding the fact that the plaintiff
refused to comply with instructions from her employer to be at work justified
her termination).
47. Courts continue to struggle with the role the employer's subjective good
faith belief plays in California's employment contract jurisprudence. Compare
Cotran v. Rollins Hudig Hall Intl, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 129 (Ct. App. 1996) (holding,
in a breach of contract claim by managerial employee discharged for sexual mis-
conduct, that the jury should have been instructed to determine whether the
defendant reasonably, and in good faith, believed the misconduct had occurred;
not to determine whether defendant proved plaintiff actually committed sexual
harassment) with Wilkerson v. Wells Fargo Bank, 261 Cal. Rptr. 185, 192 (Ct.
App. 1989) (rejecting as irrelevant evidence of the defendant's subjective good
faith belief that there was good cause for discharging the plaintiff for
misconduct).
48. See Hejmadi v. AMFAC, Inc., 249 Cal. Rptr. 5, 18 (Ct. App. 1988) (dis-
cussing reasonable expectations of the parties to an at will employment agree-
ment); Burton v. Security Pac. Nat'l Bank, 243 Cal. Rptr. 277, 782 (Ct. App.
1988) (commenting that California courts have limited the employer's right to
terminate an employee based in part on the reasonable expectations of the par-
ties); Crosier v. United Parcel Serv., 198 Cal. Rptr. 361, 366 (Ct. App. 1983)
(same). See also, infra note 487 (citing authority for the proposition that claims
for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing are also deter-
mined with reference to the parties' reasonable expectations). Compare Mundy
v. Household Fin. Corp., 885 F.2d 542, 544-45 (9th Cir. 1989) (affirming sum-
mary judgment where the plaintiff signed an at will employment agreement
and finding that since the employment relationship was clearly at will, the
plaintiff did not have a reasonable expectation ofjob security) and Crain v. Bur-
roughs Corp., 560 F. Supp. 849, 852 (C.D. Cal. 1983) (commenting that the
plaintiff did not have a legitimate expectation of a right to a just cause determi-
nation prior to discharge) and Camp v. Jeffer, Mangels, Butler & Marmaro, 41
Cal. Rptr. 2d 329, 333-35 (Ct. App. 1995) (finding that the plaintiff did not offer
evidence demonstrating a legitimate expectation of employment for any partic-
ular length of time) with Scott v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 904 P.2d 834, 846 (Cal.
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and "totality" of the circumstances. 49 Thus, a wide array of
evidence may be used to establish the same. Typically, this
evidence consists of the standard "Pugh factors" (explored be-
low), which include the employee's longevity of service,50 sal-
ary increases, promotions and performance evaluations.
51
The plaintiff may also point to the employer's personnel poli-
cies 52  and handbooks, 53  and to oral assurances of job
security. 4
1995) (finding that the plaintiffs offered evidence demonstrating a reasonable
expectation that the company would follow its progressive discipline policy) and
General Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court., 976 P.2d 487, 495 (Cal. 1994) (find-
ing that the plaintiff met his burden to allege facts establishing a reasonable
expectation of job security) and Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373,
388 (Cal. 1988) (same).
49. Foley, 765 P.2d at 388 (explaining that "the totality of the circum-
stances determines the nature of the contract"); Gould v. Maryland Sound In-
dus., 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 718, 730 (Ct. App. 1995) (following Foley); Walker v. Blue
Cross of Cal., 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 184, 192 (Ct. App. 1992) (same); Miller v. Pepsi-
Cola Bottling Co., 259 Cal. Rptr. 56, 58 (Ct. App. 1989) (same); Burton, 243 Cal.
Rptr. at 282 (same); Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 945 (Ct.
App. 1981) (making this same point). See also Harlan v. Sohio Petroleum Co.,
677 F. Supp. 1021, 1030 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (finding that the plaintiff established
an implied contract and emphasizing that the defendant, in responding to the
plaintiffs evidence, improperly addressed the facts individually rather than
based on the totality of the circumstances). For an interesting discussion of the
reason courts will consider the totality of the circumstances, see HUGH COLLINS,
THE LAW OF CONTRACT 209 (2d ed. 1993) (explaining that it is necessary to em-
brace a proxy as proof of intent since determining the exact state of minds of the
parties is impossible, and also that a broad range of proxies are permitted in
order to increase the chances of an accurate determination).
50. See infra notes 75-79 (discussing evidence of longevity).
51. See infra notes 73-74 (discussing evidence of salary increases, promo-
tions and commendations).
52. See infra notes 80-84 (discussing evidence of the defendant's personnel
policies).
53. See infra notes 90-94 (discussing handbook language).
54. See infra notes 85-89 (discussing evidence of oral representations of job
security). "There are no hard-and-fast rules for pleading [an implied-in-fact]
agreement." Gould v. Maryland Sound Indus., 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 718, 730 (Ct.
App. 1995). A conclusory allegation that the employer "implied" that the plain-
tiff would only be terminated for good cause is insufficient. Hentzel v. Singer
Co., 188 Cal. Rptr. 159, 168 (Ct. App. 1982) (reversing demurrer). However,
prospective plaintiffs may state a viable cause of action by alleging the standard
Pugh factors, which include the defendant's personnel policies or practices, the
employee's longevity of service, the defendant's express or implied promises,
and industry practices. See, e.g., General Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court,
876 P.2d 487, 495 (Cal. 1994) (finding that the plaintiff stated a viable contract
claim by alleging assurances of job security, consistent promotions, salary in-
creases and bonuses, and 14 years of employment); Foley v. Interactive Data
Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 394 (Cal. 1988) (finding that the plaintiff stated a viable
contract claim where alleging repeated assurances of job security and consis-
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Although common, employees are not limited to the stan-
dard Pugh factors. Examples of other types of relevant evi-
dence include evidence of a constructive or "positive disci-
pline" policy,5 5 the lack of unfavorable job evaluations,56
early promotions,5 v use of a company car,58 relocating at the
tent promotions, salary increases and bonuses, and also both that the defend-
ant breached its own personnel policies and that he furnished independent con-
sideration-signing a covenant not to compete-in exchange for job security);
Zilmer v. Carnation Co., 263 Cal. Rptr. 422, 425 (Ct. App. 1989) (reversing the
trial court's ruling sustaining demurrer where the plaintiff, an employee who
worked for the employer for 31 years, alleged that the terms and conditions of
his employment included both an express and implied promise that he would
only be terminated for cause); Hejmadi v. AMFAC, Inc., 249 Cal. Rptr. 5, 13 (Ct.
App. 1988) (holding that the plaintiffs complaint stated cause of action by alleg-
ing that he was assured cause would be required for termination, that the de-
fendant's policy and procedure manual provided good cause was required for
termination, and that he received promotions and strong evaluations during his
eight year tenure); Hillsman v. Sutter Community Hosp., 200 Cal. Rptr. 605,
611-12 (Ct. App. 1984) (holding that the plaintiffs complaint stated a cause of
action by alleging that his employer breached an implied-in-fact promise to fol-
low its by-laws).
55. Scott v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 884 P.2d 985, 991 (Cal. 1995) (holding
that there was substantial, "compelling" evidence of an implied contract based
solely on the defendant's progressive disciplined policy); Wood v. Loyola Mary-
mount Univ., 276 Cal. Rptr. 230, 232-33 (Ct. App. 1990) (reversing summary
judgment and emphasizing evidence that the defendant's personnel policy man-
ual set forth a progressive discipline policy in support of finding that the plain-
tiff established an implied contract); Robinson v. Hewlett-Packard Corp., 228
Cal. Rptr. 591, 599-601 (Ct. App. 1986) (emphasizing that the defendant's per-
sonnel policies and guidelines prohibited termination of an employee for poor
performance until the employee was given counseling and an opportunity to
correct his or her performance in support of holding that the plaintiff estab-
lished an implied contract). Cf Davis v. Consolidated Freightways, 34 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 438, 444 (Ct. App. 1994) (affirming summary judgment and rejecting
the plaintiffs evidence of a progressive discipline policy as immaterial, because
if relevant, "an employer would be forced purposely to terminate employees for
any and every infraction - or none at all - in order to maintain the presumption
of at will employment").
56. Panopulos v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 264 Cal. Rptr. 810, 815 (Ct.
App. 1989) (accepting the plaintiffs "long service record without unfavorable
evaluations" in support of finding that he established an implied-in-fact
agreement).
57. Tonry v. Security Experts, Inc., 20 F.3d 967, 971 (9th Cir. 1994) (af-
firming judgment for the plaintiff and commenting that the district court could
have found an implied-in-fact contract based on evidence, inter alia, the plain-
tiff was promoted to a management level position early in his career).
58. Id. (affirming judgment for the plaintiff and commenting that the dis-
trict court could have found an implied-in-fact contract based on evidence, inter
alia, the plaintiff was given benefits including use of a company car).
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employer's request, 9 and that new-hires were required to
pass a probationary period.6 0 In one case, the plaintiff was
even able to establish an implied-in-fact contract with evi-
dence that language requiring good cause was omitted from
later versions of his agency agreement.6 '
This is not to say that all of the employee's evidence is
material. To the contrary, courts have rejected efforts by em-
ployees to introduce a wide spectrum of "evidence" of an im-
plied-in-fact contract, including, for example, evidence of the
following: The requirement that management was instructed
to "build a file" on employees before termination,62 or that a
termination decision required approval from a more senior
manager;63 that the plaintiff was hired on temporary status,
but later retained as a permanent employee; 64 that the plain-
59. Id. (affirming judgment for the plaintiff and commenting that the dis-
trict court could have found an implied-in-fact contract based on evidence, inter
alia, the plaintiff relocated at the defendant's request).
60. Walker v. Northern San Diego County Hosp. Dist., 185 Cal. Rptr. 617,
621-22 (Ct. App. 1982) (reversing judgment for the defendant and finding that
the plaintiff was able to establish an implied contract with evidence that the
defendant's handbook expressly restricted its right to terminate the plaintiff
without good cause once the plaintiff successfully completed a probationary pe-
riod); Prevost v. First W. Bank, 239 Cal. Rptr. 161, 167 (Ct. App. 1987) (revers-
ing summary judgment and finding that the wording of the defendant's person-
nel manual-which stated that "[i]f it is evidence that excessive problems or
deficiencies exist [during the three month probationary period], consideration
should be given to terminating the employment relationship during the proba-
tionary period"-implied that good cause was required for termination). Cf
Gould v. Maryland Sound Indus., 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 718, 730 (Ct. App. 1995) (af-
firming ruling sustaining demurrer and finding that, alone, allegations the
plaintiff completed a 90-day probationary period would not establish an implied
agreement).
61. Wallis v. Farmers Group Ins., 264 Cal. Rptr. 294, 307 (Ct. App. 1990)
(emphasizing that language requiring cause for termination was omitted from a
subsequent agreement in support of the jury's verdict for the plaintiff on her
implied contract).
62. Davis v. Consolidated Freightways, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 438, 444-45 (Ct.
App. 1994) (affirming summary judgment and rejecting as immaterial evidence
that the employer had a practice of requiring managers to "build a file" to sup-
port an intended termination).
63. Id. (affirming summary judgment and rejecting as immaterial evidence
that the employer had a practice of requiring managers to obtain approval on a
decision to terminate an employee from a more senior manager).
64. Camp v. Jeffer, Mangels, Butler & Marmaro, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 329, 333-
35 (Ct. App. 1995) (affirming summary judgment and finding that the plaintiffs
.could not establish an implied contract with evidence that they switched from
temporary to permanent employment).
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tiff participated in a pension program;65 that the plaintiff was
invited to a retreat to discuss the employer's long-term objec-
tives;66 that the plaintiff was given a parking space; 67 and,
that the plaintiffs schooling was paid for by the employer.68
Insofar as evidence of promises allegedly made by the
employer have been concerned, courts have similarly rejected
evidence that the plaintiff was promised reasonable salary in-
creases or an annual bonus,69 training, 0 or that he or she
would participate in executive meetings, have administrative
responsibility, and would only be required to report to the
employer's executives. 71 Courts have also rejected other evi-
dence of promises which had nothing to do with the grounds
for termination. 2
b. The Standard "Pugh Factors"
Because the standard Pugh factors form the basis of
most implied-in-fact contract claims, it is necessary to con-
sider these factors in some detail.
Generally, the weakest evidence of an implied-in-fact
contract is that the employee received consistent salary in-
creases and promotions. Numerous opinions have empha-
sized the fact that the plaintiff received salary increases and
65. Baker v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 608 F. Supp. 1315, 1318
(N.D. Cal. 1984) ("The mere fact that [an employer] provides employee benefit
plans for its employees does not place [the employer] under a duty to maintain
them in its employ.").
66. Wagner v. Glendale Adventist Medical Ctr., 265 Cal. Rptr. 412, 418-19
(Ct. App. 1989) (affirming summary judgment and emphasizing that the plain-
tiff could not establish an implied contract with evidence of her participation in
a long range planning retreat).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Rochlis v. Walt Disney Co., 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 793, 798-800 (Ct. App.
1993).
70. Schneider v. TRW, Inc., 938 F.2d 986, 989-91 (9th Cir. 1991) (affirming
summary judgment and emphasizing that the plaintiff could not raise a triable
issue of fact with evidence that she was generally promised training).
71. Rochlis, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 798-800 (rejecting the plaintiffs argument
that he could establish an implied agreement with evidence that the defendant
promised he would receive "reasonable salary increases appropriate to his re-
sponsibilities and performance," because this promise was too vague and indefi-
nite to be enforceable).
72. Camp v. Jeffer, Mangels, Butler & Marmaro, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 329, 333-
35 (Ct. App. 1995) (affirming summary judgment and finding that the plaintiffs
could not establish an implied contract with evidence that the employer prom-
ised to find one plaintiff another position in firm after she complained about the
partner she was working for).
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promotions in support of ruling for the plaintiff employee.73
However, recent decisions raise distinct questions about the
weight of this evidence. In the words of one frequently cited
opinion: "Promotions and salary increases are natural occur-
rences of an employee who remains with a employer for a
substantial length of time. These factors should not change
the status of an otherwise 'at will' employee to one discharge-
able only for 'just cause.' 74
73. Tonry v. Security Experts, Inc., 20 F.3d 967, 971 (9th Cir. 1994) (af-
firming judgment for the plaintiff and commenting that the district court could
have found an implied-in-fact contract based on evidence, inter alia, the plain-
tiff received a series of increases in his annual salary); General Dynamics Corp.
v. Superior Court, 876 P.2d 487 (Cal. 1994) (finding that the plaintiff stated a
viable contract claim where alleging, inter alia, consistent promotions, salary
increases and bonuses); Haycock v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 248,
257 (Ct. App. 1994) (emphasizing that the plaintiff received favorable evalua-
tions and salary increases and commenting that he offered "very strong evi-
dence" of an implied contract); Walker v. Blue Cross of Cal., 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 184,
188-90 (Ct. App. 1992) (reversing summary judgment and emphasizing the fact
that the plaintiff received consistent promotions and salary increases); Luck v.
Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 267 Cal. Rptr. 618, 625 (Ct. App. 1990) (emphasiz-
ing the fact that the plaintiff was promoted, received salary increases and was
repeatedly complimented on the quality of her work in support of holding that
plaintiff established an implied contract), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 939 (1990);
Wood v. Loyola Marymount Univ., 267 Cal. Rptr. 230, 232-34 (Ct. App. 1990)
(reversing summary judgment and emphasizing evidence that the plaintiff re-
ceived "meritorious ... evaluations, consistent salary increases and bonuses" in
support of finding that the plaintiff established an implied contract); Panopulos
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 264 Cal. Rptr. 810, 814-15 (Ct. App. 1989) (empha-
sizing the fact the plaintiff received merit increases in support of finding that he
established an implied-in-fact agreement), overruled by Turner v. Anheuser-
Busch, Inc., 876 P.2d 1022 (Cal. 1994); Zilmer v. Carnation Co., 263 Cal. Rptr.
422, 424-25 (Ct. App. 1989) (reversing the trial court's ruling sustaining demur-
rer and emphasizing the plaintiffs allegations that he received repeated posi-
tive evaluations of his work in support of finding that he stated a viable con-
tract claim); Bell v. Superior Court, 263 Cal. Rptr. 787, 790-91 (Ct. App. 1989)
(emphasizing the plaintiffs allegations that "she performed well and was com-
pensated commensurately" in support of finding that she alleged sufficient facts
to overcome the presumption of at will employment); Hejmadi v. AMFAC, Inc.,
249 Cal. Rptr. 5, 13 (Ct. App. 1988) (emphasizing allegation that plaintiff re-
ceived promotions and bonuses in support of holding he stated viable contract
claim); Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 927 (Ct. App. 1981) (re-
versing nonsuit and emphasizing evidence that the plaintiff received commen-
dations and promotions during his 32 year tenure in support of finding jury
could determine existence of implied contract).
74. Miller v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 259 Cal. Rptr. 56, 59 (Ct. App. 1989)
(affirming summary judgment). Accord Bianco v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 897 F.
Supp. 433, 440-41 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (granting summary judgment where the
plaintiff was relying largely on promotions, pay increases and performance rat-
ings to establish an implied-in-fact contract); Davis v. Consolidated Freight-
ways, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 438, 445-46 (Ct. App. 1994) (affirming summary judg-
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In sharp contrast, evidence of longevity appears to be es-
sential evidence of an implied-in-fact contract. 75 Although at
least one 18-month employee managed to state a viable con-
tract claim,76 the unspoken standard appears to be four or
more years.77 Proof of longevity, however, does not guarantee
ment and emphasizing that, alone, promotions and salary increases received
over the course of his nine year tenure would not establish an implied contract);
Tollefson v. Roman Catholic Bishop, 268 Cal. Rptr. 550, 557-58 (Ct. App. 1990)
(affirming summary judgment and holding that even if the plaintiff did not sign
an at will agreement, she could not establish an implied promise to renew her
employment contract absent good cause with evidence of the duration of her
tenure and of promotions and salary increases). See also Haggerty v. United
Parcel Serv., No. C92-1054JPV, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2137, at *3-5 (N.D. Cal.
Feb. 22, 1993) (granting summary judgment where the only evidence that the
plaintiff offered to establish an implied contract was one positive performance
evaluation); Wood, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 235-36 (Compton, J., dissenting) ("The sug-
gestion in some recent court decisions that somehow a binding contract of em-
ployment can be 'implied' by nothing more than satisfactory performance by the
employee and praise and promotion by the employer stands traditional concepts
on their heads and will discourage employers from praising or promoting em-
ployees for fear that in doing so they are locking themselves into a binding con-
tract which neither party ever contemplated.").
75. Crain v. Burroughs Corp., 560 F. Supp. 849, 853 (C.D. Cal. 1983) (em-
phasizing that the plaintiffs two year tenure was insufficient to rebut the pre-
sumption of at will employment); Knights v. Hewlett-Packard Corp., 281 Cal.
Rptr. 295, 297-98 (Ct. App. 1991) (emphasizing the absence of evidence regard-
ing longevity of service while affirming summary judgment); Newfield v. Insur-
ance Co. of the West, 203 Cal. Rptr. 9, 12 (Ct. App. 1984), rev'd on other
grounds, Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 381 n.14 (Cal. 1988)
(affirming ruling sustaining demurrer and emphasizing that the plaintiffs two
year tenure was insufficient to establish an implied-in-fact agreement).
76. McClain v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 256 Cal. Rptr. 863, 867-70 (Ct. App.
1989) (affirming a jury verdict for the plaintiff).
77. See Tonry, 20 F.3d at 971 (affirming judgment for the plaintiff and com-
menting that the district court could have found an implied-in-fact contract
based on evidence, inter alia, of the plaintiffs eight year tenure); Harlan v. So-
hio Petroleum Co., 677 F. Supp. 1021, 1030 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (denying summary
judgment and finding that the plaintiff established an implied contract where
employed with the company for four years); General Dynamics Corp., 876 P.2d
at 495-96 (finding that the plaintiff stated a viable contract claim where alleg-
ing, inter alia, 14 years of employment); Foley, 765 P.2d at 387-88 (reversing
demurrer and emphasizing allegations that the plaintiff worked for the em-
ployer for six years and nine months in support of finding that he alleged facts
establishing an implied-in-fact agreement); Haycock, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 257
(emphasizing the plaintiffs 25 year tenure and commenting that he offered
"very strong evidence" of an implied contract); Walker, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 188-89
(reversing summary judgment and emphasizing the plaintiffs 19 years of ser-
vice); Luck, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 625 (emphasizing the plaintiffs six year tenure in
support of holding that the plaintiff established an implied contract); Wood, 267
Cal. Rptr. at 232-33 (reversing summary judgment and emphasizing evidence
that the plaintiff worked for the employer for 15 years in support of finding that
the plaintiff established an implied contract); Panopulos, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 815
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an implied-in-fact contract. Alone, it will not serve to estab-
lish the agreement.78 Of course, there is no duty to retain the
plaintiff so that he or she can establish an implied-in-fact
contract. 7
A number of opinions finding for the plaintiff have also
emphasized evidence that the employer's personnel policies
required cause for termination. 0 Indeed, this appears to be a
(emphasizing the plaintiffs 32 year tenure in support of finding that he estab-
lished an implied-in-fact agreement); Zilmer, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 424-25 (revers-
ing the trial court's ruling sustaining demurrer and emphasizing the plaintiffs
allegations that he worked for the employer for 31 years in support of finding
that he stated a viable contract claim); Bell, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 791 (emphasizing
the plaintiffs 11 years of company service in support of finding that she alleged
sufficient facts to overcome the presumption of at will employment); Hejmadi,
249 Cal. Rptr. at 13 (emphasizing the plaintiffs eight year tenure in support of
holding that the plaintiff stated a viable contract claim); Pugh, 171 Cal. Rptr. at
926-27 (reversing nonsuit and emphasizing evidence of the plaintiffs 32 year
tenure in support of finding that the jury could determine the existence of an
implied contract).
78. Hoy v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 861 F. Supp. 881, 884-87 (N.D. Cal. 1994)
(granting summary judgment where the plaintiffs only evidence of an implied
contract was his 26 years of company service); see also Wagner v. Glendale Ad-
ventist Medical Ctr., 265 Cal. Rptr. 412, 418-21 (Ct. App. 1989) (affirming sum-
mary judgment where the plaintiff relied mainly on her 18 year tenure to sup-
port an implied contract).
79. Haggerty v. United Parcel Serv., No. C92-1054JPV, 1993 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 2137, at *3-5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 1993) ("This court will not hold that an
employer has an obligation to provide an employee with the opportunity to
achieve the necessary Pugh factors in order to sustain a claim for an implied
contract.").
80. Foley, 765 P.2d at 387-88 (reversing demurrer and emphasizing that
the plaintiffs allegation that the defendant breached a policy with self-imposed
limitations on its power to discharge employees in support of finding that the
plaintiff alleged facts establishing an implied agreement); Haycock, 28 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 257 (emphasizing that the defendant's lay-off policy provided "sig-
nificant protection to long term employees" and commenting that plaintiff of-
fered "very strong evidence" of an implied contract); Seubert v. McKesson Corp.,
273 Cal. Rptr. 296, 299-300 (Ct. App. 1990) (emphasizing that defendant's per-
sonnel policy stated that employees could be terminated "if not at quota for two
full quarters" in support of ruling that the plaintiff established an implied con-
tract); Wallis v. Farmers Group Ins., 269 Cal. Rptr. 299, 306-07 (Ct. App. 1990)
(emphasizing that the defendant's policy required cause for termination in sup-
port of finding that the plaintiff established an implied contract); Wood, 267
Cal. Rptr. at 232-33 (reversing summary judgment and emphasizing evidence
that the defendant's published policies provided that administrative employees
such as the plaintiff would be dismissed only as a "last resort" in support of
finding that the plaintiff established an implied contract); Zilmer, 263 Cal.
Rptr. at 424-25 (reversing the trial court's ruling sustaining demurrer and em-
phasizing the plaintiffs allegations that the defendant's policies required good
cause for termination in support of finding that he stated a viable contract
claim); Hejmadi, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 13 (emphasizing that the defendant's policy
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particularly persuasive type of evidence.8 ' However, like the
other standard Pugh factors, evidence of the employer's per-
sonnel policies may be subject to a certain degree of scrutiny.
For example, the nature and extent of the employer's poli-
cies s2 as well as the words through which they are ex-
pressed,13 are all important. The plaintiff must do more than
required cause for termination in support of holding that the plaintiff stated a
viable contract claim); Robinson v. Hewlett-Packard Corp., 228 Cal. Rptr. 591,
599-601 (Ct. App. 1986) (emphasizing that the defendant's personnel policies
prohibited terminating an employee for poor performance until the employee
was given counseling and an opportunity to correct his or her performance
problems in support of holding that the plaintiff established an implied con-
tract); Pugh, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 927 (reversing nonsuit and emphasizing evidence
of the defendant's acknowledged policy of requiring cause for termination in
support of finding that the jury could determine the existence of implied con-
tract). See also Ibironke v. NORPAC, No. C90-0659MHP, 1992 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 8557, at *10-12 (N.D. Cal. June 3, 1992) (denying summary judgment
where the defendant admitted that employees had job security and would not
be terminated as long as their performance was satisfactory). Cf. Davis v. Con-
solidated Freightways, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 438, 445-46 (Ct. App. 1994) (affirming
summary judgment and emphasizing fact that plaintiff never saw any written
policy requiring good cause for termination in support of finding that he failed
to establish implied contract); Miller v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 259 Cal. Rptr.
56, 58-59 (Ct. App. 1989) (affirming summary judgment and emphasizing that
there was uncontroverted evidence that the defendant's policies did not require
cause for termination); Newfield v. Insurance Co. of the West, 203 Cal. Rptr. 9,
12 (Ct. App. 1984) (affirming ruling sustaining demurrer and emphasizing that
the plaintiffs complaint failed to allege that the defendant's policies required
cause for termination).
81. Scott v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 904 P.2d 834, 845 (Cal. 1995) (holding
that, alone, the defendant's detailed progressive discipline policy provided the
basis for an implied-in-fact contract); Wilkerson v. Wells Fargo Bank, 261 Cal.
Rptr. 185, 192-93 (Ct. App. 1989) (reversing summary judgment and emphasiz-
ing evidence that the defendant's policy required good cause for termination-
which was the plaintiffs only evidence of an implied contract-in support of
finding that the plaintiff established an implied-in-fact contract).
82. Hoy, 861 F. Supp. at 885 n.2 (rejecting the plaintiffs argument that an
employment document entitled "Agreement of Terms and Conditions of Com-
pensation for Big Ticket Salespeople" required good cause for his termination,
because the agreement only dealt with his compensation, not the terms of his
employment, and was thus irrelevant); Knights v. Hewlett-Packard Corp., 281
Cal. Rptr. 295, 297-98 (Ct. App. 1991) (emphasizing that the defendant's per-
sonnel policy was merely a guideline in support of finding that the plaintiff
failed to raise a triable issue of material fact as to the existence of an implied
contract). Cf. Baker v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 608 F. Supp. 1315,
1323 n.2 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (rejecting the plaintiffs argument that he established
a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing with
evidence that he was discharged without application of the defendant's progres-
sive discipline policy, because the policy only applied to hourly employees, and
he was on salary).
83. Lorentz v. Carus Corp., No. C91-1013BAC, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
12591, at *5-8 (N.D. Cal. July 14, 1992) (granting summary judgment and con-
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offer his or her own subjective impressions of what the em-
ployer's policy requires. 4
Standard allegations in a breach of contract complaint
invariably include representations of job security, i.e., assur-
ances that the employee would have a job so long as his or her
job performance remains satisfactory.8 5 This is easily ex-
cluding that statements made in the defendant's handbook that the defendant
had an "open door" policy and a policy of "respect and fair treatment for all
employees" were too general to support an implied contract).
84. Hoy, 861 F. Supp. at 887 (rejecting the plaintiffs argument that he es-
tablished an implied contract with evidence that the defendant's policies re-
quired cause for termination because the evidence, which consisted of his decla-
ration and a declaration of one of his co-workers stating that it was general
knowledge that employees were only terminated for cause, "amount[ed to no
more than a recitation of the subjective impressions of selected employees with-
out any apparent foundation for these conclusions or their relevance").
85. General Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court, 876 P.2d 487, 495-96 (Cal.
1994) (finding that the plaintiff stated a viable contract claim where alleging,
inter alia, promises of job security and substantial retirement benefits); Foley,
765 P.2d at 387-88 (reversing demurrer and emphasizing allegations that the
plaintiff "received repeated oral assurances of job security" in support of finding
that he alleged facts establishing implied agreement); Thomka v. Financial
Corp. of Am., 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 382, 383-86 (Ct. App. 1993) (affirming verdict for
the plaintiff and finding that there was substantial evidence of an implied con-
tract, including specifically evidence of posthire promises that the plaintiff
would not be terminated without cause); Wood v. Loyola Marymount Univ., 267
Cal. Rptr. 230, 232-33 (Ct. App. 1990) (reversing summary judgment and em-
phasizing evidence that the plaintiff was assured that he would only be termi-
nated for cause in support of finding that the plaintiff established an implied
contract); Zilmer, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 425 (reversing the trial court's ruling sus-
taining demurrer and emphasizing the plaintiffs allegations that he was as-
sured that he would only be terminated for good cause in support of finding that
he stated a viable contract claim); Hejmadi, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 13 (emphasizing
assurances of job security in support of holding that the plaintiff stated a viable
contract claim); Pugh, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 927 (reversing nonsuit and emphasizing
evidence that the plaintiff was assured he would only be terminated for cause in
support of finding that the jury could determine the existence of implied
contract).
Claims for breach of an oral promise are routinely treated as claims for
breach of an implied-in-fact contract. Foley, 765 P.2d at 373 (remarking that
the plaintiffs claim was properly described as one for breach of an implied-in-
fact contract rather than breach of "oral contract" where he was relying on evi-
dence of the parties' course of conduct, including oral representations of job se-
curity). Nonetheless, a promise made during an interview may be separately
actionable. Comeaux v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 915 F.2d 1264, 1272-
73 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that the plaintiff was entitled to recover reliance
damages for his moving costs based on the defendant's breach of an express
promise to assign work to the plaintiff if he relocated). But see Sheppard v.
Morgan Keegan & Co., 266 Cal. Rptr. 784, 786 (Ct. App. 1990) (commenting
that promise by the defendant that the plaintiff would be earning a certain sal-
ary and that the plaintiffs salary would increase within one year was not the
kind of communication indicating an assurance that the defendant would only
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plained by the fact that evidence of these type of assurances
is virtually essential to the employee's implied-in-fact con-
tract claim.86 Like evidence of longevity, assurances of job
security must rise to a specific standard. The California
Supreme Court has made clear that "oblique language will
not, standing alone, be sufficient to establish [an implied-in-
fact] agreement. 87 The court of appeal opinion in Gould v.
be terminated for cause where the defendant made the promise before the plain-
tiff even accepted a position with the company).
86. See, e.g., Davis v. Consolidated Freightway, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 438, 445
(Ct. App. 1994) (affirming summary judgment and commenting that assurances
that the plaintiff would not be terminated so long as he was performing well
were "conspicuously absent" from his pleadings or the evidence); Haycock v.
Hughes Aircraft Co., 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 248, 257 (Ct. App. 1994) (emphasizing in
evaluating evidence of an implied agreement the fact that the plaintiff admitted
that no one ever promised him permanent employment during his 25 year ten-
ure and that he was never told that he could only be terminated for cause);
Tollefson v. Roman Catholic Bishop, 268 Cal. Rptr. 550, 557 (Ct. App. 1990)
(affirming summary judgment and emphasizing that the plaintiff admitted no
one ever told her she had a right to have her contract renewed absent good
cause); Wagner v. Glendale Adventist Medical Ctr., 265 Cal. Rptr. 412, 419 (Ct.
App. 1989) (affirming summary judgment and emphasizing that the plaintiff
failed to present any evidence of oral representations that her employment was
in fact permanent); Miller v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 259 Cal. Rptr. 56, 58 (Ct.
App. 1989) (affirming summary judgment and emphasizing the absence of evi-
dence that the plaintiff was assured cause was required for termination). But
see Walker v. Blue Cross of Cal., 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 184, 189-90 (Ct. App. 1992)
(finding that the plaintiff established an implied contract despite the absence of
evidence of assurances she would only be terminated for cause); Luck v. South-
ern Pac. Transp. Co., 267 Cal. Rptr. 618, 624-25 (Ct. App. 1990) (finding that
the plaintiff established an implied contract for the purpose of his claim for
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing even though the
defendant did not make any assurances of continued employment, and revers-
ing nonsuit), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 939 (1990).
87. Foley, 765 P.2d at 387; accord Newfield v. Insurance Co. of the West,
203 Cal. Rptr. 9, 12 (Ct. App. 1984) (affirming ruling sustaining demurrer and
emphasizing promise that the plaintiff would have a "permanent career" was
too oblique to support an implied contract). See also Hanson v. Heckler MFG. &
Inv. Group, No. C91-2809SBA, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16861, at *11-15 (N.D.
Cal. Oct. 27, 1992) (granting summary judgment where the plaintiffs relevant
evidence consisted of one posthire statement to the effect that she would have a
job as long as her performance was satisfactory).
Assurances allegedly establishing a contract may also be attacked as vague
and indefinite. See, e.g., Ladas v. California State Auto. Ass'n, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d
810, 813-15 (Ct. App. 1993) (rejecting the plaintiff insurance representatives'
claims for failure to pay commissions comparable to that received by agents at
other companies as vague, amorphous and indefinite); Rochlis v. Walt Disney
Co., 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 793, 797-98 (Ct. App. 1993) (finding that promises alleg-
edly made to the plaintiff that he would receive "reasonable salary increases," a
"reasonable bonus" and would "actively and meaningfully participate in... all
creative activities" of the department were not cognizable as contract claims
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Maryland Sound Indus.8 8 is representative. There, the ap-
pellate court affirmed the trial court's ruling sustaining the
employer's demurrer, reasoning that statements that the em-
ployer was looking for "long-term" employees and that em-
ployees would become "members" of the company after suc-
cessfully completing a probationary period were too oblique to
support an implied-in-fact contract.8 9
Employee handbooks also may be used to establish an
implied-in-fact contract. 90 In the appropriate case, the hand-
book alone may be enough. 9' However, courts have re-
sponded to the increasing use of "disclaimers" (provisions
stating that the handbook is not a contractual document) by
because they were too vague and indefinite to be enforceable). In his dissenting
opinion in Wood, Judge Compton suggested that:
In the case of a claimed "implied-in-fact" contract, the employee should
at a minimum be required to satisfy a court as to just what the specific
terms of that contract are. The questions that need to be answered
are: (1) How long is the employment to last? Is it for a lifetime? Until a
specified age? (2) What is the amount of compensation? Can the em-
ployee's salary be cut for any reason? Are raises required? (3) In the
future, can the employee be required to do a different type of work?
Can the employee be transferred? Demoted?
Wood, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 236 (Compton, J., dissenting). Judge Compton sug-
gested further that: "Obviously, the simple assertion that the employee was "led
to believe' that if he satisfactorily did the job he was paid to do, he could only be
discharged for 'cause' answers none of these questions." Id. See also Ladas, 23
Cal. Rptr 2d at 816 ("Employers frequently boast of good benefits, competitive
salaries, excellent working conditions and the like. To anoint such puffing lan-
guage with contractual import would open the door to a plethora of specious
litigation and constitute a severe and unwarranted intrusion on the ability of
business enterprise to manage internal affairs.").
88. 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 718, 726 (Ct. App. 1995).
89. Id. at 726-27 (affirming summary judgment for the defendant).
90. Foley, 765 P.2d at 383 n.20 (commenting that the plaintiff could have
stated a viable cause of action for breach of contract by alleging the defendant's
breach of an express promise in its employee handbook); Wilkerson v. Wells
Fargo Bank, 261 Cal. Rptr. 185, 189-91 (Ct. App. 1989) (rejecting the defend-
ant's argument that its nonintegrated handbook was dispositive as to the terms
of the employment relationship and commenting that the handbook was simply
one of the factors for the jury to consider in determining the existence and con-
tent of the parties' employment agreement).
91. Wood, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 231-34 (affirming summary judgment where
there was evidence that the defendant's handbook required good cause for ter-
mination); Prevost v. First W. Bank, 239 Cal. Rptr. 161, 167 (Ct. App. 1987)
(reversing summary judgment and finding that the wording of the defendant's
personnel manual-which stated that "[i]f it is evidence that excessive
problems or deficiencies exist [during the three month probationary period],
consideration should be given to terminating the employment relationship dur-
ing the probationary period"-implied that good cause was required for
termination).
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severely restricting the use of this particular type of evidence.
"Reasonable reliance"92 and a "mutual intent" to be bound by
the handbook terms are the chief restrictions.93 Even then,
courts are free to offer their own construction of the handbook
language.
94
92. Mundy v. Household Fin. Corp., 885 F.2d 542, 544-45 (9th Cir. 1989)
(affirming summary judgment where the plaintiff signed an at will employment
agreement and finding that since the employment relationship was clearly at
will, the plaintiff could not have had a reasonable expectation that he would
only be terminated for cause); Siddoway v. Bank of Am., 748 F. Supp. 1456,
1459-60 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (granting summary judgment); Crain v. Burroughs
Corp., 560 F. Supp. 849, 852-53 (C.D. Cal. 1983) (granting summary judgment
and emphasizing that the plaintiff could not rely on the defendant's handbook
to establish an implied-in-fact agreement where the preface of the handbook
stated that it was "informational only" (i.e., not a contract) and could be modi-
fied or revoked at any time); Modafferi v. General Instrument Corp., No. C90-
0555K (CM), 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14098, at *18-19 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 1991)
(granting summary judgment and finding that the plaintiff could not rely on the
defendant's policy where the policy was rescinded before the plaintiff was origi-
nally hired). Cf DeHorney v. Bank of Am. Trust & Say. Co., 879 F.2d 459, 466-
67 (9th Cir. 1989) (affirming summary judgment and finding as a matter of law
that since the defendant's personnel policies stated that employment was at
will, the plaintiff "could not have reasonably believed that [the defendant's] per-
sonnel policies modified the clear terms of her employment contract.. . ."); Hag-
gard v. Kimberly Quality Care, Inc., 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16, 22 (Ct. App. 1995)
(reversing a jury verdict for the plaintiff based on this same conclusion).
93. Bianco v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 897 F. Supp. 433, 440 (C.D. Cal. 1995)
(granting summary judgment and holding the plaintiff could not rely on state-
ments in the defendant's handbook where there was strong evidence the parties
did not intend to enter an agreement requiring good cause for discharge);
Hillsman v. Sutter Community Hosp., 200 Cal. Rptr. 605, 611 (Ct. App. 1984)
("An employer may maintain rules or procedures related to the termination of
employment which may form part of an implied contract of employment if the
employer and the employee had a mutual understanding that the rules or pro-
cedures would apply to the employee."); see also Funk v. Sperry Corp., 842 F.2d
1129, 1132 (9th Cir. 1988) (commenting that the plaintiff would have to demon-
strate that the parties had a 'mutual understanding" the handbook terms
would apply to him before he could rely on the handbook as evidence of an im-
plied agreement); Modafferi, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14097, at *16-18 (granting
summary judgment and finding that the plaintiff could not rely on the defend-
ant's policy defining "discharge" as a separation from the company for cause
where admitting that he did not know of the policy when originally hired).
94. Haggard, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 24-25 (scrutinizing language in the defend-
ant's handbook); Kelecheva v. Multivision Cable T.V. Corp., 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d
453, 459-460 (Ct. App. 1993) (emphasizing the defendant's admission of a mu-
tual understanding that the plaintiff had a right to rely on the handbook in
support of a finding that the plaintiff raised a triable issue of material fact as to
the nature of his employment status); Moore v. May Dep't Stores Co., 271 Cal.
Rptr. 841, 843 (Ct. App. 1990) (affirming summary judgment and rejecting the
plaintiffs argument that the defendant breached an implied covenant by failing
to warn and counsel her prior to termination, because contrary to the defend-
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4. Breach of Implied-In-Fact Contract
a. Management Discretion
Just as Labor Code section 2922 is the starting point for
any analysis on the issue of the existence of an implied-in-
fact contract, the principle of "management discretion" is the
starting point for any discussion on the issue of breach. This
principle is an expression of the basic notion that juries
should not be allowed to second-guess the employer's legiti-
mate business decisions, especially where the decision in-
volves management level employees.95 The Pugh court re-
duced this principle to its most rudimentary form, stating
simply that "[clare must be taken ... not to interfere with the
legitimate exercise of managerial discretion."96 In Wilkerson
v. Wells Fargo Bank,9 7 the court then articulated the practi-
cal test. The court stated that "[b]ecause an employer has
wide latitude in making personnel decisions, the test for good
cause is not whether the jurors would have fired the em-
ployee, but rather, whether the discharge was within the
bounds of the employer's discretion, or instead, was trivial,
capricious, unrelated to business needs or goals, or pretex-
ant's personnel policies did not provide for warning and counseling in every
case, but rather depended on the seriousness of the violation).
95. As noted by the court in the second Pugh opinion:
In any free enterprise system, an employer must have wide latitude in
making independent, good-faith judgments about high-ranking em-
ployees without the threat of a jury second-guessing its business judg-
ment. Measuring the effective performance of such an employee in-
volves the consideration of many intangible attributes such as
personality, initiative, ability to function as part of the management
team and to motivate subordinates, and the ability to conceptualize
and effectuate management style and goals. Unlike the employee with
routine or mechanical duties whose performance can be measured by
an objective standard, a management employee's unsatisfactory per-
formance is often difficult to pinpoint precisely, and the reasons for his
or her discharge may be difficult to articulate.
Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 250 Cal. Rptr. 195, 212-13 (Ct. App. 1988) ("Pugh
II"). See also Wood, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 236 (Compton, J., dissenting) ("It cannot
be the law that a private employer must ... submit the soundness or wisdom of
what he or she considers to be good cause for termination to the determination
of a jury. This . . . would turn the courts into a civil service commission for
employees in the private sector."). In Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist.,
729 P.2d 743 (Cal. 1987), the California Supreme Court observed that "every
employer must on occasion review, criticize, demote, transfer and discipline em-
ployees." Id. at 750.
96. Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 928 (Ct. App. 1981).
97. 261 Cal. Rptr. 185 (Ct. App. 1989).
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tual."98 Put another way, "[a]bsent some showing that the
termination of [the] plaintiffs employment was pretextual,
the fact finder should not decide the correctness of the em-
ployer's termination of [the] plaintiffs employment."99
Significantly, while the scope of management discretion
is substantial, it is not unlimited. In the words of one court:
If the reason advanced by the employer for the discharge
are trivial, capricious, unrelated to business needs or
goals, or pretextual, the jury may properly find that the
stated reason for the termination was not a "fair and hon-
est cause or reason" regulated by good faith. In this
sense, the employer does not have an unfettered right to
exercise discretion in the guise of business judgment.1"'
In Crosier v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 01 the court explained
the reason for this restriction. The Crosier court observed
that "[a]n implied-in-fact or implied-in-law promise to dis-
miss an employee only for cause would be illusory if the em-
ployer were permitted to be the sole judge and final arbiter of
the propriety of the policy giving rise to the discharge." 102
b. Evidence Establishing Breach
Ordinarily, the plaintiff alleges breach of the employer's
written policies01 (e.g., a notice requirement or progressive
98. Id. at 192.
99. Hoy v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 861 F. Supp. 881, 888 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
100. Pugh 11, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 213. Accord Scott v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co.,
904 P.2d 834, 840 (Cal. 1995) ("[Tlhe employer's right to demote, like the right
to discharge, is not absolute."); Walker v. Blue Cross of Cal., 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 184,
190 (Ct. App. 1992) ("While the scope of [managerial] discretion is substantial,
it is not unrestricted."); Wood, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 135 ("The employer does not
have an unfettered right to exercise discretion in the guise of business
judgment.").
As an interesting aside, the California Supreme Court recently ruled that a
corporation's right to discharge an in-house attorney due to loss of confidence
was not absolute, but was rather qualified by its obligation to honor antecedent
contractual obligations, including the obligation not to discharge except for good
cause. General Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court, 876 P.2d 487, 491-94 (Cal.
1994). The defendant in that case advanced the unsuccessful argument that as
a client, it had an absolute right to discharge the plaintiff attorney at any time
and for any reason. Id. at 492-94.
101. 198 Cal. Rptr. 361 (Ct. App. 1983).
102. Id. at 366.
103. See, e.g., Kerr v. Rose, 265 Cal. Rptr. 597, 600-03 (Ct. App. 1990) (hold-
ing that the plaintiff stated a viable claim for breach of implied contract where
alleging that the defendant failed to follow its own recall policy). See also
Breitman v. May Co. Cal., 37 F.3d 562, 565 (9th Cir. 1994) (reversing summary
judgment where the plaintiff was terminated for authorizing a temporary em-
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discipline policy),' °4 pretext,1 °5 or simply that the employer
ployee to add four hours to her timecard to cover traveling expenses based on
evidence that the defendant had a written policy prohibiting the falsification of
timecards, but that this policy was neither followed nor uniformly enforced).
For this type of claim to be actionable, there must be a nexus between the
breached promise and the adverse employment action. Burton v. Security Pac.
Nat'l Bank, 243 Cal. Rptr. 277, 280 (Ct. App. 1988) (finding that employee ter-
minated for reading confidential materials could not raise a triable issue of fact
with evidence the defendant failed to give him an oral warning before writing
him up for an unrelated offense).
104. See, e.g., Scott, 904 P.2d at 844 (holding that the plaintiffs established
breach of an implied contract not to demote without good cause with evidence
that the defendant failed to follow detailed procedures outlined in its progres-
sive discipline policy); General Dynamics Corp., 876 P.2d at 495 (finding that
the plaintiff stated a viable contract claim where alleging termination in viola-
tion of the defendant's published discharge procedures); Wood, 267 Cal. Rptr. at
233-35 (reversing summary judgment where the plaintiff offered evidence that
he was terminated in violation of the defendant's written termination proce-
dures requiring notice and a pretermination hearing).
105. See, e.g., Kelecheva v. Multivision Cable T.V. Corp., 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d
453, 459-60 (Ct. App. 1993) (holding that the plaintiff raised a triable issue of
material fact with evidence that he was terminated because he refused to dis-
criminate against a coworker who was the union shop steward, not for poor
performance and insubordination); Thomka v. Financial Corp. of Am., 19 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 382, 385-86 (Ct. App. 1993) (affirming a verdict for the plaintiff and
finding that there was substantial evidence that he was terminated for ob-
jecting to the defendant's misleading practices, and not because he had psychi-
atric difficulties); Walker, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 188-89 (reversing summary judg-
ment where there was evidence that the defendant amended its medical leave
policy to facilitate the plaintiffs discharge while she was on medical leave in
order to avoid having to retain her after an impending reduction in force); Wal-
lis v. Farmers Group Ins., 269 Cal. Rptr. 299, 306-08 (Ct. App. 1990) (affirming
judgment for the plaintiff in a case where the plaintiff asserted that she was
terminated for filing suit against the defendant, and not for a conflict of inter-
est); McClain v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 256 Cal. Rptr. 863, 869-70 (Ct. App. 1989)
(affirming a jury verdict for the plaintiff where the plaintiff asserted that he
was terminated for complaining about his supervisor's racist behavior); Prevost
v. First W. Bank, 239 Cal. Rptr. 161, 166-68 (Ct. App. 1987) (reversing sum-
mary judgment where there was evidence raising a triable issue of fact as to
whether the plaintiff was actually terminated for poor performance, as asserted
by the defendant, or whether he was discharged as part of a "power struggle").
In Scott, the California Supreme Court recently held that disgruntled em-
ployees may sue their employers for wrongful demotion. Scott, 904 P.2d at 838-
39. In that case, the plaintiffs were both long-term employees demoted based
on conflict of interest and negligent supervision charges. Id. at 836. They sub-
sequently brought suit alleging breach of an implied-in-fact promise not to de-
mote except for good cause, based largely on the defendant's failure to follow
procedures outlined in its detailed progressive disciplined policy. Id. at 837. In
rejecting the defendant's argument that there can be no claim for wrongful de-
motion, the court explained that:
Conceptually, there is no rational reason why an employer's policy that
its employees will not be demoted except for good cause, like a policy
restricting termination or providing for severance pay, cannot become
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"got it wrong" (i.e., mistakenly concluded that there was good
cause for termination). ' 0 6 This issue also may be resolved as
a matter of law.10
7
an implied term of an employment contract. In each of these instances,
an employer promises to confer a significant benefit on the employee,
and it is a question of fact whether that promise was reasonably under-
stood by the employee to create a contractual obligation.
Id. at 843.
It must be noted further that an actual termination is not the sine qua non
of a wrongful discharge claim. The doctrine of "constructive discharge" permits
plaintiffs to maintain an action against an employer who "purposely creates
working conditions so intolerable that the employee has no option but to resign
.... " Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 876 P.2d 1022, 1025 (Cal. 1994) (quoting
Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NRLB, 467 U.S. 883, 894 (1984)). To prevail at trial, the
plaintiff "would have to prove that [the defendant] breached an implied promise
not to discharge him without good cause by forcing him to submit to intolerable
working conditions which forseeably and proximately caused his resignation."
Panopulos v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 264 Cal. Rptr. 810, 814 (Ct. App. 1989).
106. Wilkerson v. Wells Fargo Bank, 261 Cal. Rptr. 185, 192-93 (Ct. App.
1989) (reversing summary judgment where the plaintiff offered evidence contro-
verting the defendant's evidence that the reason for his termination-person-
ally benefiting from a bank transaction-constituted good cause for
termination).
107. E.g., Joanou v. Coca-Cola Co., 26 F.3d 96, 99 (9th Cir. 1994) (affirming
summary judgment where there was unrefuted evidence that the plaintiffs
were discharged when the defendant sold the portion of its enterprise at which
they were employed); Gianaculas v. TWA, 761 F.2d 1391, 1394-95 (9th Cir.
1985) (affirming summary judgment where the plaintiffs failed to refute the
defendant's evidence that they were furloughed as the result of a general reduc-
tion in management necessitated by the company's economic condition); Hoy v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 861 F. Supp. 881, 887-88 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (granting sum-
mary judgment where the plaintiff was terminated for poor performance); Van
Komen v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 638 F. Supp. 739, 740-41 (C.D. Cal. 1986)
(granting summary judgment where there was overwhelming evidence of the
plaintiffs poor performance); Stokes v. Dole Nut Co., 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 673 (Ct.
App. 1995) (affirming summary judgment against management level employees
who tried to set up a new business which would compete directly with the de-
fendant's business while still employed by the defendant); Knights v. Hewlett-
Packard Corp., 281 Cal. Rptr. 295, 297-98 (Ct. App. 1991) (affirming summary
judgment where the plaintiffs poor performance was "abundantly clear");
Moore v. May Dep't Stores Co., 271 Cal. Rptr. 841, 843 (Ct. App. 1990) (af-
firming summary judgment where there was "no question" that the plaintiffs
gross negligence resulted in theft of substantial amount of jewelry); Fowler v.
Varian Assoc., Inc., 241 Cal. Rptr. 539, 542-44 (Ct. App. 1987) (affirming sum-
mary judgment and expressly rejecting the plaintiffs argument that the good
cause issue cannot be resolved as a matter of law); Robinson v. Hewlett-Pack-
ard Corp., 228 Cal. Rptr. 591, 599-601 (Ct. App. 1986) (affirming summary
judgment where the plaintiff was discharged for poor performance when, de-
spite efforts to accommodate his work-related back injury, his performance in-
creasingly deteriorated).
However, to prevail on summary judgment, the employer has to offer evi-
dence beyond conclusory statements concerning the reason for the plaintiffs
discharge. Cf. Sheppard v. Morgan Keegan & Co., 266 Cal. Rptr. 784, 787 (Ct.
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B. The Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
1. General Principles
The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is im-
plied in every contract not as a matter of fact, but instead as a
matter of law. 10 8 It obligates employers to act fairly and in
good faith, 10 9 to treat like cases alike,110 and to follow their
own written policies and procedures. 1 What the implied
App. 1990) (reversing summary judgment and emphasizing that the defendant
failed to demonstrate good cause for the plaintiffs termination with conclusory
statements about the reason for the plaintiffs discharge). And note that at
least one court has stated that the good cause issue may not be resolved as a
matter of law in cases involving termination for misconduct. Wilkerson, 261
Cal. Rptr. at 192-93 ("If an employer claims the employee was discharged for
specific misconduct, and the employee denies the charge, the question of
whether the misconduct occurred is one of fact for the jury.").
108. Kern v. Levolor Lorentzen, Inc., 899 F.2d 772, 777 (9th Cir. 1990)
("Under California law, every contract includes a covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, which requires that neither party 'do anything which will deprive the
other of the benefits of the agreement."') (quoting Seaman's Direct Buying Serv.
v. Standard Oil Corp., 686 P.2d 1158, 1166 (Cal. 1984)); Mundy v. Household
Fin. Corp., 885 F.2d 542, 544 (9th Cir. 1989) ("California law implied a covenant
of good faith and fair dealing in every contract."); Funk v. Sperry Corp., 842
F.2d 1129, 1132 (9th Cir. 1988) ("In California, as a matter of law every con-
tract contains an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing."); Tollefson v.
Roman Catholic Bishop, 268 Cal. Rptr. 550, 555 (Ct. App. 1990) ("[Tlhe law
implies a duty of good faith and fair dealing in every contract."); Sheppard v.
Morgan Keegan & Co., 266 Cal. Rptr. 784, 786 (Ct. App. 1990) ("There is also
inherent in every contract a covenant of good faith and fair dealing."); Luck v.
Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 267 Cal. Rptr. 618, 623 (Ct. App. 1990) ("A covenant
of good faith and fair dealing is implied in every contract."); Hejmadi v.
AMFAC, Inc., 249 Cal. Rptr. 5, 16 (Ct. App. 1988) ("It is well settled that the
implied covenant exists in every contract."); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 205 (1996) ("Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of
good faith and fair dealing in its performance and enforcement.").
109. Hoy, 861 F. Supp. at 888 ("The implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing requires that the employer act fairly and in good faith."); Walker, 6 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 190 ("The duty imposed by the covenant is one of good faith and fair
dealing in the performance and enforcement of the contract."); Sheppard, 266
Cal. Rptr. at 786 ("This covenant implies a promise that each party will refrain
from doing anything to injure the right of the other to receive the benefits of the
agreement.").
110. Rulon-Miller v. International Business Machs. Corp., 208 Cal. Rptr.
524, 526 (Ct. App. 1984) ("The duty of fair dealing by an employer is, simply
stated, a requirement that like cases be treated alike.").
111. Kern, 899 F.2d at 776-77 (affirming verdict for the plaintiff where there
was evidence that the manner of the plaintiffs layoff breached the defendant's
layoff policy); Rulon-Miller, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 526 (Implied in the duty of fair
dealing "is that the company, if it has rules and regulations, apply those rules
and regulations to its employees as well as affording its employees their
protection.").
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covenant of good faith and fair dealing does not require is
good cause for terminating at will employees. 112  In this
sense, the implied covenant should be carefully distinguished
from an implied-in-fact promise not to terminate except for
good cause.
112. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 400 n.39 (Cal. 1988) (A
claim for breach of the implied covenant "cannot logically be based on a claim
that a discharge was made without good cause. If such an interpretation ap-
plied, then all at will contracts would be transmuted into contracts requiring
good cause for termination, and Labor Code § 2922 would be eviscerated."). Ac-
cord Schneider v. TRW, Inc., 938 F.2d 986, 991 (9th Cir. 1991) ("'Because the
implied covenant protects only the parties' right to receive the benefit of their
agreement, and, in an at will relationship there is no agreement to terminate
only for good cause, the implied covenant standing alone cannot be read to im-
pose such a duty.") (quoting Foley, 765 P.2d at 400 n.39); Comeaux v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Co., 915 F.2d 1264, 1272 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that the
plaintiff could not rely on the implied covenant to "transform" his at will em-
ployment contract into a contract requiring good cause for termination); Rose v.
Wells Fargo & Co., 902 F.2d 1417, 1425-27 (9th Cir. 1990) ("[W]hen an employ-
ment contract expressly provides that it may be terminated at will or for any
reason... the covenant of good faith and fair dealing cannot be used to supply a
requirement for good cause to terminate."); DeHorney v. Bank of Am. Natl
Trust & Sav. Co., 879 F.2d 459, 465-66 (9th Cir. 1989) ("In sum, Foley settles
California law that when parties have agreed that their contract is terminable
at the will of either of them, . . .the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing cannot be invoked by either party to prevent a court from enforcing the
terms of the contract.").
Termination of an at will employee without good cause does not violate the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. See, e.g., Mundy, 885 F.2d at
544-45 (affirming summary judgment); DeHorney, 879 F.2d at 465-66 (same);
Camp v. Jeffer, Mangels, Butler & Marmaro, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 329, 335 (Ct. App.
1995) (same); Gould v. Maryland Sound Indus., Inc., 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 718, 727
(Ct. App. 1995) (affirming ruling sustaining demurrer); Slivinsky v. Watkins-
Johnson Co., 270 Cal. Rptr. 585, 588 (Ct. App. 1990) (affirming summary judg-
ment); Gerdlund v. Electronic Dispensers Int'l, 235 Cal. Rptr. 279, 285-87 (Ct.
App. 1987) (commenting that it was error for the trial court to instruct the jury
on the plaintiffs claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing where the plaintiff signed an at will agreement). However, in the ex-
ceptional case, an at will employee may still be able to maintain a cause of
action. Comeaux, 915 F.2d at 1272 ("The implied covenant.., remains avail-
able as a cause of action, even in the face of an at-will employment contract,
where a plaintiff alleges that conduct other than his discharge violated the [im-
plied) covenant."); Rose, 902 F.2d at 1425-27 (explaining that an at will em-
ployee can maintain an action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing where establishing the following elements: "(1) the employee's
expectation of benefit from the contract; (2) that the expectation of benefit is not
dependent upon a continuous employment relationship which can only be ter-
minated for cause; and (3) a bad-faith termination coupled with the wrongful
intent of the employer to deprive the employee of that benefit of the
agreement.").
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To establish this claim, the plaintiff must offer evidence
of an employment contract 113 and of "bad faith" conduct ex-
traneous to the contract.' 14 Evidence of the absence of good
113. "If plaintiff is able to establish the existence of an employment agree-
ment, California law will supply a covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
which requires that neither party do anything to deprive the other of the bene-
fits of the agreement." Kelecheva v. Multivision Cable T.V. Corp., 22 Cal. Rptr.
2d 453, 458 (Ct. App. 1993); see also Bianco v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 897 F.
Supp. 433, 441 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (granting summary judgment on the plaintiffs
claim for breach of the implied covenant because he failed to establish an em-
ployment contract); Foley, 765 P.2d at 415 (Kaufman, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ("Clearly, no action for breach of the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing will lie unless it has first been proved that, expressly or by
implication, the employer has given the employee a reasonable expectation of
continued employment so long as the employee performs satisfactorily.");
Gould, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 726 (affirming ruling sustaining demurrer to the
plaintiffs claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
where he failed to state a viable breach of contract claim).
114. See, e.g., Rose, 902 F.2d at 1425-27 (affirming summary judgment
where even assuming the plaintiffs established the fact that the defendant had
a reassignment policy, there was no evidence that they were terminated in bad
faith or that the defendant intended to deprive them of the benefit of the policy);
Baker v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 608 F. Supp. 1315, 1322-23 (N.D.
Cal. 1984) (granting summary judgment where the plaintiff failed to establish
bad faith conduct extraneous to the contract); Shapiro v. Wells Fargo Realty
Advisors, 199 Cal. Rptr. 613, 619-20 (Ct. App. 1984) (finding that no cause of
action for breach of the implied covenant was stated where the plaintiffs com-
plaint alleged only that the defendant represented that the plaintiff would not
be terminated without good cause or in violation of statute or public policy, that
these representations were false and willfully concealed, and that the plaintiff
relied on these representations to his detriment, because the complaint did not
allege facts showing "a bad faith act by [the defendant] which was extraneous to
the employment relationship and which was intended to frustrate his enjoy-
ment of contractual rights"); see also Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 250 Cal. Rptr.
195, 213 (Ct. App. 1988) (reciting elements of cause of action); Burton v. Secur-
ity Pac. Nat'l Bank, 243 Cal. Rptr. 277, 281 (Ct. App. 1988) ("To be entitled to a
trial for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, [the plain-
tiff] must bring forth facts showing that [the defendant] acted in 'bad faith' and
without 'probable cause."'). But see infra note 122 (citing cases where the plain-
tiff established a viable covenant claim with evidence the defendant failed to
follow its own personnel policies).
"Although longevity of satisfactory service is helpful to a plaintiff in estab-
lishing a breach of duty of fairness towards him, that factor is not essential to
the cause of action." Prevost v. First W. Bank, 239 Cal. Rptr. 161, 167 (Ct. App.
1987). Accord Gray v. Superior Court, 226 Cal. Rptr. 570, 573 (Ct. App. 1986).
"'Bad faith' is defined as [t]he opposite of 'good faith,' generally
implying or involving actual or constructive fraud, or a design to mis-
lead or deceive another, or a neglect or refusal to fulfill some duty or
some contractual obligation, not prompted by an honest mistake ... ,
but by some interested or sinister motive[,] . . . not simply bad judg-
ment or negligence, but rather ... the conscious doing of a wrong be-
cause of dishonest purpose or moral obliquity; .. . it contemplates a
state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill will."
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cause for termination is relevant to a showing of bad faith.11
Conversely, evidence of good cause may be used to refute or
negate allegations of bad faith, 116 as can evidence of a good
faith mistake1 7 or of the employer's efforts to investigate the
charged misconduct. 8 Recovery is limited to contract
damages." 9
Pugh 11, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 209 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DicT. 127 (5th ed. 1979))
(alterations original; internal quotation marks omitted).
115. Pugh II, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 213 ("Lack of good cause is evidence that the
employer acted in bad faith, i.e., had a wrongful motive in depriving the em-
ployee of the benefits of the employment contract."). See also Prevost, 239 Cal.
Rptr. at 168 ("[An action will lie where the existence of good cause for dis-
charge is asserted by the employer without a good faith belief that good cause in
fact exists.").
116. Fowler v. Varian Assoc., Inc., 241 Cal. Rptr. 539, 542 (Ct. App. 1987)
(commenting that because the "defendant had good cause to discharge [the
plaintiff], the discharge by definition was not in bad faith"); Pugh 11, 250 Cal.
Rptr. at 213 ("Good cause to discharge is... evidence of the [defendant's] justifi-
cation for its actions and inferentially of its good faith."). See also supra note
112 (citing cases holding that termination of an at will employee for cause does
not violate the implied covenant).
117. Walker v. Blue Cross of Cal., 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 184, 191 (Ct. App. 1992)
("There is no breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing where
the employer determined honestly and in good faith that good cause for dis-
charge existed."); Wilkerson v. Wells Fargo Bank, 261 Cal. Rptr. 185, 193 (Ct.
App. 1989) ("[An employer's honest though mistaken belief that legitimate
business reasons provided good cause for discharge.., will negate a claim that
it sought in bad faith to deprive the employee of the benefits of the contract.");
Pugh 11, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 213 ("Even an honest, though mistaken, belief that
the employer for legitimate business reasons had good cause for the discharge
would negate bad faith."); Burton, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 281 ("If the law was other-
wise, no employment contract would be 'at will'.... If the employee was enti-
tled to a jury trial for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing merely by asserting that the charged misconduct was not true, the deci-
sion to terminate would be at the discretion of a jury, not the employer. The
law of employment contracts would be turned on its head."); Fowler, 241 Cal.
Rptr. at 543 n.7 (affirming summary judgment and acknowledging rule).
118. Burton, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 281 (granting summary judgment and empha-
sizing evidence that the defendant investigated the charged misconduct in sup-
port of finding that the plaintiff was not discharged in bad faith).
119. Comeaux v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 915 F.2d 1264, 1273 n.10
(9th Cir. 1990) (considering the impact of Foley on remedies available to plain-
tiffs for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing); Rose, 902
F.2d at 1426 (same); Aragon-Haas v. Family Sec. Ins. Serv., Inc., 282 Cal. Rptr.
233, 238-39 (Ct. App. 1991) (same); Seubert v. McKesson Corp., 273 Cal. Rptr.
296, 300 (Ct. App. 1990) (same); Wallis v. Farmers Group Ins., 269 Cal. Rptr.
299, 308 (Ct. App. 1990) (same); Zilmer v. Carnation Co., 263 Cal. Rptr. 422,
427 (Ct. App. 1989). In Pugh II, the court explained that the significance of this
distinction is that punitive damages and damages for emotional distress are not
available in a contract action. Pugh II, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 201 n.6.
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As a practical matter, the contract-requirement makes it
difficult for an at will employee to challenge his or her termi-
nation under the implied covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing. Courts have repeatedly explained that the implied cove-
nant only protects the plaintiffs right to receive the benefits
of his or her agreement with the employer, and that the bene-
fits of an at will agreement do not include the right to contin-
uous employment. 120 From the employee's perspective, this
rule makes it all the more important to overcome the statu-
tory presumption of at will employment.
2. Evidence Establishing Breach
Two common allegations of breach are pretextual termi-
nation1 21 and breach of the employer's written policies, proce-
dures or by-laws.1 22 The analysis with regard to the latter
120. See, e.g., Slivinsky v. Watkins-Johnson Co., 270 Cal. Rptr. 195, 201 (Ct.
App. 1990) (rejecting the plaintiffs claim for breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing because she was an at will employee); Tollefson v.
Roman Catholic Bishop, 268 Cal. Rptr. 550, 556 (Ct. App. 1990) (same). See
also infra note 487 (citing additional cases).
121. Harlan v. Sohio Petroleum Co., 677 F. Supp. 1021, 1030-31 (N.D. Cal.
1988) (denying summary judgment on claim for breach of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing where the plaintiff raised a triable issue of mate-
rial fact about whether or not the defendant's alleged reduction in force was
merely pretextual); Crossen v. Foremost-McKesson, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 1076,
1078-79 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (denying summary judgment where the plaintiff of-
fered concrete evidence that he was terminated because he refused to violate
foreign law and not for insubordination, as asserted by the employer); Walker, 6
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 189-90 (reversing summary judgment where there was evi-
dence that the defendant amended its medical leave policy to facilitate the
plaintiffs discharge while she was on medical leave in order to avoid having to
retain her after an impending reduction in force); Zilmer, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 426-
27 (reversing the trial court's ruling sustaining demurrer where the plaintiff
alleged both that he was told that he would have to obtain a certain kind of
certificate to keep his job, and that the certificate requirement was merely a
pretext used to force him out of the company); Prevost v. First W. Bank, 239
Cal. Rptr. 161, 167 (Ct. App. 1987) (reversing summary judgment where there
was evidence raising a triable issue of fact as to whether the plaintiff was actu-
ally terminated for poor performance, as asserted by the employer, or whether
he was discharged as part of a "power struggle"); Rulon-Miller v. International
Business Machs. Corp., 208 Cal. Rptr. 524, 529 (Ct. App. 1984) (affirming judg-
ment for the plaintiff where the verdict was supported by substantial evidence
that the reason given for the plaintiffs termination, a conflict of interest flowing
from a romantic relationship with the manager of a rival firm, was pretextual).
122. Kern v. Levolor Lorentzen, Inc., 899 F.2d 772, 776-77 (9th Cir. 1990)
(affirming verdict for the plaintiff where there was evidence that the manner of
the plaintiffs layoff breached the defendant's layoff policy); Kelecheva v. Mul-
tivision Cable T.V. Corp., 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 453, 459-60 (Ct. App. 1993) (holding
that the plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact on his claim for breach of the
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tracks the implied-in-fact contract analysis; that is, courts
are likely to take the nature and extent of the policy into ac-
count in evaluating the plaintiffs claims. 123 For example, it
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing with evidence that his pretex-
tual termination violated the defendant's policies guaranteeing a safe working
environment and providing for progressive discipline); Gray v. Superior Court,
226 Cal. Rptr. 570, 572-73 (Ct. App. 1986) (reversing ruling sustaining demur-
rer based on determination that the complaint stated a viable claim with alle-
gations that the defendant failed to follow its progressive discipline policy and
affirming judgment for the plaintiff where the verdict was supported by sub-
stantial evidence that the defendant's policies guaranteed employees a right of
privacy and that the plaintiff was terminated for exercising this right). These
opinions are difficult to square with cases explaining that covenant claims re-
quire proof of bad faith conduct extraneous to the contract. See supra note 114.
Suffice it to say here that courts are still exploring the role the implied covenant
plays in the employment relationship. See generally WRONGFUL EMPLOYMENT
TERMINATION PRACTICE §§ 240-43, at 48-53 (California Continuing Education of
the Bar ed., 1987) (discussing nature of cause of action).
Two other examples of successful claims for breach of the implied covenant
include: failing to honor a promise made to an employee, Luck v. Southern Pac.
Transp. Co., 267 Cal. Rptr. 618, 624 (Ct. App. 1990) (reversing nonsuit and re-
marking that the jury could have found that the defendant failed to honor a
promise made to the plaintiff to provide her with a pretermination hearing and
to continue her insurance coverage during the interim), and failing to give a
new employee a chance to perform once he or she is initially hired, Sheppard v.
Morgan Keegan & Co., 266 Cal. Rptr. 784, 785-87 (Ct. App. 1990) (reversing
summary judgment where, after initially hiring the plaintiff, the defendant dis-
charged him before he started work).
123. See supra notes 82-84 (discussing contract claims). Moreover, like con-
tract claims, claims for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing can be resolved as a matter of law. See, e.g., Joanou v. Coca-Cola Co.,
26 F.3d 96, 99-100 (9th Cir. 1994) (affirming summary judgment where there
was unrefuted evidence that the plaintiffs were discharged when the defendant
sold portion of its enterprise at which they were employed); Funk v. Sperry
Corp., 842 F.2d 1129, 1132-33 (9th Cir. 1988) (affirming summary judgment
and concluding that no reasonable jury could find that the defendant breached
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by failing to provide the
plaintiff with a presidential review of his termination, as asserted by the plain-
tiff, where there was no evidence to support this theory and the unrefuted ma-
terial facts showed otherwise); Cox v. Resilient Flooring Div. of Congoleum
Corp., 638 F. Supp. 726, 732-35 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (granting summary judgment
in a case where the plaintiff was discharged as part of a reduction in force);
Burton v. Security Pac. Nat'l Bank, 243 Cal. Rptr. 277, 280-81 (Ct. App. 1988)
(rejecting argument that the defendant breached the implied covenant by ter-
minating the plaintiff for misconduct - reading confidential material in confi-
dential area - because the defendant failed to give the plaintiff any warning
before issuing a written warning for an unrelated offense, excessive absentee-
ism, on ground that even assuming a warning was required by the defendant's
handbook, the plaintiff still failed to demonstrate any connection between the
absence of a warning and his termination); Fowler v. Varian Assoc., Inc., 241
Cal. Rptr. 539, 543 n.7 (Ct. App. 1987) (affirming summary judgment where the
record contained absolutely no supporting evidence). But see Luck, 267 Cal.
Rptr. at 633 ("The reason for an employee's dismissal and whether that reason
19961 "AT WILL" EMPLOYMENT 35
may be difficult for a management-level employee to state a
cause of action by relying on a policy which covers hourly em-
ployees, 12  or which only concerns his or her compensation,
and not the terms of employment. 125 Moreover, not just any
policy will do. At a minimum, the policy must apply to the
situation, 126 have some material significance, 127 and create
rights rather than mere expectations. 128 Termination of an
constitutes bad faith are evidentiary questions most properly resolved by the
trier of fact."); Gray, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 573 (commenting that the issue of
whether the defendant's conduct "is a breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing is a factual question, not an issue of law"); Khanna v.
Microdata Corp., 215 Cal. Rptr. 860, 868 (Ct. App. 1985) ("The true reasons for
an employee's dismissal, and whether they show bad faith rather than dissatis-
faction with services and reflect an intention to deprive the discharged em-
ployee of the benefits of the contract, are evidentiary questions most properly
resolved by the trier of fact.").
124. Baker v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 608 F. Supp. 1315, 1323 n.2
(N.D. Cal. 1984) (rejecting the plaintiffs argument that he established a claim
for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing with evidence
that he was discharged without application of the defendant's progressive disci-
pline policy, because the policy only applied to hourly employees, which he was
not).
125. Cf. Hoy v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 861 F. Supp. 881, 885 n.2 (N.D. Cal.
1994) (rejecting the plaintiffs argument that an employment document entitled
"Agreement of Terms and Conditions of Compensation for Big Ticket Sales-
people" required good cause for his termination because the agreement only
dealt with his compensation, not the terms of his employment, and was thus
irrelevant).
126. Cox, 638 F. Supp. at 733 (granting summary judgment and rejecting the
plaintiffs argument that the defendant breached the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing by failing to provide him with counseling before he was
terminated, because there was no evidence that the counseling policy applied to
a reduction in force).
127. Id. at 733-34 (granting summary judgment in a case where the plaintiff
was discharged as part of a reduction in force and rejecting the plaintiffs argu-
ment that the defendant violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing by failing to provide him with an exit interview, because even assuming
this was true, these were not the type of actions that would make the termina-
tion wrongful).
128. Mundy v. Household Fin. Corp., 885 F.2d 542, 545 (9th Cir. 1989) (af-
firming summary judgment and concluding that the plaintiff could not establish
a right to job security based on written management guidelines focusing on em-
ployee evaluations, because while the guidelines stated they were intended to
assist employees in identifying and improving performance problems, there was
"no indication that they were intended to override existing employment agree-
ments or to create any new rights in the employees"); Cox, 638 F. Supp. at 734
(granting summary judgment and concluding that the plaintiff mischaracter-
ized the nature of his rights under the defendant's reduction in force policy,
because rather than rights under the policy, the plaintiff had a mere expecta-
tion that the employer would transfer him to another division in lieu of
termination).
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employee for cause, of course, does not breach the implied
covenant. 129
C. The Parol Evidence Rule
1. General Principles
California's parol evidence rule is codified in section 1856
of the Code of Civil Procedure, providing that: "Terms set
forth in a writing intended by the parties as a final expres-
sion of their agreement with respect to such terms as are in-
cluded therein may not be contradicted by evidence of any
prior agreement or of a contemporaneous oral agreement."1 3
0
At least two of the policies served by this rule are accuracy1 3 1
and promoting impassionate results.'1 2
Parol evidence issues come up in two different situations.
The first situation is where parol (or extrinsic) evidence is of-
fered to prove the meaning of terms used in the parties' writ-
ten agreement (e.g., "indemnify"). Parol evidence is admissi-
ble for this purpose providing the disputed term is
"reasonably susceptible" to the interpretation advanced by
the party seeking to introduce the evidence. 13 3 The second
129. Gianaculas v. TWA, 761 F.2d 1391, 1394-95 (9th Cir. 1985) (affirming
summary judgment); Malstrom v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 231 Cal.
Rptr. 820, 831 (Ct. App. 1986) (same); Stokes v. Dole Nut Co., 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d
673 (Ct. App. 1995) (same); Burton v. Security Pac. Nat'l Bank, 342 Cal. Rptr.
277, 280-81 (Ct. App. 1988) (same).
130. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1856(a) (West 1996).
131. Masterson v. Sine, 436 P.2d 561, 563 (Cal. 1968) (explaining that one of
the policies the parol evidence rule is intended to serve is "the assumption that
written evidence is more accurate than human memory").
132. Id. (explaining that because the party offering the parol evidence is
"most often the economic underdog, threatened by severe hardship if the writ-
ing is enforced," the parol evidence rule serves "to allow the court to control the
tendency of the jury to find through sympathy and without a dispassionate as-
sessment of the probability of fraud or faulty memory ... that an oral agree-
ment was made by the parties collateral to the written contract, or that prelimi-
nary tentative agreements were not abandoned when omitted from the
writing.").
133. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. G. W. Thomas Drayage Co., 442 P.2d 641, 643-
46 (Cal. 1968) (reversing judgment for the plaintiff in an action to enforce an
indemnity clause contained in the parties' agreement and finding that the trial
court erroneously excluded parol evidence that the clause was only intended to
cover damage to property owned by third persons, because the term "indemnify"
was reasonably susceptible to this meaning); Aragon-Haas v. Family Sec. Ins.
Serv., Inc., 282 Cal. Rptr. 233, 237-38 (Ct. App. 1991) (reversing demurrer on
the plaintiffs contract claim because the contract was ambiguous, in that it
provided that the plaintiff could be terminated for cause during first six
months, but did not say if this right continued after first six months); Wallis v.
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situation is where parol evidence is offered to prove addi-
tional terms of the parties' agreement. An example of this
situation would be where the plaintiffs employment contract
is silent on the grounds for termination, and he or she offers
parol evidence of oral assurances of job security made during
his or her initial interview with the company. Generally
speaking, parol evidence is only admissible to prove addi-
tional terms which are consistent with, but do not vary or
contradict, the written agreement. 13 4 This is because "it can-
Farmers Group Ins., 269 Cal. Rptr. 299, 305-06 (Ct. App. 1990) (holding that
the trial court properly permitted the plaintiff to introduce evidence that she
was assured that she would only be terminated for cause, because the plaintiffs
employment contract provided only that either party could terminate the agree-
ment on 30 days notice, and thus was susceptible to the plaintiffs interpreta-
tion of the agreement that good cause was required for her termination); Mc-
Lain v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 256 Cal. Rptr. 863, 868 (Ct. App. 1989) (holding that
evidence of oral assurances made to the plaintiff that he would become a "per-
manent" employee after completing a probationary period was admissible to ex-
plain the meaning of the parties' written agreement since the written agree-
ment provided that terms of the employment relationship could be changed at
any time); Brawthen v. H & R Block, Inc., 104 Cal. Rptr. 486, 489 (Ct. App.
1972) (finding that evidence of an oral agreement that the defendant would em-
ploy the plaintiff as a manager as long as he did a good job was admissible
where the written contract was silent on the grounds for termination, because it
was such that it might naturally be made as a separate agreement). Cf
Comeaux v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 915 F.2d 1264, 1271 n.7 (9th Cir.
1990) (holding that at will term in the plaintiffs employment application was
not ambiguous where stating "in no uncertain terms" that the employment rela-
tionship was at will); Haggard v. Kimberly Quality Care, Inc., 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d
16, 21 (Ct. App. 1995) (rejecting the plaintiffs argument that clause in her em-
ployment contract providing that she could be terminated "at will, at any time,
with or without cause or advance notice" was ambiguous because the meaning
of this provisions was "inescapable"); Gerdlund v. Electronic Dispensers Int'l,
235 Cal. Rptr. 279, 283-84 (Ct. App. 1987) (holding that the term "any reason"
is not ambiguous because it "is plainly all-inclusive, encompassing all reasons
'of whatever kind,' good, bad, or indifferent"); Malstrom, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 828
(rejecting the plaintiffs argument that evidence of oral assurances of continued
employment was admissible to explain the meaning of contract terms because
the contract-which provided that the employer would continue to employ the
plaintiff "for a length of time as shall be mutually agreeable"-was not reason-
ably susceptible to an interpretation requiring cause for discharge).
134. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1856(a) (West 1996); Masterson, 436 P.2d at
562-67 (reversing judgment for the buyer in an action by the seller's trustee to
enforce an option in the underlying landsale contract and finding that the trial
court erroneously excluded evidence that the option was intended to keep the
property in the family); Esbensen v. Userware Intl, Inc., 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 93, 95
(Ct. App. 1993) ("To the extent a contract is integrated, the parol evidence rule
precludes the admission of evidence of the parties' prior or contemporaneous
oral statements to contradict the terms of the writing.. . ."); Slivinsky v. Wat-
kins-Johnson Co., 270 Cal. Rptr. 585, 587 (Ct. App. 1990) (affirming summary
judgment and holding that evidence of prehire assurances was barred by parol
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not reasonably be presumed that the parties intended to inte-
grate two directly contradictory terms in the same agree-
ment."135 In this sense, the parol evidence rule "is not merely
a rule of evidence, but is substantive in scope."136
2. Integration
The parol evidence rule, which precludes introduction of
evidence of additional terms inconsistant with the terms of a
written contract, is generally qualified by the rules governing
integration. A written contract is "integrated" where it repre-
sents the final expression of the parties' agreement. 137 Inte-
gration does not mean that the writing contains all of the
terms and conditions of the parties' agreement. Instead, inte-
gration means only that the parties have reached a complete
and final understanding as to some or all of the terms of their
agreement.1 38  The rule, in other words, applies with equal
evidence rule where the plaintiff signed an integrated employment contract ex-
pressly stating that his employment was at will); Aragon-Haas, 282 Cal. Rptr.
at 238 (acknowledging rule); Harden v. Maybelline Sales Corp., 282 Cal. Rptr.
96, 98 (Ct. App. 1991) (same); Wallis, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 305 (same); Wagner v.
Glendale Adventist Medical Ctr., 265 Cal. Rptr. 412, 415 (Ct. App. 1989)
(same).
"Evidence of related oral understandings... is admissible to prove addi-
tional terms of the contract not inconsistent with the express language of the
writing." Esbensen, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 96.
135. Gerdlund, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 283. Accord Haggard, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
21. Extrinsic evidence which is contrary to the express contract terms is simi-
larly inadmissible to interpret the meaning of the agreement under a theory
that the agreement is ambiguous. "Testimony of intention which is contrary to
a contract's express terms ... does not give meaning to the contract: rather it
seeks to substitute a different meaning." Gerdlund, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 284.
136. BMW of North Am., Inc. v. New Motor Vehicle Bd., 209 Cal. Rptr. 50, 55
(Ct. App. 1984). Accord Riley v. Bear Creek Planning Comm., 551 P.2d 1213,
1219 (Cal. 1976); Tahoe Natl Bank v. Phillips, 480 P.2d 320, 329 (Cal. 1971).
137. Esbensen, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 96 ("In contract law, 'integration' means
the extent to which a writing constitutes the parties' final expression of their
agreement."); Wagner, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 415 ("The central question in determin-
ing whether there has been an integration, and thus whether the parol evidence
doctrine applies, is 'whether the parties intended their writing to serve as the
exclusive embodiment of their agreement."') (quoting Masterson v. Sine, 436
P.2d 561, 563 (Cal. 1968)). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 209(1) (1996) ("An integrated agreement is a writing or writings constituting
a final expression of one or more terms of an agreement.").
138. Wagner, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 415 ("An integration may be partial as well as
complete; that is, the parties may intend that a writing finally and completely
express certain terms of their agreement rather than the agreement in its en-
tirety."). Accord Haggard, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 21 (citing Wagner). See also RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 209(1) (1996) ("An integrated agreement
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force to written contracts which are only "partially" inte-
grated. 139 No particular form is required.
140
Whether or not the underlying contract constitutes an in-
tegrated agreement is a question of law for the court.141 Rele-
vant evidence includes the agreement's scope (i.e., whether or
not it covers essential contract terms),14 2 the presence or ab-
is a writing or writings constituting a final expression of one or more terms of
an agreement.").
139. Comeaux v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 915 F.2d 1264, 1271 n.7
(9th Cir. 1990) (holding that evidence of oral assurances of continued employ-
ment which the plaintiff claimed were made to him when he was hired was
inadmissible to vary the terms of his partially integrated at will employment
contract); Masterson, 436 P.2d at 563 (explaining that where the contract is
partially integrated, parol evidence is not admissible to vary or contradict the
partially integrated contract terms); Haggard, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 20 ("If only
part of the agreement is integrated, the parol evidence applies to that part.");
Wagner, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 415 ("The parol evidence rule applies equally to the
partial integration.").
140. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 209 cmt. b (1996).
141. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1856(d) (West 1996). See also Haggard, 46 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 21 ("Whether the agreement is an integration is ... a question of
law for the court."); Esbensen, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 97 n.4 (same); Slivinsky v.
Watkins-Johnson Co., 270 Cal. Rptr. 585, 588 (Ct. App. 1990) (same); Wagner,
265 Cal. Rptr. at 416 (same); Brawthen v. H & R Block, Inc., 104 Cal. Rptr. 486,
489 (Ct. App. 1972) (same); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 209(2)
(1996) (same).
142. Haggard, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 22 (emphasizing the fact that the plain-
tiffs employment agreement covered various conditions relating to her employ-
ment in support of finding that the agreement was partially integrated); Seu-
bert v. McKesson Corp., 273 Cal. Rptr. 296, 298-99 (Ct. App. 1990)
(emphasizing that the plaintiffs employment application did not set forth es-
sential terms in support of ruling that application was not an integrated writ-
ing); Wallis v. Farmers Group Ins., 269 Cal. Rptr. 299, 305 (Ct. App. 1990) (em-
phasizing that the plaintiffs employment application did not cover how the
plaintiff would earn commissions nor how the defendant would pay the plaintiff
for any commissions earned in support of ruling that application was only a
partially integrated writing); Wagner, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 415 (emphasizing that
the plaintiffs employment application lacked essential terms like position and
salary in support of ruling that application was only partially integrated); An-
derson v. Savin Corp., 254 Cal. Rptr. 627, 630 (Ct. App. 1988) (emphasizing
that employment letter sent to the plaintiff described his position and set forth
provisions of employment in support of finding that letter was integrated); Mc-
Lain v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 256 Cal. Rptr. 863, 868 (Ct. App. 1989) (emphasiz-
ing that the parties' agreement did not contain essential terms such as salary
and position in support of finding that the plaintiffs employment application
was not an integrated agreement); Malstrom v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem.
Corp., 231 Cal. Rptr. 820, 828 (Ct. App. 1986) (emphasizing the fact that the
parties' contract contained essential terms in support of finding that the con-
tract was integrated).
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sence of an "integration clause,"'1 43 and language limiting
contract modifications. 1 " Evidence that the contract is set
forth in a form agreement 145 and of any negotiations 146 is also
143. Comeaux, 915 F.2d at 1271 n.7 (emphasizing the fact that the parties'
employment agreement - an employment application - contained an integration
clause in support of finding that the agreement was partially integrated); Hag-
gard, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 21 (same); Esbensen, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 97 (emphasiz-
ing that the parties' agreement did not contain an integration clause in support
of finding that the contract was only partially integrated); Seubert, 273 Cal.
Rptr. at 298 (emphasizing that the plaintiffs employment application did not
contain an integration clause in support of ruling that the application was not
an integrated writing); Wallis, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 305 (same); McLain, 256 Cal.
Rptr. at 868 (emphasizing the absence of an integration clause in support of
finding that the plaintiffs employment application was not an integrated agree-
ment); Malstrom, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 828 (emphasizing the fact that the parties'
contract contained an integration clause in support of finding that the contract
was integrated); Brawthen, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 489 (emphasizing the absence of
an integration clause in support of finding that the plaintiffs employment ap-
plication was not an integrated agreement).
144. Comeaux, 915 F.2d at 1271 n.7 (emphasizing the fact that the parties'
employment agreement - an employment application - made no provision for a
modification by a subsequent writing or oral agreement in support of finding
that the agreement was partially integrated); Haggard, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 22
(same where the agreement provided that the contract could only be modified
by a subsequent writing signed by the president of the company); Wagner, 265
Cal. Rptr. at 48-49 (emphasizing that acknowledgment form stating that the
employer's policies "may change from time to time" indicated a "specific intent
that the terms and conditions of employment remain[ed] subject to change" in
support of ruling that the acknowledgment was not an integrated writing); An-
derson, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 629 (emphasizing the fact that the plaintiffs employ-
ment letter provided that the parties' agreement could not be modified without
approval from corporate officer in support of finding that agreement was inte-
grated); McLain, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 868 (emphasizing that contract language
providing that the terms of the employment relationship could be changed at
any time stripped at will clause of its force).
145. Seubert, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 299 (emphasizing that the plaintiffs employ-
ment application was a form agreement in support of ruling that the applica-
tion was not an integrated writing); Wagner, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 415 (emphasizing
that the plaintiffs employment application was a form agreement in support of
ruling that the application was only partially integrated); Gerdlund v. Elec-
tronic Dispensers Int'l, 235 Cal. Rptr. 279, 284 (Ct. App. 1987) (emphasizing the
fact that the parties did not use a form agreement in support of ruling that their
contract was integrated); McLain, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 866 (emphasizing the fact
that the parties used a form agreement in support of finding that employment
application was not an integrated document); Brawthen, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 490
(same).
146. Esbensen, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 96 ("Obviously where following negotia-
tions the parties execute a written agreement, that agreement is at least 'par-
tially' integrated and parol evidence cannot be admitted to contradict the terms
agreed to in the writing."); Gerdlund, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 284 (emphasizing the
fact that the plaintiffs helped draft the entire agreement, including the termi-
nation clause, in support of ruling that the contract was integrated).
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important, as is evidence of legal advice 147 and of the circum-
stances surrounding the transaction. 148 Of course, courts will
also consider whether or not the agreement was actually
signed.149
It must be noted that even assuming integration, parol
evidence is still not inadmissible per se. Rather, the trial
court has discretion to admit evidence of a prior or contempo-
raneous agreement where it might "naturally" be made as a
separate side-agreement. 150 On the other hand, the exercise
of this discretion is inappropriate where the additional terms
would "certainly" have been included in the written
contract. 151
147. Esbensen, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 97 (emphasizing the fact that the parties
to the contract did not have the benefit of legal counsel in support of finding
that contract was partially integrated).
148. Haggard, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 21 (emphasizing the fact that the plaintiff
read the agreement before executing it, and that while she was reluctant to sign
the agreement, she did so with the understanding that this was a necessary
condition of her employment); Esbensen, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 97 (emphasizing
the fact that the agreement was between business entrepreneurs and computer
programmer unsophisticated in legal matters in support of finding that contract
was partially integrated); Brawthen, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 490 (emphasizing the
fact that the plaintiff was hired to develop business in new region in support of
finding that the contract was not integrated).
149. Haggard, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 21 (emphasizing the fact that the plaintiff
signed the agreement in support of finding that the contract was partially inte-
grated); Wilkerson v. Wells Fargo Bank, 261 Cal. Rptr. 185, 189-91 (Ct. App.
1989) (rejecting the defendant's argument that its at will handbook established
the nature of the employment relationship as a matter of law because it was not
a signed agreement).
150. Masterson v. Sine, 436 P.2d 561, 562-64 (Cal. 1968) (reversing judg-
ment for the buyer in an action by the seller's trustee to enforce an option in the
underlying landsale contract and finding that extrinsic evidence the option was
personal to the seller was admissible parol evidence because the agreement was
such that it might naturally be made as a side agreement); Brawthen, 104 Cal.
Rptr. at 489-90 (finding that evidence of an oral agreement that the defendant
would employ the plaintiff as a manager as long as he did he a good job was
admissible where the written contract was silent on the grounds for termina-
tion, because the agreement was such that it might naturally be made as a
separate agreement). Cf. Gerdlund, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 284 (finding that a sepa-
rate collateral agreement regarding grounds for the plaintiffs termination was
not the type of agreement which would "naturally" be made separately given
explicit language in the contract that the agreement could be terminated for
any reason).
151. Masterson, 436 P.2d at 562-65 (articulating rule); Haggard, 46 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 21-22 (concluding that an agreement not to terminate except for
cause was not the type of agreement naturally made separately from the under-
lying contract where the contract specifically addressed the grounds for
termination).
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III. THE EMERGING SHAPIRO-GERDLUND DOCTRINE
It is difficult to reconcile the various opinions in this
area, especially those dealing with employment applica-
tions."5 2 At the same time, it is important to appreciate the
fundamental role that discord has played in this emerging
area of the law. After wading through the cases, one is left
with the distinct impression that the doctrine has been
shaped largely by the tension between cases embracing an ex-
pansive interpretation of the reasonable expectation principle
on the one hand, and opinions favoring a more narrow read-
ing of this principle on the other.
A. 1952-1961: The Early Compensation Cases
The Shapiro-Gerdlund doctrine has been around a lot
longer than one might think, with two of the earliest cases
focusing on the plaintiffs right to compensation, not job se-
curity. Sharpe v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. 15 3 is one of the earliest
reported opinions. The issue there was whether the plaintiff
tugboat captain was entitled to recover damages for compen-
sation above the amount specified in his written contract."5
The contract provided for a fixed monthly salary.5 5 The
plaintiff argued that since he had been on "standby" during
his off duty hours, he was working 24 rather than eight hours
each day.' According to the plaintiff, the employer there-
fore owed him wages for 16 hours a day in overtime for each
day worked. 157 Although there was no express provision cov-
ering overtime pay,' 58 the plaintiff claimed that this promise
was implicit in the agreement.' 59
152. In Foley, the California Supreme Court observed that "[a] few recent
cases, including Shapiro v. Wells Fargo Realty Advisors ... can be interpreted
to preclude enforcement of an implied-in-fact modification of an on-going em-
ployment agreement when some express written provision insists on the em-
ployee's at will status." Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 387 n.23
(Cal. 1988). With the exception of this passing reference in Foley, the court has
not taken the opportunity to examine this emerging line of cases.
153. 244 P.2d 83 (Cal. 1952).
154. Id. at 84-85.
155. Id. at 85.
156. Id. at 84-85.
157. Id.
158. See Arabian, 244 P.2d at 85.
159. Id. at 85.
[Vol. 37
"AT WILL" EMPLOYMENT
The appellate court disagreed and reversed a judgment
for the plaintiff in the trial court. 160 The court reasoned that
because the contract covered the terms and conditions of the
plaintiffs employment, it would be inappropriate to imply a
provision for overtime pay.161 To do so, the court exclaimed,
would be to make a new contract which was not necessarily
consistent with the intentions of the parties.1
62
The precise issue raised in Sharpe appeared again more
than nine years later in Rogers v. American President Line,
Ltd.,'63 a case involving a ship steward rather than a tugboat
captain.16  The plaintiff sued his employer for outstanding
wages after returning home from the last of nine voyages.' 65
Although he was paid under the terms of written shipping
articles (which he executed),166 the plaintiff claimed that
there was an implied promise that he was entitled to the
same salary increase given to other employees.
67
The trial court rejected this argument, 6 8 and the appel-
late court affirmed. 169 The court reasoned that "[an action
[will] not lie on an implied contract where there exists be-
tween the parties a valid express contract which covers the
same subject matter."170
B. 1982-1985: The Early Security Term Cases
After Rogers, the issue did not resurface in an employ-
ment case for more than twenty years, until Crossen v. Fore-
most-McKesson, Inc.' 71 was finally decided in 1982. In
Crossen, the plaintiff was promoted to fill a management
level position overseeing the operation of several of the de-
fendant's foreign plants in late 1977.172 When promoted, he
signed an agreement providing that his employment could
"be terminated at any time on 60 days' written notice by
160. Id. at 87-88.
161. Id. at 85-88.
162. Id. at 86.
163. 291 F.2d 740 (9th Cir. 1961).
164. Id. at 741.
165. Id. at 740-41.
166. Id. at 741.
167. Id. at 742.
168. Rogers, 291 F.2d at 741.
169. Id. at 743.
170. Id. at 742.
171. 537 F. Supp. 1076 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
172. Id. at 1076.
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either party."1 73 In November 1978, the defendant notified
the plaintiff that he was terminated effective May 31,
1979.174 He subsequently filed a suit for wrongful termina-
tion, alleging that he was fired for trying to correct the de-
fendant's violations of foreign law, and not, as asserted by the
defendant, for sending disrespectful and disruptive letters to
his supervisors.
175
Although the district court denied summary judgment 1 76
(reasoning that the plaintiff raised a triable issue of material
fact on his claim for breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing) 177 the court rejected the plaintiffs
claim for breach of an implied-in-fact contract.17 8 The court
explained that an implied promise that the plaintiff only
would be terminated for cause was inconsistent with the ex-
press terms of his written employment agreement. 179 Beyond
revitalizing the rule articulated in Sharpe and Rogers, the
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 1076, 1078.
176. Crossen, 537 F. Supp. at 1080.
177. Id. at 1077-79
178. Id. at 1076-77.
179. See id. The district court did not rely on the earlier employment cases,
but rather on Wal-Noon Corp. v. Hill, 119 Cal. Rptr. 646 (Ct. App. 1975), a case
involving a dispute over the cost of repairing premises leased by the plaintiffs.
In that case, the lease provided that all repairs would be made by the defendant
landlord. Id. at 647. The dispute involved the cost of replacing the roof, ini-
tially paid for by the plaintiffs. Id. At trial, the defendant maintained that he
was not required to reimburse the plaintiffs, because they repaired the roof
without telling him about the damage. Id. at 648. The trial court agreed that
the plaintiffs breached the lease, but, applying the equitable principle of resti-
tution, ruled for the plaintiffs. Id. The court of appeals reversed, reasoning
that because the lease required the plaintiffs to maintain the property in "good
order and condition at their own expense," the lease necessarily implied that
the defendant had a right to control the nature and cost of any repairs. Id. at
649. The court reasoned further that by extending equitable relief to the plain-
tiffs, the trial court deprived the defendant of this right, which was "part of the
bargained-for consideration in the lease ...... Id. at 650. In language fre-
quently cited by contemporary opinions, the court stated: "There cannot be a
valid, express contract and an implied contract each embracing the same sub-
ject matter, existing at the same time." Id.
The Crossen court did not stop to consider whether a valid analogy can be
drawn to the landlord-tenant context. The court might have pointed out, for
example, that both areas of the law involve an inequality of bargaining power.
It is also important to observe that Wal-Noon is really a constructive condition
case, that is, a case where the court was relying on an implied contract term. E.
ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 8.2, at 346 n.12 (1990) (cit-
ing Wal-Noon for the proposition that courts may supply a term making an
event a condition in order to effectuate the parties' contractual intent). This is
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court's opinion marks the shift from actions to enforce an im-
plied promise to pay additional compensation to actions to en-
force an implied promise not to terminate without good cause.
In Crain v. Burroughs Corp.,18 0 decided the following
year, the district court picked up where the Crossen court left
off. In Crain, the plaintiff was terminated for poor perform-
ance after approximately two years of employment. 181 She
then brought suit alleging claims for breach of contract, age
discrimination and intentional infliction of emotional
distress. 182
In rejecting the plaintiffs contract claim, the district
court offered two reasons why the plaintiff could not establish
an implied-in-fact promise by relying on statements in the de-
fendant's "Field Marketing Manual." The first reason was
that the plaintiffs contract 8 3 clearly stated that her employ-
ment was at will.18 1 Citing Crossen, the district court ex-
plained that in light of her at will agreement, the plaintiff
"could not reasonably have had a legitimate expectation of a
right to a just cause determination prior to termination."
185
The second reason was that the manual contained an effec-
tive disclaimer, stating that it was "informational only" and
was not intended to constitute an employment contract.'8 6
somewhat surprising given the fact that the opinion is cited in employment
cases where the court is relying on an express contract term.
180. 560 F. Supp. 849 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
181. Id. at 851-52.
182. Id. at 851. The defendant only moved for summary adjudication as to
the plaintiffs breach of contract and intentional infliction of emotional distress
claims. Id. at 850.
183. The plaintiff signed a written employment agreement approximately
one month after she was initially hired in December, 1979. Id. The written
agreement contained the following terms. First, that either party was free to
terminate the contract "at any time." Id. Second, that there were no oral agree-
ments affecting the written contract. Id. Third, that the contract could only be
modified by a subsequent agreement signed by both parties. Id. Fourth, that
the written contract superseded all prior agreements. Id. She later signed two
identical agreements, one in April 1981, and one in January, 1980. Id. In
March 1981, the employer shifted from individual employment agreements to a
"combined contract/personnel action notice" knows as the "Sales Representative
Agreement/P.A.N." Id. The agreement stated that it superseded all prior con-
tracts. Id. It also stated that the employer retained the sole discretion to deter-
mine the length of an employee's tenure and would "continue to employ sales
representatives only for as long as [it] desire[d] his/her services." Id.
184. Id. at 852.
185. Crain, 560 F. Supp. at 852 (emphasis added).
186. Id. Emphasizing that the plaintiff was only employed for two years and
that he had less than a satisfactory performance record, the court also con-
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Accordingly, the court granted summary judgment for the
defendant. 187
Crain sent a message to employers: Spelling out the fact
that the employment relationship is at will in a written
agreement offers distinct advantages. By this same token, it
was clear that it was time to start incorporating disclaimers
into employee handbooks and to hire defense attorneys famil-
iar with motions for summary judgment.
From the plaintiffs perspective, Crain deviated from the
earlier cases in a subtle, yet important way. While reciting
the factual background for the dispute, the court observed
that there was an integration clause in the contract, that it
was signed by the plaintiff, and that it contained a provision
limiting modifications to a subsequent written agreement."188
The court, in other words, seemed to be looking at some of the
criteria traditionally used to determine whether a contract is
integrated. Arguably, Crain was thus the first case to sug-
gest a substantive limitation on the scope of the Shapiro-Ger-
dlund rule, i.e., that the rule might be limited to integrated
agreements. 189
The opportunity to respond to this question arrived one
year later, in what is now the very well known case of Sha-
piro v. Wells Fargo Realty Advisors.190 In Shapiro, the plain-
tiff was employed as the defendant's treasurer and vice presi-
dent.191 He brought suit after his discharge, alleging claims
for wrongful termination in violation of public policy, breach
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and
breach of contract.'9 2 With regard to the latter, the plaintiffs
complaint alleged breach of implied promises not to termi-
nate his employment without good cause and to provide him
cluded that there was insufficient evidence of an implied-in-fact contract. Id. at
853.
187. Id. at 853-54. The court also rejected the plaintiffs claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress. Id.
188. Id. at 850-52.
189. Significantly, though, the court did not discuss or even cite the parol
evidence rule. This may not have been necessary, however, since the plaintiff
was relying on posthire evidence of his longevity of service to establish an im-
plied-in-fact contract. See id. at 853.
190. 199 Cal. Rptr. 613 (Ct. App. 1984).
191. Id. at 615.




with the opportunity to achieve the maximum level of base
pay.193
The trial court sustained the defendant's demurrer to all
three causes of action, 94 and the appellate court affirmed.'
95
With respect to the plaintiffs contract claim, the court of ap-
peals held that the plaintiff could not rebut his status as an
at will employee as a matter of law.' 96 The court reasoned
that the plaintiff signed an at will stock option agreement,
and thus "could not have reasonably relied on any implied
promise by [the defendant] which contradicted the express
provisions of the written stock option agreement which he
signed."' 97 The court reasoned further that the plaintiffs
conclusory allegations of an implied promise were insufficient
to support a cause action.'
98
The facts of Shapiro offered a perfect chance to limit the
scope of the Crossen and Crain opinions. After all, the court
was dealing with a stock option agreement, not a comprehen-
sive employment contract. Instead, the court embraced an
expansive interpretation of the rule, extending it not only be-
yond integrated agreements (the court did not even allude to
the parol evidence rule),199 but beyond formal employment
contracts as well.2 °°
The court's opinion in Hillsman v. Sutter Community
Hosp. ,201 decided within a month of Shapiro, is one of the
193. Id.
194. Id. at 615-16.
195. Shapiro, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 622. The court treated the appeal as one
from summary judgment, because the plaintiff failed to object to the trial court's
decision to take judicial notice of the stock option agreement. Id. at 616 n.3.
196. Id. at 621.
197. Id. (emphasis added). The court cited Wal-Noon as direct authority for
this proposition (without considering the analogy between employment and
landlord and tenant law), and cited Crossen and Crain with a "see also" signal.
Id.
198. Id. The court also rejected the plaintiffs claims for wrongful termina-
tion in violation of public policy, breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing, and violation of due process. Id. at 616-19, 622.
199. Again, precisely when the defendant made the alleged representations
is not clear from the opinion. Accordingly, discussing the parol evidence rule
may not have been necessary.
200. Shapiro, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 621. Baker v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem.
Corp., 608 F. Supp. 1315 (N.D. Cal. 1984) was the first case where the plaintiff
claimed that the underlying agreement-a patent agreement-was not an "em-
ployment contract." Id. at 1320. Shapiro was cited in support of the court's
conclusion rejecting this argument. Id.
201. 200 Cal. Rptr. 605 (Ct. App. 1984).
1996]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
first cases retreating from the expansive approach taken by
decisions like Shapiro. In Hilisman, the plaintiff was termi-
nated after three years of employment.2 °2 Her complaint al-
leged, inter alia, breach of an implied promise that she would
be terminated only as provided by the defendant's bylaws.203
The trial court sustained the defendant's demurrer with-
out leave to amend,20 4 but the appellate court reversed.20 5
The dispute focused on a "letter of understanding" the de-
fendant sent to the plaintiff when she was originally hired,
stating the employment relationship could be terminated by
either party upon 30 days notice.20 6 The defendant argued
that the letter foreclosed an implied-in-fact contract as a mat-
ter of law.20 v The court disagreed. The court acknowledged
the "well settled" rule that it is inequitable to imply a promise
which contradicts a term set forth in the parties' written
agreement.20 8 According to the court, however, this principle
was not dispositive. The court reasoned that the letter did
not speak to the grounds and procedures for termination, and
thus there was no "readily ascertainable conflict between
[the] plaintiffs implied contract theory and the express terms
of the letter of understanding."20 9
In Hillsman, the defendant was definitely attempting to
put the newly emerging doctrine to the test. The court re-
sponded with the unequivocal message that, at a minimum, a
basic conflict was required.210 It is important to note, how-
ever, that the court simply could have said the letter of un-
derstanding was not the type of document which would sup-
port the Shapiro-Gerdlund defense. Like Shapiro, the court
declined to do so. 211
202. Id. at 607-08.
203. Id. at 608. The court only discussed the plaintiffs contract claim. See
id. at 607-08.
204. Id. at 607.
205. Id. at 613.
206. Hillsman, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 608 n.2.
207. Id. at 612. The defendant cited Wal-Noon in support of its position.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 612. The court also cited Wal-Noon for the proposition that it is
inequitable to imply a contract term contrary to the parties' written contract,
but distinguished Wal-Noon on the ground that the written contract did not
expressly preclude an implied-in-fact contract. Id. The court did not consider
whether a valid analogy could be drawn to the landlord-tenant context.
210. See id.
211. Hillsman, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 608-09.
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The court's opinion in Baker v. Kaiser Aluminum &
Chem. Corp.2 12 was a direct response to Hillsman. In Baker,
the plaintiff was terminated after 15 years of employment for
violating his supervisor's instructions not to give storeroom
keys to non-salaried employees.213 The plaintiff, who was 51
years of age, claimed that he was really terminated to pre-
vent him from qualifying for early retirement.214 He would
have qualified for early retirement in two years.21 5 The
plaintiff brought suit alleging, inter alia, breach of an im-
plied-in-fact contract not to terminate except for good cause
or before he was eligible for early retirement.2 16
In granting summary judgment, the court reasoned that
the plaintiff signed a written contract (a patent agree-
ment),21 7 stating the defendant agreed to employ the plaintiff
"at such compensation and for such a length of time as shall
be mutually agreeable to [the parties]."218 The court ex-
plained further that "[t]he Pugh analysis ... applies only in
the absence of an express agreement. A valid express agree-
ment precludes a contradictory implied contract embracing
the same subject."21 9
In Hillsman, the court emphasized the need to demon-
strate an actual conflict between the written and implied con-
tract terms.22 ° What Baker did was to effectively take the
teeth out of this refinement by endorsing the use of relatively
ambiguous at will language.
221
212. 608 F. Supp. 1315 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
213. Id. at 1317.
214. Id. at 1319.
215. Id. at 1317.
216. Id. at 1317-18. The plaintiff also sued for interference with a beneficial
contractual relationship, wrongful termination in violation of public policy, and
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Id. at 1317.
217. Baker, 608 F. Supp. at 1320.
The plaintiff argued that the patent agreement was not the same as an employ-
ment agreement. Id. Citing Shapiro, the court disagreed. Id.
218. Id. at 1320-21.
219. Id. at 1320 (citing Hillsman, Crossen, Crain and Shapiro). The court
also rejected the plaintiffs remaining claims. Id. at 1317-19, 1321-23. The
court emphasized the fact both that the plaintiff signed the agreement and that
the agreement was expressly at will, but did not discuss integration. See id. at
1320. The court did not discuss evidence of an implied-in-fact contract.
220. Hillsman, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 612.
221. See Baker, 608 F. Supp. at 1320-21.
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In the next opinion addressing this subject, Gianaculas
v. TWA,222 the Ninth Circuit went a step further than Sha-
piro and Baker by extending the rule to include employment
applications. In Gianaculas, the plaintiffs, all long-term em-
ployees,223 were discharged as part of a company-wide reduc-
tion in force.224 Relying mainly on the defendant's "Manage-
ment Policy and Procedure Manual," they brought suit
alleging breach of an implied promise to allow them to dis-
place less senior employees.225
In affirming summary judgment, the Ninth Circuit em-
phasized that each of the plaintiffs signed at will employment
applications stating that the defendant was free to terminate
the relationship "at any time without advance notice."226 The
court reasoned that the implied promise was contrary to the
express terms of the plaintiffs' employment applications.227
C. 1986-1988: The Emerging "Track Two" Cases
Beginning in 1986, California courts pioneered a second
approach to the Shapiro-Gerdlund rule: Using it, not as a
complete defense, but rather to exclude extrinsic evidence of
an implied-in-fact agreement. Malstrom v. Kaiser Aluminum
& Chem. Corp.228 was the first case decided using this
approach.
In Malstrom, the plaintiff was hired in 1977, at the age of
fifty-six. 229 He was hired to work in California. 230 The day
before the plaintiff was hired, he signed an agreement stating
that the defendant agreed to employ him "at such compensa-
tion and for such a length of time as shall be mutually agree-
able to [the parties]."231 In or about April 1981, the plaintiff
222. 761 F.2d 1391 (9th Cir. 1985).
223. Id. at 1392-93.
224. Id. at 1393.
225. Id. The plaintiff sued both for breach of contract and for breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Id. at 1392.
226. Id. at 1394.
227. Gianaculas, 761 F.2d at 1394. The court cited Shapiro as authority for
this conclusion, but did not discuss the analogy between a stock option agree-
ment and an employment application. Id. at 1394. The court also cited Wal-
Noon, but used a "see" signal, suggesting that the opinion was relevant, but not
controlling. Id. The court did not discuss or even cite the parol evidence rule.
228. 231 Cal. Rptr. 820 (Ct. App. 1986).





was then offered a transfer to Florida.232 He was offered the
transfer in lieu of discharge when the defendant decentral-
ized his job functions. 23 3 The plaintiff accepted the transfer
and sold his home to the defendant at a substantial profit.234
The defendant also paid both to move the plaintiffs family to
Florida and to cover the mortgage rate differential, inflation
and loan points on the purchase of his new home.235 The next
year the plaintiffs job in Florida was eliminated as part of a
reduction in force.236 After an evaluation, the defendant had
decided that the plaintiffs experience was too specialized to
place him in another job.23 v The plaintiff secured alternative
employment in California shortly after his termination.2 38
The defendant paid for his moving costs again.239
On appeal from an order granting summary judgment240
the court focused on two issues. First, the court considered
whether the plaintiff had established an implied contract
that he would only be terminated for good cause with evi-
dence of the defendant's alleged prehire promises in 1977.241
Second, the court asked whether the plaintiff had established
an implied promise that he would be employed until the age
of retirement with evidence of the defendant's alleged
promises in 1981.242
The court ruled for the defendant on both issues and af-
firmed summary judgment for the defendant.243 The court
reasoned that the prehire statements constituted inadmissi-
ble parol evidence,244 and that the written agreement pre-
232. Id. at 824.





238. Malstrom, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 824.
239. Id. at 825.
240. Id.
241. See id. at 826-29.
242. See id. at 829.
243. Malstrom, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 831. The court also rejected the plaintiffs
claims for breach of an express oral agreement not to terminate except for
cause, estoppel, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing. Id. at 830-32.
244. Id. at 828. The court ruled that the contract was integrated, reasoning
that the contract expressly provided that it superseded all prior agreements
and covered the essential terms of the parties' contract. Id. at 827.
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cluded the alleged retirement-promise as a matter of law.245
Shapiro (which did not discuss the parol evidence rule)246
was cited as authority for both aspects of the court's
holding.247
The next "track-two" case employed the same analytical
scheme but relied on different authority. Instead of Shapiro,
the court in Gerdlund v. Electronic Dispensers Int'12 48 looked
to Masterson v. Sine,2 49 a California Supreme Court case fo-
cusing on the contours of the parol evidence rule.250 The ba-
sic facts of Gerdlund were as follows. Mr. Gerdlund was em-
ployed as a sales representative. 25 1 He was hired in 1967.252
Mrs. Gerdlund joined him as a partner in 1973.253 In 1975,
both plaintiffs signed an at will "Representative Agree-
ment."254 The plaintiffs claimed that the defendant repeat-
edly promised their sales territory would be secure as long as
they did a good job.255 In 1976, the defendant terminated the
agreement after unsuccessful contract negotiations.2 56
Prior to trial, the defendant filed a motion in limine to
exclude evidence of the oral representations.257 The trial
court denied the motion, and the jury eventually returned a
verdict for the plaintiffs on the plaintiffs' breach of contract
245. Id. at 826-829. According to the court, the only way the plaintiff could
have established a separate agreement in 1981 would have been through a sub-
sequent oral modification, a novation or an independent collateral agreement.
Id. at 829. The court concluded that there was no subsequent oral modification
because there was no evidence that the parties intended to extinguish the writ-
ten agreement. Id. The court concluded that there was no independent collat-
eral agreement reasoning that "[an independent collateral agreement cannot
contradict the terms of a prior written contract." Id. The court concluded that
there was no oral modification because the alleged promise in 1981 was not
supported by new consideration. Id.
246. See supra note 199.
247. Malstrom, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 828-829. Malstrom implied that the scope
of the Shapiro-Gerdlund rule was not limited to prior or contemporaneous
agreements. However, because the court concluded that the agreement was in-
tegrated, the opinion does not speak to the issue of whether or not the Shapiro-
Gerdlund rule requires an integrated writing.
248. 235 Cal. Rptr. 279 (Ct. App. 1987).
249. Masterson v. Sine, 436 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968).
250. Id.




255. Id. at 280-81.
256. Gerdlund, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 281.
257. Id. at 280.
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and misrepresentation claims.2 58 On appeal, the defendant
challenged the verdict on the ground that the trial court
should have excluded evidence of the oral representations.2 59
The appellate court agreed and reversed. 260 Relying on Mas-
terson, the court held that regardless of whether the agree-
ment was integrated, 261 evidence of the oral representations
was inadmissible because it contradicted the agreement's ex-
262press at will provision. The court explained that "it cannot
reasonably be presumed that the parties intended to inte-
grate two directly contradictory terms in the same
agreement."26
3
Anderson v. Savin Corp.26 4 was really the first case to
comment on the relationship between the complete defense
theory announced in Crossen, Crain and Shapiro, and the
substantive evidentiary restriction articulated in Malstrom
and Gerdlund. In Anderson, the plaintiff signed an employ-
ment letter when originally hired in May, 1978.265 The letter
contained a provision stating that the employment relation-
ship would be renewed for successive one year periods "unless
terminated by either party in its discretion on five days no-
tice."266 During the next four years, the plaintiff signed re-
strictive covenants, each stating that the agreement did not
create a right to continued employment and did not interfere
258. Id. at 281. The trial court also instructed the jury on breach of the im-
plied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Id. at 286.
259. Id. at 280.
260. Id. at 287.
261. Gerdlund, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 283. The court explained that extrinsic evi-
dence is inadmissible under Masterson where inconsistent with the terms of the
parties' written agreement. Id. at 282-83. Obviously, this is an expansive in-
terpretation of Masterson, one which extends the parol evidence rule beyond the
confines of integration. Note, however, that since the Gerdlund court concluded
that the agreement was integrated, this aspect of the court's holding is really
dicta. See id. at 281-83.
262. Id. at 282-84.
263. Id. at 283-84 (emphasis added). Citing Shapiro, the court also held that
that it was error for the trial court to instruct the jury on breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Id. at 286. The court reasoned that an
obligation may not be implied "which would result in the obliteration of a right
expressly given under a written contract." Id. Citing Masterson, the court fur-
ther held that evidence of the parol representations was inadmissible to explain
the meaning of the contract term "any reason," explaining that this term was
"plainly all-inclusive, encompassing all reasons 'of whatever kind,' good, bad or
indifferent." Id. at 283-84.
264. 254 Cal. Rptr. 627 (Ct. App. 1988).
265. Id. at 628.
266. Id.
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with the defendant's right to terminate the plaintiff "at any
time, with or without cause, without liability."26 7 He was
fired in August 1982 for making offensive remarks to a
trainee.268 In opposition to summary judgment on his con-
tract claim,269 the plaintiff offered his own declaration testi-
mony that he was told he would only be terminated for good
cause when hired, and that he had a strong performance rec-
ord.270 He denied making the offensive remarks, asserting
that he was terminated so that another employee could have
his promotion.27 '
On appeal from an order granting summary judgment for
the defendant,272 the court held that the plaintiff failed to
overcome the presumption of at will employment. 3 The
court concluded that because the contract was integrated, the
plaintiffs declaration testimony regarding the prior oral rep-
resentations was inadmissible parol evidence. 274 "Moreover,"
the court reasoned, "the implied promise was inconsistent
with the express terms of the employment letter."275 Accord-
ingly, the court affirmed judgment for the defendant.276
In contrast to Malstrom, the Anderson court did not care-
fully distinguish the alleged prehire statements from evi-
dence of the plaintiffs performance once he was hired. In-
stead, ignoring evidence of the plaintiffs performance, the
court seemed to conclude that the Shapiro analysis reinforced
its parol evidence analysis. Because the plaintiff was relying
in part on posthire evidence to establish an implied-in-fact
contract, the plaintiffs case offered an important opportunity
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. The plaintiff also sued for wrongful termination in violation of public
policy, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and negli-





273. Id. at 630-31.
274. Anderson, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 630 (citing Malstrom). The Court's integra-
tion analysis is implicit in the factual background portion of the opinion. See id.
(emphasizing both that the agreement contained an integration clause and that
it expressly stated the plaintiffs employment was at will).
275. Id. at 634 (citing Shapiro and Malstrom).




to discuss the relationship between these two theories. Un-
fortunately, this is an opportunity the court declined to take.
D. 1989-1990: Early Signs of Resistance
Prior to 1989, the Shapiro-Gerdlund rule met with very
little resistance. If anything, Shapiro was reinforced by the
emerging track two cases. In 1989, however, at least two
courts made it clear that they were not going to allow Shapiro
and Gerdlund to steam roll Pugh. The first of these two cases
was McLain v. Great Am. Ins. Co.,277 a case taking issue with
the courts' decisions in Malstrom and Gerdlund.
In McLain, the plaintiff was terminated for insubordina-
tion approximately two years after he was hired away from
another firm.178 The plaintiff was reluctant to leave his prior
job, but accepted a position with the defendant based on rep-
resentations about opportunities available at the defendant's
company. 9 In particular, he was told that he would become
a "permanent" employee after completing an initial proba-
tionary period.2 0 The plaintiffs wrongful termination action
asserted that he was discharged for complaining about his su-
pervisor's inappropriate and racist behavior, not for
insubordination. 8 1
On appeal from a jury verdict finding for the plaintiff,2 2
the issue was whether the trial court violated the parol evi-
dence rule by admitting the prehire statements into evi-
dence.28 3 The defendant argued the statements were inad-
missible because the plaintiff signed an integrated at will
employment application when hired.28 4 The court disagreed
and affirmed.28 8 The court reasoned that the standardized
277. 256 Cal. Rptr. 863 (Ct. App. 1989).
278. Id. at 867-69.
279. Id. at 865.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 865-66. The plaintiff sued for breach of contract, breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, violation of civil rights, negli-
gent and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and wrongful termination
in violation of public policy. Id. at 866. The court's opinion only addressed the
merits of the plaintiffs contract claim. Id. at 867.
282. McLain, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 867.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 870.
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form application was not an integrated agreement. 2 6  The
court also concluded that the plaintiff offered substantial evi-
dence both of an implied-in-fact contract and that the reason
asserted for his termination, insubordination, was
pretextual.28 7
The second case, Wilkerson v. Wells Fargo Bank,288
echoed the sentiments expressed in McLain. In Wilkerson,
the plaintiff was terminated after approximately three years
of employment for violating the defendant's prohibition
against personally benefiting from bank transactions. 28 9 The
plaintiff conceded that he approved an overdraft on a cus-
tomer's account for two checks paid to him.290 He countered,
however, that the violation was unintentional and did not
constitute good cause for termination.291 The plaintiff also
claimed that his termination was racially motivated.292 His
suit alleged claims for, inter alia, breach of contract. 293
286. Id. at 867-70. The court distinguished the plaintiffs case from the facts
of Anderson and Gerdlund, reasoning that the application did not contain an
integration clause and was merely a form agreement. Id. In particular, the
court emphasized the fact that the application contained language stating that
the terms of the agreement could "be changed, with or without cause, and with
or without notice, at any time by the [defendant]." Id. at 868. The court ex-
plained that the significance of this provision was twofold. First, the court con-
cluded, the provision strongly suggested "that the parties specifically intended
their relationship to remain subject to change in terms and conditions." Id.
Second, that it stripped the at will term of any force, in that the application
stated that the plaintiff could be terminated "with or without cause," on the one
hand, and that the agreement could be changed at any time, on the other. Id.
Because of this, the court reasoned, there was no "flat" contradiction between
the at will term and the plaintiffs claim for an implied-in-fact contract. Id. The
court did not discuss or even cite Shapiro.
287. McLain, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 867-70. The court remarked further that the
evidence was admissible to explain the meaning of the provision stating the
terms of the plaintiffs employment could be changed at any time. Id. The court
reasoned that this language was ambiguous given additional language stating
the defendant could not enter into a "contrary arrangement." Id.
288. 261 Cal. Rptr. 185 (1989).




293. Wilkerson, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 188. The plaintiff sued for breach of oral
contract, but his claim was treated as one for breach of an implied-in-fact agree-
ment. Id. at 189 n.2. As evidence of an expectation of continuous employment,
the plaintiff cited "exemplary performance reviews, success in developing and
maintaining customer relations, and his elevation to assistant manager and
then deposit team leader. . . ." Id. at 188.
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The trial court granted the defendant's summary judg-
ment motion, 294 but the appellate court reversed.295 The de-
fendant argued that its express at will Service Operations
Manual ("SOM") precluded an implied-in-fact contract as a
matter of law.296 The court disagreed, reasoning that the
SOM was not a signed, integrated agreement.2 97 The ab-
sence of these requirements, the court concluded, distin-
guished the facts of the plaintiffs case from the facts of ear-
lier cases going the other way.298 The court reasoned further
that the plaintiff raised a triable issue of material fact on the
issue of good cause with evidence that the defendant's policy
was only to terminate for a gross violation resulting in a sub-
stantial loss. 2 99
Like Anderson, the Wilkerson court ignored an important
opportunity to explore the relationship between the emerging
doctrine and the parol evidence rule. The court commented
only that Shapiro was "consistent with" the parol evidence
rule. °° Some discussion would have been appropriate given
the fact that the plaintiff was relying on posthire evidence of
his exemplary job performance and not on any alleged prior
or contemporaneous agreements.
294. Id. at 188, 194.
295. Id. at 194.
296. Id. at 189. The defendant cited, inter alia, Shapiro as authority for this
argument. Id. at 190.
297. Id. at 190-93.
298. Wilkerson, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 190-93. In Walker v. Blue Cross of Cal., 6
Cal. Rptr. 2d 184 (Ct. App. 1992), the court cited this aspect of the Wilkerson
court's holding in support of its conclusion that the defendant could not negate
the existence of an implied-in-fact contract by pointing to language in its em-
ployee handbook stating that the employment relationship was "voluntary em-
ployment 'at will."' Id. at 189. The court reasoned that "where the employment
relationship has not been reduced to an integrated written agreement, signed
by the employee, language in the handbook that there is an at-will relationship
does not establish the nature of the relationship as a matter of law." Id.
299. Id. at 191-93. The court also reversed as to the plaintiffs breach of cove-
nant claim, but rejected the plaintiffs contention that his termination was a
pretext for race discrimination. Id. at 191.
300. Id. at 190. Although the court did not say whether Shapiro requires an
integrated writing, the opinion suggests as much. The court's opinion states
that Shapiro and its progeny "are consistent with the parol evidence rule, which
generally prohibits the introduction of any extrinsic evidence to vary or contra-
dict the terms of an integrated written instrument." Id. Note further that the
Wilkerson court cited Gerdlund in support of this description of the parol evi-
dence rule, thereby implicitly rejecting the Gerdlund court's dicta extending the
parol evidence rule beyond integrated agreements. Id. at 190-91.
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Wagner v. Glendale Adventist Medical Center,30 1 the
third case decided in 1989, made an attempt to expressly
limit the Shapiro-Gerdlund rule. In Wagner, the plaintiff
was hired to work as a physical therapist in 1969.302 Her
original employment application stated that she could be ter-
minated at will.3°3 The at will application language was rein-
forced by at will language in the defendant's employee hand-
books.3 °4  In 1986, the plaintiff also signed an
acknowledgment form attached to the most recent version of
the handbook, again stating that she was an at will em-
ployee.30 5 She brought suit after the defendant eliminated
her position in January 1987.106
On appeal, the issue was whether the trial court properly
excluded parol evidence of a collateral agreement that the
plaintiff could only be terminated for cause. 7 This is an is-
sue the court analyzed separately with respect to the plain-
tiffs employment application and signed acknowledgment
form. With regard to the application, the court disagreed
with the trial court's ruling excluding the parol evidence.
The court's reasoning was as follows.
The plaintiffs employment application was partially in-
tegrated.30 8 In deposition, the plaintiff acknowledged the fact
that the terms and conditions of her employment were set
forth in the defendant's employee handbooks. 30 9 The at will
language in the handbooks was also consistent with the at
will language in the employment application. 10 In fact, the
latter version of the handbook added the words "at will" to
the provision governing termination.3 1' On balance, it was
thus apparent that the parties intended to incorporate the at
will employment application into their agreement as the com-
plete and final expression of one contract term.3 12 However,
since the plaintiff was relying on evidence of express and im-
301. 256 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1989).




306. Wagner, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 415.
307. Id.
308. Id. at 417-22.
309. Id. at 417.
310. Id. at 417-18.
311. Wagner, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 415.
312. Id. at 417-18.
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plied assurances made after she executed the application, the
issue of integration was not dispositive.3 13
Shapiro does not foreclose an implied modification of the
prior written agreement: "The principle expressed is based on
the reasoning that where the parties freely, fairly and volun-
tarily enter into a bargain, it would be inequitable to imply a
different liability and to withdraw from one party benefits to
which he or she is entitled under the contract."314 Where, as
here, one party has induced the other party's reliance based
on oral representations, conduct or custom, "it would be
equally inequitable to deny the relying party the benefit of
the other party's apparent modification of the written con-
tract."315 Nonetheless, summary judgment is granted.3 16
The plaintiff failed to offer admissible evidence raising a tria-
ble issue of material fact as to the existence of an implied-in-
fact contract.31 7
The court also disagreed with the trial court's ruling re-
garding the acknowledgment form. Emphasizing that the
plaintiff was relying on prehire representations, the court ex-
plained that at will language in the acknowledgment form
precluded a contrary implied-in-fact agreement as a matter of
law regardless of whether the acknowledgment form was in-
tegrated.31 8 The court cited Shapiro and Wal-Noon for this
proposition 9.3 1  The court then reiterated its conclusion that
the plaintiffs evidence of an implied agreement failed to raise
a triable issue of material fact.
32 0
313. Id. at 418. The court cited Wal-Noon for this proposition, but failed, like
the courts' earlier opinions in Crossen and Hillsman, to analyze the analogy.
See id. Wal-Noon is discussed supra note 179.,
314. Wagner, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 418.
315. Id.
316. Id. at 418-22.
317. Id.
318. Id. at 420-22. Relying on McLain, the court concluded that the ac-
knowledgment form was not an integrated agreement. Id. at 421-22. The court
reasoned that the acknowledgment form was a standardized form contract
missing key elements of the employment agreement, and that it indicated a
specific intent that the terms of the agreement remained subject to change. Id.
at 421. The court pointed out, however, that in contrast to McLain, the plaintiff
was relying on events which preceded execution of the contract to establish an
implied-in-fact agreement. Id. at 421-22.
319. Wagner, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 421. The court could have, but did not, cite
Gerdlund for its conclusion that the acknowledgment form was controlling even
if it was not an integrated writing.
320. Id.
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The Wagner court was trying to strike a balance between
the competing interpretations of the Shapiro-Gerdlund rule.
Thus, while embracing the employment application and ac-
knowledgment form as the type of documents which are
within the Shapiro-Gerdlund rule,32 ' the court also ratified
an implied-in-fact modification theory. 22 The court was es-
sentially saying that a written at will employment agreement
will not operate as an absolute bar to a claim for breach of an
implied-in-fact contract, so long as the implied contract is
anchored in evidence of postexecution conduct and state-
ments. However, because the court went on to conclude that
the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of material fact as
to the existence of an implied-in-fact modification, 23 this as-
pect of the opinion is really dicta.
It is also noteworthy that the Wagner court tried to rec-
oncile the emerging doctrine and parol evidence rule. The
court's opinion implies that these are overlapping theories, in
the sense that both bar implied-in-fact contract claims based
on evidence of preexecution or contemporaneous agreements,
but do not prevent the plaintiff from establishing an implied-
in-fact contract based on evidence of postexecution conduct or
representations. 324  This is an extremely narrow interpreta-
tion of the doctrine's scope.325
Notably, while not cited by the court in Wagner, the
Ninth Circuit's opinion in DeHorney v. Bank of Am. Trust &
Say. Ass'n 326 had already considered the implied-in-fact mod-
ification issue. In DeHorney, the plaintiff filed suit for, inter
alia, wrongful termination and race discrimination following
her discharge (after eight months of employment) for misap-
propriating bank funds.3 27 The plaintiff advanced the novel
argument that the defendant's "Code of Corporate Conduct"
modified the terms of her written at will employment con-
321. Id. at 420-21.
322. Id. at 416-20.
323. Id. at 419-22.
324. See Wagner, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 418.
325. On the other hand, though, the court's conclusion that the acknowledg-
ment form precluded an implied-in-fact contract regardless of whether it was
integrated would seem to strengthen the parol evidence rule, which ordinarily
turns on the issue of integration. See id. at 421-22.
326. 879 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1989).
327. Id. at 460-62. The plaintiff also sued for interference with a beneficial




tract. 28 In particular, she emphasized language in the Code
of Corporate Conduct promising "all employees fair treat-
ment, good career opportunities, and attractive working con-
ditions" and stating that employees would be terminated
"whenever such action [was] justified."3 29
The court was not persuaded and affirmed summary
judgment.3 3 0 The court did not hold that an at will employ-
ment contract can never be modified by an implied-in-fact
contract. Indeed, the court expressly declined to do so.331 In-
stead, the court held only that under the circumstances, the
plaintiff could not have reasonably believed the Code of Cor-
porate Conduct modified her written at will employment
contract.332
E. 1990-1994: Dissension
The first case decided in 1990 was Wood v. Loyola Mary-
mount Univ.333 Although the Wood court did not look to the
earlier opinion in Hilisman v. Sutter Community Hospital,334
the court resolved the appeal based on the same analysis: The
absence of a conflict between the express and implied con-
tract terms.335 In Wood, the plaintiff worked as the defend-
ant's head baseball coach from 1969 to 1984.36 Each year
the plaintiff received an "annual appointment letter" stating
328. Id. at 466-67.
329. Id. at 466.
330. Id. at 466-67.
331. DeHorney, 879 F.2d at 466-67.
332. Id. at 466. The court also rejected the plaintiffs remaining claims. Id.
at 464-65, 467-78. In Siddoway v. Bank of Am., 748 F. Supp. 1456 (N.D. Cal.
1990), the district court cited DeHorney for the proposition that the plaintiff
bank employee could not establish an implied-in-fact contract given her written
at will agreement (which was the same agreement at issue in DeHorney), but
failed to conduct any meaningful analysis. Id. at 1459-60. The modification
issue was not raised in Siddoway. In fact, the plaintiffs opposition papers
failed to offer any rebuttal whatsoever. Id. at 1460. However, the modification
issue was raised in Mundy v. Household Fin. Corp., a case decided shortly
before DeHorney. 885 F.2d 542 (9th Cir. 1989). In that case, the Ninth Circuit
commented that while it was possible the plaintiffs written at will agreement
was modified by his long tenure, the plaintiff failed to offer any evidence "that
such a change in the expectations of the parties ever occurred." Id. at 545.
DeHorney did not cite Mundy.
333. 267 Cal. Rptr. 230 (Ct. App. 1990).
334. 200 Cal. Rptr. 605 (Ct. App. 1984). Hillsman is discussed supra notes
201-11.
335. Wood, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 232-34.
336. Id. at 231.
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that his employment had been renewed for the coming aca-
demic year.337 However, in 1971, the plaintiff also received a
memorandum explaining that employment at the university
was "continuous, subject ... to the continuing mutual satis-
faction from the [parties] with regard to performance, salary,
professional opportunities, and working conditions."33 ' The
memorandum stated further that the plaintiffs employment
would be governed by the terms set forth in the university's
employee handbook.3 39 The memorandum was authored by
the president of the university.340 The plaintiff filed suit af-
ter he was terminated without warning in May 1984. 3
4 1
In reversing summary judgment, 42 the court rejected
the defendant's argument that the appointment letters pre-
cluded an implied-in-fact contract. According to the court, by
stating that employment with the university was "continu-
ous," the letters raised a triable issue of material fact con-
cerning the plaintiffs at will status.343 The court similarly
rejected the defendant's attempt to assert the president's
memo as a contract defense. The court concluded that a tria-
ble issue of fact was raised when the letter was read in con-
junction with the handbook, which promised "that employees
... would not be discharged pursuant to an 'arbitrary pro-
cess,' but rather would be dismissed pursuant to established
procedures."3 44
After Wood came Tollefson v. Roman Catholic Bishop,345
a decision which stands out as one of the first cases expressly
extending the Shapiro-Gerdlund rule to claims for breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.346 In Tol-
lefson, the plaintiff was employed first as a teacher, then later
promoted to assistant principal.3 47 She was employed under
337. Id.
338. Id. at 232.
339. Id.
340. Wood, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 232.
341. Id. at 234.
342. Id. at 235.
343. Id. at 231-32.
344. Id. at 232.
345. 268 Cal. Rptr. 550 (Ct. App. 1990).
346. Gerdlund was one of the earliest California opinions on this subject.
See Gerdlund v. Electronic Dispensers Intl, 235 Cal. Rptr. 279, 286-87 (Ct. App.
1987) (commenting that it was error for the trial court to instruct the jury on
the plaintiffs claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing where the plaintiff signed an at will agreement).
347. Tollefson, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 552.
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successive one year employment agreements from 1978 to
1985, each explicitly stating that the defendant did not have
any obligation to renew the agreement at the end of the one
year term. 48
In 1985, the plaintiff was informed that her appointment
as assistant principal would not be renewed, but that she
could resume her teaching position.3 49 While accepting the
teaching position, the plaintiff also filed a lawsuit alleging
claims for, inter alia, breach of contract and breach of the im-
plied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
350
The defendant moved for summary judgment asserting;
(1) that the contract stated there was no obligation to renew
the agreement; and (2) that the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing could not be used to supply a good cause
requirement.3 5  The trial court agreed that the plaintiff be-
came an at will employee at the end of the contract term and
granted the employer's motion.352
On appeal, the issue was whether the implied covenant
required the defendant to renew the plaintiffs appointment
absent good cause for not doing so. 3 53 The appellate court re-
jected the plaintiffs position that good cause was required,
reasoning that the implied covenant only protects the parties'
reasonable expectations, and that continuous employment is
not a reasonable expectation of an at will agreement. 54 The
appellate court also concluded that the plaintiff failed to re-
348. Id.
349. Id. at 553-54.
350. Id. at 554. The plaintiff also sued for negligent discharge. Id. Her hus-
band sued for negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress and loss
of consortium. Id. at 559 n.6.
351. Id. at 554.
352. Tollefson, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 554.
353. Id. at 555.
354. Id. at 555-57. As to the plaintiffs at will status, the court explained
that "her right to continue employment expired with the contract term." Id. at
557.
1996]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37
but the presumption of at will employment 35 5 and, in any
event, that the contract was integrated.3 56
The Ninth Circuit arrived at this same conclusion two
months later in Rose v. Wells Fargo & Co. ,357 which was prin-
cipally an age discrimination case.358 In Rose, the plaintiffs
filed suit after their jobs were eliminated following a
merger.359 Their claim for breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing asserted breach of an implied
* promise not to discharge them except for good cause.36 ° In
affirming summary judgment, the court agreed with the dis-
trict court's determination that the plaintiffs were at will em-
ployees.3 6 1 The court reasoned that the plaintiffs were em-
ployed pursuant to an express at will agreement. 6 2
The analytical focus of the courts' opinions in Tollefson
and Rose was not on integration. Indeed, no mention is made
of the integration criteria. However, the issue came up again
within a month of the Rose decision. In Slivinsky v. Watkins-
Johnson Co. ,363 decided in June 1990, the plaintiff signed an
at will employment application when originally applying for a
job with the defendant.364 When hired, she then signed an at
355. The court reasoned both that the plaintiffs implied-in-fact contract the-
ory was inconsistent with the express at will term in the written agreement,
and that she could not establish an implied-in-fact contract with evidence of her
longevity of service, salary increases and promotions. Id. at 557. The court's
analysis with respect to the at will agreement is somewhat muddled. The court
cites the parol evidence rule, and then states: "Indeed, there simply cannot exist
a valid express contract on one hand and an implied contract on the other, each
embracing the identical subject but requiring different results." Id. (citing, in-
ter alia, Shapiro). What the court meant by "indeed" is unclear.
356. Id. at 557-58. The court did not explain why the contract was inte-
grated. See id. The court also rejected the plaintiffs-and her husband's-
remaining claims. Id. at 558-59.
357. 902 F.2d 1417 (9th Cir. 1990).
358. See id. at 1420-25.
359. Rose, 902 F.2d at 1419-20.
360. Id. at 1425.
361. Id. at 1425-26.
362. Id. In support of this finding, the court cited Gerdlund for the proposi-
tion that "the implied covenant may only be used to supply a requirement of
good cause for termination when the contract between the parties is silent or
ambiguous on that subject." Id. at 1426. The court also cited Foley v. Interac-
tive Data Corp, 765 P.2d 373 (1988), even though Foley only made a passing
reference to Shapiro. See supra note 152. The court's reliance on Foley was
misplaced.
363. 270 Cal. Rptr 585 (Ct. App. 1990).
364. Id. at 586.
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will employment agreement referenced in the application.365
Two years later, she was discharged as part of a reduction in
force.366 She brought suit alleging that the reason for her ter-
mination was pretextual. s67
On appeal, the issue was whether the at will documents
were dispositive as to the nature of the parties' employment
relationship. 8 The court held that they were and affirmed
summary judgment.369 The court reasoned that the parties'
written agreement was integrated, and thus that extrinsic
evidence of an implied-in-fact contract was barred by the pa-
rol evidence rule.37 ° The court remarked further that "[t]here
simply cannot be a valid express contract and an implied con-
tract, each embracing the same subject, but requiring differ-
ent results."3
71
The facts of Slivinsky were distinguished in the next case
on this subject, Seubert v. McKesson Corp.372 In Seubert, the
plaintiff signed an employment application stating that his
employment could be "terminated at any time without prior
notice" when he was originally hired in 198 1. 37 3 He brought
suit alleging various wrongful termination claims after he
was terminated in 1985.374 The plaintiff was terminated for
365. Id. at 587.
366. Id.
367. Id. The plaintiff sued for breach of contract, breach of the implied cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing, fraud and invasion of privacy. Id. at 586.
368. Slivinsky, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 587.
369. Id. at 590. The court also rejected the plaintiffs other causes of action.
Id. at 589-90.
370. Id. at 587-90. The court's conclusion that the parties' employment con-
tract was integrated was based largely on the fact that the plaintiff first signed
the at will employment application, and then later signed the at will employ-
ment agreement referenced in the application. The court reasoned that: "Read-
ing these documents together, the only reasonable conclusion that can be drawn
is that the parties intended that there would be no other agreement regarding
termination other than that set forth in the employee agreement, i.e., that em-
ployment was terminable at the will of either party, with or without cause." Id.
at 588.
371. Id. at 588 (quoting Malstrom v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 231
Cal. Rptr. 820, 828 (Ct. App. 1986)). The court's exclusive focus on the parol
evidence issue is once again suspect. True, the plaintiff was relying on evidence
of prehire representations of continuous employment. Id. at 587. However, she
was also relying on posthire evidence of longevity of service, promotions and
lack of criticism of her job performance. Id.
372. 273 Cal. Rptr. 296 (Ct. App. 1990).
373. Id. at 297.
374. Id. at 298. The plaintiff sued for breach of contract, breach of the im-
plied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and misrepresentation. Id.
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failing to meet his sales quota.375 There was evidence, how-
ever, that the plaintiffs failure to meet his sales quota re-
sulted from the defendant's decision, despite the plaintiffs
protests, to market an inadequate computer system. 376 Cus-
tomers returned virtually all of the systems the plaintiff was
instructed to sell.3 7
7
On appeal, the defendant challenged the jury's verdict
for the plaintiff on his claim for breach of the implied cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing. 37 The defendant argued
that, based on his signed employment application, the plain-
tiffs employment was at will.3 79 The court of appeals rejected
this argument and affirmed.38 0 Relying on McLain, the court
reasoned that the employment application was not an inte-
grated agreement. 38 1 The court concluded further that the
plaintiff established an implied promise that he would only
be terminated for good cause with evidence that the defend-
ant's personnel policy provided for the termination of a sales-
person for failing to meet quota for two full quarters. 2
Contrast the holding in Seubert with the Ninth Circuit's
opinion in Comeaux v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co.,383
decided only two days later. In that case, the plaintiff was
hired to start work on August 18, 1987. 8s 4 When originally
applying for the position, he signed an at will employment
application.38 5 He was also invited to interview with the
company.3 8 Additional terms were set forth at the inter-
view, including a physical examination, relocation, and re-
signing from his job with one weeks notice.38 7 The plaintiff
375. Id.
376. Id. at 297-98.
377. Seubert, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 298.
378. Id. at 299. The defendant also challenged the award for damages for
misrepresentation. Id. at 297. The plaintiff, in turn, cross-appealed on the trial
court's decision not to submit his Labor Code claim to the jury. Id.
379. Id. at 299.
380. Id. at 301.
381. Id. at 299. In support of its determination that the application was not
integrated, the court emphasized that the application did not contain an inte-
gration clause, that it was a form agreement, and that it did not state that the
employer was free to terminate the relationship at "any time." Id.
382. Seubert, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 300.
383. 915 F.2d 1264 (9th Cir. 1990).
384. Id. at 1266.
385. Id. at 1269-70.




reported to work on August 18, 1987, after fully complying
with these additional terms.388 However, he was informed
first that his start date would be delayed, and then later that
he was not going to be hired at all.38 9 The plaintiff was told
that he was being rejected due to his poor credit history.39 °
He subsequently brought suit alleging, inter alia, breach of
contract.391
On appeal from an order granting summary judgment,392
the defendant argued that the plaintiffs employment applica-
tion precluded his implied contract claim as a matter of
law.3 93 The Ninth Circuit agreed, but only in part. The court
agreed that the application precluded an implied-in-fact
promise that the plaintiff would only be terminated for cause,
explaining that the application was a partially integrated
writing, and thus that evidence the plaintiff was told he
would only be terminated for cause when he signed the writ-
ing was inadmissible under the parol evidence rule.3 94 The
court explained further that the evidence was inadmissible
under the theory that the application was ambiguous, be-
cause it clearly stated that the plaintiffs employment was at
will.395 The court added that the implied promise was barred
by the express contract term, stating that "[t]here cannot be a
valid express contract and an implied contract each embrac-
ing the same subject, but requiring different results."396
Nonetheless, analyzing the conversation where the de-
fendant promised to "assign the plaintiff work" if he met the
388. Comeaux, 915 F.2d at 1266.
389. Id. at 1267.
390. Id. at 1266-67.
391. Id. at 1267-68. The plaintiff also sued for breach of the implied cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing, promissory estoppel, wrongful termination
in violation of public policy, violation of the Bankruptcy Act, invasion of privacy,
loss of consortium and negligent and willful violation of the Fair Credit Report-
ing Act. Id.
392. Id. at 1268.
393. Comeaux, 915 F.2d at 1270.
394. Id. at 1271 n.7. The court concluded that the writing was partially inte-
grated because it contained an integration clause and "made no provision for its
modification by subsequent written or oral agreements." Id.
395. Id.
396. Id. (citing Gianaculas v. TWA, 761 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1985)). The
court also rejected the plaintiffs remaining claims. Id. at 1268-69, 1272-75.
Comeaux was purely a parol evidence case and did not call on the court to con-
sider the relationship between the parol evidence rule and Shapiro-Gerdlund
doctrine. However, the court could have commented on the need for integration
in the first place.
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additional terms as a separate express employment contract,
the Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiff was entitled to re-
cover reliance damages. 97 The court reasoned that the de-
fendant breached this agreement by refusing to assign the
plaintiff work and a salary.398 As to the application, the court
explained that it was not controlling because it was not effec-
tive until the plaintiff actually started work.399
In Harden v. Maybelline Sales Corp.400 the court
squarely rejected the idea that an employment application
could be used as a complete defense to a contract claim.4 °1 In
Harden, the plaintiff was contacted by the defendant about
prospective employment while at another job.40 2 He was ini-
tially told that the defendant was looking for "long term" em-
ployees.40 3 Representations of long-term employment were
again made at his subsequent interviews, including represen-
tations by the president of the company.40 4 Nevertheless,
before he was hired, the plaintiff signed an at will employ-
ment application.40 5 He was terminated after two and one-
half years of employment for allegedly falsifying expense
reports.40 6
The question on appeal was whether the signed at will
employment application precluded an implied-in-fact con-
tract.40 v The court held that it did not and reversed summary
judgment.40 8 The court reasoned that the application was a
noncontractual document which did not constitute an inte-
grated agreement and, accordingly, that evidence of the de-
fendant's prehire representations was admissible evidence of
an implied-in-fact contract. 40 9 The court reasoned further
397. Id. at 1269-71.
398. Comeaux, 915 F.2d at 1270.
399. Id.
400. 282 Cal. Rptr. 96 (Ct. App. 1991).
401. See id. at 98-99.





407. Harden, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 98.
408. Id. at 98-99.
409. Id. The court characterized the application as "a mere solicitation of an
offer of employment." Id. at 99. In contrast to some of the earlier opinions
which failed to explore the foundation of the Shapiro-Gerdlund doctrine, the
Harden court expressly stated that the doctrine is based on (not just "consistent
with") the parol evidence rule. See id. (citing, inter alia, Shapiro). Recall that
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that this evidence was sufficient to raise a triable issue of ma-
terial fact.4 10
The next two cases were also decided in favor of the
plaintiff. Esbensen v. Userware Int'l, Inc.,4 1 which followed
directly after Harden, is an example of a case where the de-
fendant was really trying to pull a fast one on the plaintiff. In
that case, the plaintiff was originally hired pursuant to an
oral contract in 1977, but persuaded the defendant to reduce
the agreement to writing in 1979.412 Between 1979 and 1981,
he signed three written contracts, each stating that the par-
ties' employment agreement was effective for a one-year
term.41 3 In 1982, the plaintiff subsequently filed suit against
the defendant alleging breach of an implied contract when he
was terminated for failing to timely report to work after a
vacation.4 14 The plaintiff claimed that he was told his con-
tract would be perpetually renewed given his satisfactory job
performance.4 15
The issue on appeal was the propriety of the trial court's
ruling granting the defendant's motion in limine to exclude
evidence of the alleged oral representations about job secur-
ity.4 16 The appellate court reversed. 41 7 The court started by
making quick work of the defendant's somewhat disingenu-
ous argument that the at will language in the agreement was
controlling. The court reasoned that such language did not
refer to acceptable grounds for termination, but rather to the
defendant's obligation to pay the plaintiff his outstanding
commissions in the event of his termination.41  The court
then explained further that, since the written contract was
partially integrated,4 19 the real issue was whether evidence
Shapiro makes no mention of the parol evidence rule. See supra note 199.
Therefore, it is somewhat difficult to see how the court arrived at this
conclusion.
410. Id. at 99.
411. 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 93 (Ct. App. 1993).
412. Id. at 94.
413. Id.
414. Id. at 95.
415. Id.
416. Esbensen, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 95.
417. Id. at 98.
418. Id. at 96. The contract provided that "[u]pon termination for any rea-
son, all salary shall cease on the effective date of termination." Id. at 95.
419. Id. at 95-97. The court concluded that the writing was partially inte-
grated because it did not contain an integration clause and was silent on the
grounds for termination. Id. at 96-97. The court emphasized further that it
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of the parol agreement was inadmissible because it was in-
consistent with the contract's one-year term.420 The defend-
ant argued that the conflict was readily apparent, but the
court disagreed.4 21 Emphasizing that the contract called for
an annual salary review, the court reasoned that the one-year
term was susceptible to an interpretation consistent with the
evidence, namely that "the parties would be obligated to ne-
gotiate in good faith at the end of each year toward the goal of
renewal on mutually acceptable terms."422
Like Esbensen, the defendant in Thomka v. Financial
Corp. of Am.423 was really trying to stretch the limits of the
emerging doctrine. In that case, the plaintiff was hired as an
account executive in 1983.424 He did not sign any sort of at
will employment agreement when hired but did sign at will
sales regulations shortly before his termination in 1987.425
The plaintiff signed several sales regulations during his ten-
ure. 426 However, earlier versions of the sales regulations did
not contain at will language.427 The plaintiff filed a wrongful
termination suit alleging that he was terminated for ob-
jecting to the defendant's misleading sales practices and not
due to any psychiatric problems, as asserted by the
defendant.428
On appeal from a jury verdict for the plaintiff on his
breach of contract claim,429 the defendant argued that the
sales regulations barred the plaintiffs contract action as a
matter of law. 430 The court disagreed and affirmed. 43 1 Em-
was "hardly unnatural to think that small business entrepreneurs and a com-
puter programmer, unsophisticated in legal matters and unadvised by lawyers,
might have discussed those uncertainties and resolved them orally." Id. at 97.
420. Id. at 97-98.
421. Esbensen, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 98.
422. Id. This conclusion stands in marked contrast to Tollefson, which was
not cited in the court's opinion. See supra text accompanying notes 347-356
(discussing Tollefson).
423. 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 382 (Ct. App. 1993).




428. Thomka, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 384-85. At trial the defendant offered testi-
mony that the plaintiff threatened a person with a gun and that he was para-
noid. Id. at 385. The opinion is not clear about what the plaintiffs other claims
were, but the contract cause of action appears to have been the only claim sub-
mitted to the jury. Id. at 383.




phasizing the lack of any notice that at will language was be-
ing inserted into the sales regulations, the court reasoned
that the defendant was not relying on an integrated agree-
ment.4 32 The court reasoned further that the jury's verdict
was supported by substantial evidence, including evidence of
the plaintiffs strong performance record, and that the de-
fendant assured account executives that they would have a
"home" with the company as long as they continued to meet
their quota during a period when the company was experienc-
ing financial difficulties.433
Before turning to the two most recent opinions, at least a
passing reference must be made to the court's decision in
Rochlis v. Walt Disney Co.,434 a case extending the Shapiro-
Gerdlund rule to contractual negotiations.435 In Rochlis, the
plaintiff entered into a written agreement with the defendant
for a fixed three-year term.436 The parties renegotiated the
plaintiffs employment agreement before the end of the con-
tract term, with the plaintiff receiving a raise and stock op-
tions. 437 The defendant refused to enter into a fixed-term
contract but agreed to pay the plaintiff a year's salary as sev-
erance pay if electing to terminate the relationship. 438 The
stock option agreement the plaintiff ultimately signed pro-
vided that his employment could be terminated "at any time
for any reason whatsoever, with or without good cause.
The plaintiff resigned in early 1989.440 He decided that
he had to leave the company based on his increasing dissatis-
faction with his job responsibilities and compensation.44 '
The plaintiff then filed suit against the defendant alleging
claims for breach of contract, fraud, defamation and conspir-
431. Id. at 386.
432. Id. at 385-86. Although the opinion is not perfectly clear on the subject,
it appears that the plaintiff was relying on posthire evidence to establish an
implied-in-fact agreement. See id. at 383-84. Thus, this is another example of a
case where the court's exclusive focus on integration was arguably
inappropriate.
433. Thomka, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 383-86.
434. 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 793, 797-98 (Ct. App. 1993).
435. See id.
436. Rochlis, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 794.
437. Id. at 795.
438. Id.
439. Id. at 795 n.7.
440. Id. at 796.
441. Rochlis, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 794-96.
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acy.442 The trial court granted the defendant's summary
judgment motion, reasoning-as to the plaintiffs implied con-
tract claim-that his employment was at will.443 The trial
court based this conclusion on the fact that the plaintiff
signed the at will stock option agreements.444 The court of
appeals affirmed.445 Without citing any specific authority,
the court reasoned that "[i]t would be error for a court to im-
ply a contractual term which the parties themselves had ex-
pressly rejected during their negotiations."446 The court rea-
soned further that under Shapiro, the plaintiff could not
rebut the presumption of at will employment given the fact
that he signed the at will stock option agreement.447
F. 1995: Fortification
Camp v. Jeffer, Mangels, Butler & Marmaro448 is the first
of two cases decided in 1995. In Camp, the plaintiffs, hus-
band and wife, sued their former employer alleging claims for
breach of implied contract, breach of covenant, wrongful ter-
mination in violation of public policy, and misrepresenta-
tion.449 The plaintiffs were both employed as legal secretar-
ies.45° Mrs. Camp was terminated for typing a letter with
excessive errors.45' Mr. Camp was terminated soon thereaf-
ter for working on a personal matter during business
hours.452 The Camps' complaint alleged that Mrs. Camp was
terminated in retaliation for reporting alleged insider trading
by one of the partners.453 The complaint alleged further that
Mr. Camp was terminated because he was married to Mrs.
Camp.4 5
4
442. Id. at 796.
443. Id.
444. Id.
445. Id. at 802-03.
446. Rochlis, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 797.
447. Id. at 797-98. The opinion is not clear about what evidence the plaintiff
was relying on to establish an implied-in-fact contract. Thus, it is difficult to
tell if there was any call to discuss questions left open by the earlier opinions.
448. 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 329 (Ct. App. 1995).
449. Id. at 333.
450. Id. at 332.
451. Id. at 333.
452. Id.




In affirming summary judgment, the court rejected the
plaintiffs' implied contract claims based on the fact that they
signed a document acknowledging their at will employment
status shortly after they were hired.4 5 Citing Gerdlund, the
court reasoned that "[t]he express term [was] controlling even
if it [was] not contained in an integrated employment con-
tract."456 The court also stated that the plaintiffs could not
raise a triable issue of material fact as to the existence of an
implied contract with Mrs. Camp's deposition testimony that
the firm "promised" to place her in another position after she
reported the alleged insider trading, that she quit her prior
job to accept a position with the defendant, or that both Mr.
and Mrs. Camp switched from temporary to permanent em-
ployment.45 7 The court reasoned that this evidence did not
create a legitimate expectation of job security.458
The significance of the Camp opinion is twofold. Obvi-
ously, the fact that the court was willing to accept the defend-
ant's argument that the acknowledgment forms precluded
the plaintiffs' implied-in-fact contract claims reflects an ex-
pansive interpretation of the Shapiro-Gerdlund rule. This is-
sue did come up before in Wagner, but in Wagner the ac-
knowledgment form was reinforced by at will language both
in the plaintiffs employment application and in the defend-
ant's handbook. 459 This observation also follows from the
court's explicit holding (in marked contrast to a majority of
the earlier opinions) that the at will acknowledgment form
was controlling regardless of whether it was an integrated
employment contract.46 °
455. Id. at 332.
456. Id. at 334. The court cited Shapiro as authority for the proposition that
there cannot be an express and implied contract covering the same subject but
requiring different results. Id.
457. Id. at 334-35. With regard to the evidence that Mrs. Camp quit her
prior job to accept employment with the defendant, the court explained that
"[a]lthough a job offer may give rise to a good cause termination standard if it
includes assurances of long-term employment, a simple offer, without more, is
not sufficient." Id. at 335. The absence of these assurances, the court reasoned,
distinguished the Camps' case from McLain v. Great Am. Ins. Co. Id.
458. Camp, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 335. The court also rejected the plaintiffs
remaining claims. Id. at 335-41.
459. See supra text accompanying note 304.
460. Camp, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 329. Since the Camp court did not discuss
the parol evidence rule, citing Gerdlund rather than Shapiro here was a bit
strange. It is likely, however, that the court cited Gerdlund, because Gerdlund
expressly states this proposition. See supra note 261.
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Additionally important is the fact that the court's modi-
fied opinion discards language endorsing the Wagner dicta.4 6'
Recall that Wagner strongly suggests that a written at will
agreement can be modified by the parties' postexecution con-
duct.462 Of course, the reason the Camp court dumped the
Wagner dicta is not clear. However, appreciating the spirit in
which the opinion was written, a reasonable argument can be
made that the court was rejecting this theory.
This is an aspect of the Camp opinion which contrasts
sharply with Haggard v. Kimberly Quality Care, Inc.,463 the
more recent of the two decisions. In that case, the plaintiff
was originally hired by Quality Care, Inc. in January 1986.464
She was promoted to a management level position in 1987,
and retained following a merger between Quality Care and
Kimberly, Inc. in 1988.465 Significantly, when the two compa-
nies merged, the plaintiff was required to sign an agreement
stating that she was an at will employee and that the terms
of the agreement could only be changed by a formal written
agreement signed by the president of the company.4 66 Ap-
proximately two years later, the plaintiff signed a form ac-
knowledging the receipt of the most recent version of the de-
fendant's handbook.46 v Like the written agreement, the
handbook stated that the plaintiff was an at will employee.468
The plaintiff subsequently brought suit against the defendant
when she was discharged based on a knowing violation of the
defendant's policies in 1992.469 The plaintiff, who suffered
from multiple sclerosis, countered that the reason asserted
461. The court's original opinion cited Wagner for the proposition that: "The
express term is controlling unless it has been modified by subsequent events."
The court's modified opinion states instead: "The express term is controlling
even if it is not contained in an integrated employment contract." Camp, 41
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 334.
462. Wagner v. Glendale Adventist Medical Ctr., 265 Cal. Rptr. 412, 418 (Ct.
App. 1989).
463. 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16 (Ct. App. 1995).
464. Id. at 19.
465. Id.
466. Id.
467. Id. at 20.
468. Haggard, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 20.
469. Id. The plaintiff sued for breach of contract, wrongful termination in
violation of public policy, discrimination, intentional and negligent infliction of
emotional distress, and invasion of privacy. Id. Only the contract and disabil-
ity discriminations claims went to the jury. Id.
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for her termination was merely a pretext for disability
discrimination.47 °
On appeal from a verdict for the plaintiff on her breach of
contract claim,4 7' the defendant argued that the trial court
should not have submitted this theory to the jury.472 The de-
fendant claimed that the signed at will agreement barred the
plaintiffs contract claim as a matter of law.473 The court
agreed and reversed.474 Relying on Gerdlund, the court held
that parol evidence was inadmissible to establish an implied-
in-fact agreement predating the plaintiffs partially inte-
grated post-merger employment contract.47 5 Relying on Mal-
strom and Tollefson, the court held that the agreement was
not subject to an implied-in-fact or written modification.476
The court reasoned that, based on the express modification
provision, the "plaintiff could not reasonably have relied on
470. Id. The trial court denied the defendant's motion in limine to exclude
parol evidence of the alleged implied-in-fact contract, the defendant's motion for
non-suit, and the defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
Id. at 20 n.1.
471. Id. at 21.
472. Id.
473. Haggard, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 21.
474. Id. at 26.
475. Id. at 21-24. The court also rejected the plaintiffs claim that the post-
merger agreement was invalid for lack of consideration. The court explained
that this argument was based on the erroneous assumption that the plaintiff
was not an at will employee before signing the post-merger agreement, i.e., that
she surrendered the right to a just cause determination before she was dis-
charged without receiving any corresponding benefit from the defendant. Id. at
22-23. In this respect, the court noted that the plaintiff signed no fewer than
three at will agreements before the merger, and, in any event, that the plain-
tiffs argument was contrary to the well established principle that courts will
not inquire into the adequacy of consideration. Id. The court concluded that
the agreement was partially integrated because, inter alia, "[tihe plain lan-
guage of the Agreement indicate[d] that it cover[ed] various conditions related
to [the] plaintiffs employment." Id. at 23.
The plaintiff also argued that the post-merger agreement was not an "em-
ployment contract." Id. at 25. She emphasized that the defendant's employee
handbook stated that the at will confidentiality agreement and restrictive cove-
nants employees were required to sign-and which the plaintiff signed-were
not considered employment contracts. Id. The court rejected this argument,
reasoning that the question was whether the post-merger agreement was a
complete expression of the terms it covered, i.e., a partially integrated agree-
ment, not whether it was an "employment contract." Id.
476. Id. at 24-26.
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an alleged implied contract, which was not in a writing
signed by the president, to modify the Agreement."47
7
IV. REASONABLE EXPECTATION CONTRACT THEORY
Reading all of these opinions together, it becomes clear
that courts are still divided over some of the important is-
sues here. Murky areas include the need for integration, the
value of an at will employment application, and the continued
viability of the implied-in-fact modification theory. This is
due in large measure to disagreement over the scope and
mechanics of the Shapiro-Gerdlund doctrine. Cases like
Wagner treat the Shapiro-Gerdlund doctrine as the func-
tional equivalent of the parol evidence rule; cases like Mal-
strom and Haggard treat the doctrine and parol evidence rule
as discrete theories. Cases like Wilkerson turn on the issue of
integration; cases like Camp forcefully reject this require-
ment. Nonetheless, the opinions can be interpreted to stand
for a unified proposition, namely that substantial, material
evidence of a reasonable expectation of job security is neces-
sary to overcome a written at will employment agreement. I
submit this is a proposition, which can be justified in terms of
conventional "reasonable expectation" contract theory. The
analysis is as follows.
A. Principles of Contract Interpretation
According to standard principles of contract interpreta-
tion,47 the parties' agreement largely defines their contrac-
477. Id. at 24. The court also rejected the plaintiffs argument that the
agreement was modified by language in an employee handbook distributed in
1991. The thrust of the plaintiffs argument was twofold. First, that the hand-
book called for progressive discipline procedures and contained language prom-
ising to treat employees "very well." Id. Second, "that the handbook reserved
the right to change any and all employment policies." Id. The court's response
was, one, that the handbook repeatedly indicated that the employment relation-
ship was at will, and thus was entirely consistent with the terms of the written
contract, two, the handbook expressly stated that the progressive discipline pro-
cedure was not waiving the defendant's right to terminate the relationship
without cause. Id. at 25.
478. "Questions of interpretation arise in determining whether there is a con-
tract as well as in determining rights and duties under a contract." RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 200 cmt. a (1981) (emphasis added).
The California Supreme Court has clearly indicated that standard contract
principles apply to employment contracts. See supra note 16. Professor Corbin
disagrees. Challenging this view, his influential treatise argues that:
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tual obligations. 479 As a practical matter, before the plaintiff
A "contract" terminable at will by either party without further obliga-
tion or right flowing to either is repugnant to the term "contract" itself,
which carries with it implications of performance and duty, expecta-
tions based upon promises. The only way such an arrangement may be
seen as a "contract" is through the rear-view mirror of obligation to pay
for services already rendered. If there is nothing more, then the ana-
lytical differences between "employee" and "independent contractor"
have disappeared.
3A ARTHUa LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 684, at 134 (West Supp.
1994).
479. For examples of California cases embracing this "promissory" theory of
contractual obligations, see Robinson v. Magee, 9 Cal. 81, 83 (1858) ("A contract
is a voluntary and lawful agreement, by competent parties, for a good consider-
ation, to do or not to do a specified thing. The only end and object of the con-
tract, is the doing or not doing the particular thing mentioned."); Bundsen v.
Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 195 Cal. Rptr. 10, 11-13 (Ct. App. 1983)
(expressly rejecting formalistic, elemental approach to principles of contract for-
mation); Parkinson v. Caldwell, 272 P.2d 934, 937 (Cal. App. 1954) ("A contract
right has its origin in the agreement of the parties and if the parties by their
free agreement place a limitation on the right at the very time of its creation no
good reason occurs to us why they may not do so."). See also CAL. CIV. CODE.
§ 1549 (West 1982) ("A contract is an agreement to do or not to do a certain
thing."); Seamen's Bank For Sav. v. Superior Court, 236 Cal. Rptr. 31, 36 (Ct.
App. 1987) (citing California Civil Code § 1549 for the definition of a contract);
Ehrler v. Ehrler, 178 Cal. Rptr. 644, 647 (Ct. App. 1981) (same); Jaffe v. Carroll,
110 Cal. Rptr. 435, 438 (Ct. App. 1973) (same); Leo J. Meyberg Co. v. Bd. of
Trade, 342 P. 2d 395, 398 (Cal. App. 1959) (same); Stevens v. Dillon, 168 P.2d
492, 494 (Cal. App. 1946) (same); McClintock v. Robinson, 64 P. 2d 749, 752
(Cal. App. 1937) (same). The Restatement similarly defines a contract as "a
promise or a set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or
the performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty." RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1981) (emphasis added). For examples of
California opinions citing the Restatement definition, see Schaefer v. Williams,
19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 212, 213-14 (Ct. App. 1993) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 1); A-Mark Coin Co. v. General Mills, Inc., 195 Cal. Rptr. 859, 865
(Ct. App. 1983) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 cmt. f: "The word
'contract' connotes a promise creating a duty recognized by law."); Friedman v.
Jackson, 172 Cal. Rptr. 129, 132 (Ct. App. 1968) (same).
Promissory contract theory is rooted in the concepts of individual liberty
and freedom of contract. COLLINS, supra note 49, at 207 (commenting that the
"the ideal of individual liberty.., gives rise to a presumption that the parties
should be free to choose the terms of their contract"); Claude D. Rohwer, Termi-
nable-At-Will Employment: New Theories for Job Security, 15 PAC. L.J. 759, 759
(1984) ("According to the theory of freedom of contract, the sole purpose of con-
tract law is to enforce the bargain made by the parties."); CHARLES FRIED, CON-
TRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 19 (1981) (comment-
ing that "the promise principle was embraced as an expression of the principle
of liberty"); see also Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 384 (Cal.
1988) ("We begin by acknowledging the fundamental principle of freedom of
contract: employer and employee are free to agree to a contract terminable at
will or subject to limitations."); Tollefson v. Roman Catholic Bishop, 268 Cal.
Rptr. 550, 557 (Ct. App. 1990) (acknowledging this same point).
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will be heard to argue that the defendant failed to honor a
specific contractual commitment, the plaintiff is therefore re-
quired to show that the defendant assumed the specific com-
mitment (or "promise") in the first place. 4 0 To accomplish
this, the plaintiff must satisfy an affirmative evidentiary bur-
den to demonstrate that, based on the defendant's words or
conduct, a reasonable person would have believed the defend-
ant was promising to act or refrain from acting in a specific
way.481 In turn, this objective test is entirely consistent with
the fundamental notion that the realization of reasonable ex-
pectations induced by promises is the main purpose of con-
tract law.48 2 As explained by Professor Corbin:
480. The creation of an enforceable obligation is governed by statute in Cali-
fornia. California Civil Code § 1428 provides in pertinent part that: "An obliga-
tion arises from [either]: [ ] One-The contract of the parties; or, [ 1 Two-The
operation of law." CAL. CIv. CODE § 1428 (West 1982). "An obligation is a legal
duty, by which a person is bound to do or not to do a certain thing." Id. at
§ 1427. See also Kern v. Levolor Lorentzen, Inc., 899 F.2d 772, 784 (9th Cir.
1990) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) ("It is the most fundamental principle of con-
tract law that there can be no legally enforceable obligation without a promise,
a commitment to future behavior.").
481. See, e.g., Bianco v. H.F. Ahranson & Co., 897 F. Supp. 433, 440-41 (C.D.
Cal. 1995) (granting summary judgment and holding the plaintiff simply failed
td offer evidence demonstrating the defendant "promised, or made any commit-
ment, not to terminate [her] employment except upon good cause"); see also RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2(1) (1981) ("A promise is a manifestation
of intention to act or refrain from acting in a specified way, so made as to justify
a promisee in understanding that a commitment has been made.").
482. For an example of a California case commenting that an objective test is
used to determine whether a promise has been made, see Findleton v. Taylor,
25 Cal. Rptr. 439, 440 (Ct. App. 1962) (observing that "words which would be
understood by a reasonable person as importing a promise may establish a con-
tract despite the subjective intent of the party using them"). See also RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2 cmt. b (1981) ("The phrase 'manifestation of
intention' adopts an external or objective standard for interpreting conduct; it
means the external expression of intention as distinguished from undisclosed
intention. A promisor manifests an intention if he believes or has reason to
believe that the promisee will infer that intention from his words or conduct.");
1 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1:2, at 10 (4th
ed. 1990) ("[W]hether a manifestation of intention by the promisor rises to the
level of a promise is largely dependent upon how the promisee understands the
manifestation. That manifestation, however, is to be judged by an objective
standard."); § 1:3, at 15 ("[Tlhe nature of agreement requires a manifestation of
mutual assent, and the concept of manifestation generally requires an objective
indicium of mutual assent. This objective indicium may by evidenced by words
or any other conduct, including, in an appropriate case, silence."); COLLINS,
supra note 49, at 210 ("A contract has been concluded if a reasonable person
would infer from words and conduct that a decision to enter a contract had been
made."); VICTOR MORAWETZ, AN ESSAY ON THE ELEMENTS OF A CONTRACT AND A
STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES GovERNING ITS FORMATION § 2, at 11 (1926) ("Any
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The law does not attempt the realization of every expecta-
tion that has been induced by a promise; the expectation
must be a reasonable one. Under no system of law that
has ever existed are all promises enforceable. The expec-
tation must be one that most people would have; and the
promise must be one that most people would perform.48 3
The analysis prescribed by the Shapiro-Gerdlund doc-
trine comports with this basic rule of contract interpretation.
In a breach of employment contract action, the plaintiff typi-
cally claims that the defendant failed to honor a specific com-
mitment not to terminate the relationship without good
cause. What the Shapiro-Gerdlund doctrine says, in so many
words, is that once the parties have memorialized the terms
of their at will employment agreement in writing, the plain-
tiff has no right to assert a breach of contract action against
the defendant without evidence which would lead a reason-
able person to conclude that the defendant assumed a specific
obligation to provide the plaintiff with job security. 48 4 Thus,
communication to another party by words or acts sufficiently specifying an offer
or a promise or an agreement is an expression to such party of intent to make
the offer or the promise or to enter into the agreement if, in light of pertinent
facts, the act of making the communication reasonably indicates [to the other
party] that the communication is made with such intent and it appears that the
other party so understands it.").
483. CORBIN, supra note 479, § 1, at 2. Professor Corbin continues that-,
It must not be supposed that contract problems have been solved by
the dicta that expectations must be "reasonable." Reasonableness is no
more absolute in character than is justice or morality. Like them it is
an expression of customs and mores of men - the customs and mores
that are themselves complex, variable with time and place, inconsis-
tent and contradictory. Nevertheless, the term is useful, giving direc-
tion to judicial research, and producing workable results. The reason-
ably prudent [person], reasonable care and diligence, reasonable
expectations, are terms that are not to be abandoned, at least until we
can demonstrate that others will work better.
Id. § 1:1, at 4.
484. Some opinions appear to embrace a per se rule, that is, a rule prohibit-
ing implied-in-fact contracts as a matter of law where the plaintiff signs a writ-
ten at will agreement. See, e.g., Gianaculas v. TWA, 761 F.2d 1391, 1394-95
(9th Cir. 1985) (affirming summary judgment and holding that the plaintiffs' at
will employment applications foreclosed an implied-in-fact contract as a matter
of law without discussing whether or not the plaintiffs offered evidence demon-
strating an implied-in-fact contract). This is not a well reasoned approach to
the problem. As explained by Professor Corbin:
The statement is frequently found that where the parties have made
an express contract the law will not imply one. This is a misleading
statement, even though some truth is concealed within it. It is more
accurate, even though not very useful as a working rule to say that
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this test, which is also clearly objective, is simply another
way of asking whether the plaintiff satisfied the affirmative
burden to show that the defendant made the specific promise
in the first place.48 5 As one court put it, an at will "employee
cannot complain about a deprivation of the benefits of contin-
ued employment for the agreement never provided for a con-
tinuation of its benefits in the first instance."486
where the parties have made an express contract, the court should not
find a different one by "implication" concerning the same subject mat-
ter if the evidence does not justify an inference that they intended to
make one. Of course, even in the absence of any express promise or
contract, an implied promise or contract should not be found to exist
unless the conduct of the parties, under the existing circumstances,
makes such an inference or implication reasonable. But the fact that
an express contract has been made does not prevent the parties from
making another one tacitly, concerning the same subject matter or a
different one.
CORBIN, supra note 479, § 564 at 292-93 (emphasis added).
485. Professor Farnsworth suggests that this issue should be analyzed in
terms of whether there has been an "offer" as opposed to whether the plaintiff
has established an enforceable promise. FARNSWORTH, supra note 179, at
§ 3.15a, at 242 ("The initial problem for the court is to determine if the em-
ployer has made an offer of employment on other than an at-will basis."). Since
the analytical focus is essentially the same, the distinction between an offer and
a promise is not really material. Professor Farnsworth notes that: "In the typi-
cal special contract case, the employee claims that at the time of employment,
the employer gave assurances that the employment would be terminated only
for cause. Employees who have succeeded with such claims have met the re-
quirements of conventional reasoning, including a showing that the employee
reasonably understood the employer to be making such assurances." Id. (em-
phasis added).
486. Hejmadi v. AMFAC, Inc., 249 Cal. Rptr. 5, 17-18 (Ct. App. 1988); accord
Mundy v. Household Fin. Corp., 885 F.2d 542, 544 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting
Hejmadi); Camp v. Jeffer, Mangels, Butler & Marmaro, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 329,
335 (Ct. App. 1995) (same). The Hejmadi court added that "[tlo hold otherwise
... would constitute an unwarranted judicial intrusion upon the fundamental
public policy of this state as expressed in Labor Code § 2922 and dramatically
upset the reasonable expectations of the parties to an at-will agreement."
Hejmadi, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 18.
Courts have embraced this same analysis for the purpose of claims for
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. See, e.g., Mundy,
885 F.2d at 544-45 (commenting that the duty imposed by the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing depends largely on the parties' legitimate expecta-
tions); Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 389-90 (Cal. 1988) (same);
Slivinsky v. Watkins-Johnson Co., 270 Cal. Rptr. 585, 589 (Ct. App. 1990)
(same); Tollefson v. Roman Catholic Bishop, 268 Cal. Rptr. 550, 556 (Ct. App.
1990) (same); Sheppard v. Morgan Keegan & Co., 266 Cal. Rptr. 784, 786-87
(Ct. App. 1990); Anderson v. Savin Corp., 206 Cal. Rptr. 627, 631-32 (Ct. App.
1988) (holding that as a matter of law the plaintiff at will employee could not
have reasonably believed he would be employed indefinitely except for good
cause for termination, and affirming summary judgment against his claim for
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It should be noted that this rule serves distinct practical
concerns. Consider this scenario. Company X wants to hire
Y as an at will employee. Knowing that written at will agree-
ments have some inherent risk, what is X supposed to do?
The likely company response is that X will begin to take
measures necessary to avoid creating an implied-in-fact con-
tract, including, for example, revising the employee handbook
and rescinding the company's progressive discipline policy.
In this scenario, it is readily apparent that refusing to enforce
the agreement threatens to undermine the job security the
doctrine of implied-in-fact security terms was developed to
protect.48 7 As explained by Judge Spencer Letts in Cox v. Re-
silient Flooring Div. of Congoleum Corp. :488
The increasing necessity for terminating employees at all
levels has caused forward-thinking employers to address
not only the perceived requirements of law, but also the
ethical requirements imposed by basic institutional fair-
ness and good business practice. Courts should not think
that the policies of the major corporations, which are so
often before them by virtue of alleged breach, are the
norm in the business world at large. It may be that courts
are seeing mainly the leaders. [In this sense], the inter-
ests of society are not served when judge-made law, the
product of well-intentioned desire to achieve social justice,
steps in front of those to whom the law applies and who
are already leading the way in the same direction. To do
so is to punish the leaders and reward the hindmost, when
the better judicial course would be to assure that the lag-
gards do not lag too far behind.8 9
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing); Gerdlund v. Elec-
tronic Dispensers Intl, 235 Cal. Rptr. 279, 286-87 (Ct. App. 1987) (holding that
it was error for the trial court to instruct the jury on the plaintiffs claim for
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing because the plain-
tiff was an at will employee, and explaining that the implied covenant only pro-
tects the legitimate expectations of the parties to the agreement); Brandt v.
Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 201 Cal. Rptr. 746, 748-49 (Ct. App. 1984) (ex-
plaining that the duty imposed by the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing depends in large measure on the parties' legitimate expectations).
487. See generally Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 920-22 (Ct.
App. 1981).
488. 638 F. Supp. 726 (C.D. Cal. 1986).
489. Id. at 739 (emphasis added). Accord Van Komen v. Montgomery Ward
& Co., 638 F. Supp. 739, 742 (C.D. Cal. 1986) ("Punishing an employer for
granting its employees a 'second bite of the apple' when it was not required to
do so inevitably raises the question whether it is wise ever to adopt such 'second
bite' policies."). See also Davis v. Consolidated Freightways, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d
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B. A Brief Word on Integration
While the issue of integration has been dispositive in a
number of opinions, this narrow focus was not always appro-
priate in cases where the plaintiff was attempting to estab-
lish an implied-in-fact agreement with evidence of postexecu-
tion words or conduct. By its express terms, the parol
evidence rule applies to evidence of prior or contemporaneous
agreements.4 9 ° More fundamentally, although courts have
long dispensed with the traditional "four-corners-of-the-docu-
ment test,"49 ' the integration analysis still centers on evi-
dence of the parties' contractual intent at the time the agree-
ment was executed. As noted by the Haggard court: "In
determining the intent of the parties regarding whether the
written agreement is integrated, the court must attempt to
place itself in the same situation in which the parties found
themselves at the time of contracting."492 If one thing has
become clear, however, it is that the reasonable expectation
inquiry contemplates evidence relating to the complete em-
ployment relationship or "totality" of the circumstances.
Courts restricting their analysis to the issue of integration
a~e missing this important point. Whether the underlying
contract is a complete and final expression of the parties'
agreement is not the critical issue, but instead, whether
taken together with the written at will agreement, all of the
438, 445 (Ct. App. 1994) (affirming summary judgment and rejecting the plain-
tiffs evidence of a progressive discipline policy as immaterial, because if rele-
vant, "an employer would be forced purposely to terminate employees for any
and every infraction - or none at all - in order to maintain the presumption of
at- will employment."); Wood v. Loyola Marymount Univ., 267 Cal. Rptr. 230,
236 (Ct. App. 1990) (Compton, J., dissenting) ("The suggestion in some recent
court decisions that somehow a binding contract of employment can be 'implied'
by nothing more than satisfactory performance by the employee and praise and
promotion by the employer stands traditional concepts on their heads and will
discourage employers from praising or promoting employees for fear that in do-
ing so they are locking themselves into a binding contract which neither party
ever contemplated.").
490. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1856(a) (West 1983).
491. Masterson v. Sine, 436 P.2d 561, 563-67 (Cal. 1968) (rejecting the tradi-
tional rule that the terms of the parties' written agreement are dispositive on
the issue of integration).
492. Haggard v. Kimberly Quality Care, Inc., 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16, 22 (Ct.
App.1995). Accord Gerdlund v. Electronic Dispensers Int'l, 235 Cal. Rptr. 279,
282 (Ct. App. 1987).
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plaintiffs evidence demonstrates a reasonable expectation of
job security.493
V. CONCLUSION
In Brawthen v. H & R Block, Inc.,494 the defendant not
only had the plaintiff sign an agreement which was silent on
the grounds for termination, but later issued a written state-
ment promising employees job security.495 In Wood v. Loyola
Mayrnount Univ.,496 the defendant notified employees that
they were employed on a year-to-year basis but then sent
these same employees a memo stating that employment with
the university was "continuous," subject to the parties' mu-
tual satisfaction.49 v In Panopulos v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp.,498 the defendant had a published "Creed" promising
employees "stability of employment to the greatest practical
extent."499 Although this sort of scenario is becoming in-
creasingly rare, employers and employees are likely to con-
tinue litigating breach of contract claims for a number of
years to come. Recognizing this, some principled discussion
about the scope and mechanics of the Shapiro-Gerdlund doc-
trine would seem to be in order. Reasonable expectation con-
tract theory is one direction that this discussion might take.
493. Haggard may encourage implied-in-fact modification arguments. Note,
however, that for this same reason, the implied-in-fact modification issue does
not require any discrete analysis. The implied-in-fact modification inquiry fo-
cuses on evidence relating to the parties' relationship after the written agree-
ment was executed. This, of course, is entirely consistent with the comprehen-
sive analysis required by the Shapiro-Gerdlund doctrine. The issue is
essentially redundant. For examples of California opinions addressing the im-
plied-in-fact modification issue outside of the employment context, see Garrison
v. Edward Brown & Sons, 154 P.2d 377, 379-81 (Cal. 1944) (holding that there
was no implied modification of the parties' written contract because the parties'
conduct was consistent with the terms of the agreement); Daugherty Co. v.
Kimberly-Clark Corp., 92 Cal. Rptr. 120, 124 (Ct. App. 1971) (reversing sum-
mary judgment in an action to foreclose a mechanic's lien and for compensation
because there was a triable issue of material fact relating to whether the par-
ties' conduct modified their written agreement).
494. 104 Cal. Rptr. 486 (Ct. App. 1972).
495. Id. at 488.
496. 267 Cal. Rptr. 230 (Ct. App. 1990).
497. Id. at 231-32.
498. 264 Cal. Rptr. 810 (Ct. App. 1989).
499. Id. at 813.

